THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME IS EXPERIENCING A DIFFICULT TIME

© PIR CENTER

PIR Center: When the international nuclear nonproliferation regime backed by the IAEA system of safeguards was established in the 1960s it was clear that in view of the regime’s non-comprehensive nature (existence of nuclear haves and have-nots, deficiencies in the then extant system of safeguards, etc.) the world community would be facing many challenges in combating the risks of nuclear proliferation and that there was a danger of its getting out of control. Do you think that, overall, the world community has a basically sound nonproliferation regime capable of further improvement? And if not, is the regime in need of a radical reform?

Mohamed ElBaradei: I think it is fair to say that the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - and the nuclear non-proliferation regime it supports - has in most respects been a remarkable success. Under the NPT bargain, an overwhelming majority of States have chosen to renounce the nuclear weapons option, in exchange for assistance in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful applications, and a commitment by the five recognized nuclear weapons States to work toward nuclear disarmament. Verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played a vital role in the success of this regime.

But it is also true that at times flaws in the regime have become apparent, and it is clear that the regime is presently under stress. It is not my view that we could have anticipated all these sources of stress in the late 1960s, when the regime was being established. Rather, I would say that it is logical that any such regime must be adapted, from time to time, to maintain currency with new realities and emerging threats.

In the 1990s, we went through one such adaptation. Revelations regarding Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, together with the IAEA’s discovery of the failure by the DPRK to implement its NPT safeguards agreement, underlined the importance of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. This led to the establishment of a new mechanism, referred to as the ‘additional protocol,’ under which States gave the IAEA greater rights of access to facilities and information, to enable the Agency to provide assurance not only regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It is the responsibility of each NPT State to conclude this ‘additional protocol’ with the Agency.

One fault of the current system is that this strengthened safeguards system is far from universal. Out of the 189 NPT States, 47 remain without a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, and additional protocols have only entered into force for 37 States. This clearly is unacceptable. If the IAEA is to be able to perform its responsibilities, it must be given the corresponding authority.

Any instances of NPT States pursuing clandestine nuclear programmes are clearly a matter of great concern to everyone. It is therefore important for the international community - including the UN Security Council - to take, and be perceived as taking, effective action in dealing with any offenders. Another focus for international concern has been the lack of progress towards internationally verifiable nuclear disarmament, and the impact of that lack of progress on the perception of the NPT bargain. In a nutshell, in my view it is essential for all parties to the NPT - both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States - to meet both the letter and the spirit of their commitments. And the international community undoubtedly also wants to see progress made on persuading the three countries that remain outside of the NPT - India, Israel, and Pakistan - to join the universal effort to combat proliferation and to move towards nuclear disarmament.

While these concerns make it clear that reforms and changes in approach are needed, I think many elements of the regime are essentially sound, and that we should retain and build on the NPT foundation. There is a growing consensus that more can be done to adapt the regime to fit current realities. For example, we are reconsidering the feasibility of limiting certain ‘sensitive’ fuel cycle operations, such as plutonium separation and uranium enrichment, to international centres under multinational control - in order to place greater controls on access to nuclear material directly usable in nuclear weapons. These and other ideas should be considered that would help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, while ensuring that nuclear technology remains available for peaceful applications.

PIR Center: Why the accession by states to the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements is proceeding at such a low pace and what, in your view, is required to accelerate this process?

Mohamed ElBaradei: As I said earlier, it has been disappointing to see the slow rate at which NPT States are bringing into force safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In particular, the 70 States that have significant nuclear activities - and in particular those whose capabilities encompass the entire nuclear fuel cycle - have a special responsibility to bring these agreements into force, to ensure transparency and to provide confidence, through IAEA verification, that their nuclear activities are peaceful in nature.

The Agency has analysed the obstacles that may delay States in taking steps to conclude additional protocols. For some developing countries with little or no nuclear activities, there may be little awareness of the role that strengthened safeguards plays in nuclear non-proliferation and international security. On the other hand, for a number of the countries with a more comprehensive fuel cycle, there may be political considerations that lead to a delay in submitting to the more intrusive verification provided for under the additional protocol. In still other cases, delays are caused by technical or even administrative factors.

Both the Agency and many individual Member States have accelerated their outreach activities to help States overcome such obstacles. Over the past year, we have seen some increase in the rate of States adhering to and concluding additional protocols. I remain hopeful that this rate of improvement will increase, as the need for universal adherence to the strengthened safeguards regime becomes a matter of increasing international focus.

PIR Center: There are still fundamental differences among many experts about ways of further developing nuclear energy, the use of MOX-fuel, waste management, etc., which have been underscored by the recent interdisciplinary MIT study “The Future of Nuclear Power”. At the same time, it is widely recognized that nuclear energy is an important option for meeting future energy needs without emitting carbon dioxide and other atmospheric pollutants. Can the Agency play the role of a focal point in bringing together those different approaches in the interest of establishing a common international policy in the exercise of nuclear energy based on better economics, greatly improved safety, fully successful waste management and low or zero proliferation risk?

Mohamed ElBaradei: Your question is complex, and I need to answer it in two parts. First, yes, it is certainly part of the IAEA’s role to serve as a focal point of discussion, information exchange, and concrete action on nuclear energy. We seek to ensure that the environmental benefits of nuclear power are broadly understood, and that comparisons of nuclear to other sources of energy are fair and balanced. We also promote technological innovation - under our International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and other projects - with a view to enhancing safety and security, inhibiting proliferation risk, reducing waste, and improving economic competitiveness. We are committed to ensuring, through these efforts, that nuclear energy remains available in the future as a viable source of energy generation for those States that choose to use it.

However, it is also clear that views in the international community - and among IAEA Member States - are divided on the merits of nuclear power. It is not the role of the Agency to push nuclear power or any other nuclear technology on a State that does not seek it. Our role is to assist those States who have decided to make use of peaceful nuclear technologies by assisting them in like quality assurance, safety, security, etc. We, however, seek to promote a more extensive dialogue on nuclear issues among government leaders, non-governmental organizations, and the public at large, because we believe that by raising awareness of the benefits of nuclear technologies - both nuclear power and other applications - we can enrich the collective search for solutions to some of the problems, environmental and otherwise, that our planet is facing. A recent example would be the idea I referred to earlier - reconsidering the merits of bringing certain sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle under international control.

PIR Center: What role the IAEA could play in helping and advancing the programme of the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction established by G-8?

Mohamed ElBaradei: Well, first of all it is up to the Global Partnership to decide whether to invite the IAEA to undertake any additional activities. We would certainly be willing to assist in our areas of competence. Some possible areas of engagement are:

PIR Center: How does the DG assess the results and decisions of the last session of the Agency’s General Conference?

Mohamed ElBaradei: I would have to say that I was very pleased by the responses of our Member States at the General Conference last month. This has clearly been a challenging year, particularly in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, and the Agency has been operating somewhat in the international spotlight. And Member States overwhelmingly expressed their appreciation and support for the Agency’s efforts. One mark of confidence was the approval of an increase of approximately 10% in the Agency’s overall budget - at a time when many international organizations are having their budgets slashed. For me, it was noteworthy that despite the complexity of a number of situations in the area of nuclear safeguards, IAEA Member States remain committed to working together to find solutions to these issues - and also remain unified in their support of a strong and effective Agency verification regime.

I also found it gratifying that, while the needs and priorities of IAEA Member States vary widely, broad support was expressed not only for safeguards, but for all our areas of activity. Member States were strongly supportive of the INPRO project I mentioned earlier, as well as of IAEA efforts to improve nuclear facility safety and to promote universal adherence to uniform nuclear and radiation safety standards. We were encouraged to continue our expanded efforts to assist Member States in improving nuclear security - including the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the detection of illicit trafficking and the control of radioactive sources. And hearty appreciation was voiced from many quarters for Agency efforts to assist Member States in using nuclear technologies to address a broad range of development issues - related, for example, to human health, water resource management, and food safety and productivity.