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NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT WILL BECOME A PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR THE AUTHORITIES ARMS CONTROL & SECURITY LETTERS # 11(155), November 2004 Nikolai Spassky © PIR CENTER In this article, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai N. Spassky discusses the key issues behind the efforts to develop a new Russian National Security Concept. The Security Council staff, together with the interested agencies (especially from the security block), began work on a new national security concept for the Russian Federation. This matter has been touched on by the secretary of the Security Council Igor Ivanov several times during his recent interviews. In the beginning of November 2004, the first roundtable on this topic was held at Moscow State University. But I believe that for a start one has to understand what we are discussing. This June, on the advice of the Security Council, the President of the Russian Federation requested the introduction of changes into the Russian national security concept. In the beginning, we really thought that we could make do by just amending the already existing document. Now, we are speaking about the development of a principally new document, not just a new edition, but about drafting a principally new document, one that deals with principally new tasks. We expect this work to be finalized in the coming spring. Let us, for a beginning, try to sum up why a new national security concept for Russia is needed, and what we are expecting from this document. What tasks, in our view, should it solve? First of all, that which we can all see and understand: it is perfectly obvious that over the recent years there have been fundamental changes in the outside world and within this country. Let us begin with Russia. In general, the following is the majority view on the situation in our staff, inside the government and the presidential administration: it is that he period of extremely difficult transition that has characterized the previous years in Russia is, essentially, over. The country has attained significant political and economic stability. When we are speaking about stabilization in this country, we are most of all speaking about the political sphere and the current economic sphere and current economic indicators. I would like to provide you with some basic numbers, which truly characterize the results of the first term President Vladimir Putin. For example, gold and foreign currency reserves have grown 3.8 times since 2000: they were 25 billion USD and are now 117,1 billion USD. The pace of the GDP growth in the country in these years is well known. Last year, it was 7.3%. For the first 9 months of this year, compared to the same period last year, growth is 6.9%. The situation is the same in investment. In 2004, we expect that the economy of the Russian Federation will enjoy 13.5 billion USD in direct investments. This is 3 times more then in the year 2000. Again, if we are to call things what they are, this is incredibly low compared to the situation between the United States and China, not to speak of the scale of interaction between the leading Western countries. But all that is to be seen in the dynamics: if we compare this situation with that which existed a few years ago, when despite of all the declarations and memoranda of understanding there was almost no real direct investment in the Russian economy, now there is. This is a very real and fundamental change. The situation is the same in the field of the real income of the population: here we are also observing considerable and, what is especially important, sustainable growth. Over the first nine months of this year, growth in the real income of the people has reached 9.8 %. Finally, it is worth mentioning that within the total population, the proportion of those who have incomes lower than the minimum standard of living has decreased. Again, if we compare 2000 and 2004, then in this time the proportion of this group of the population has decreased from 27% to 21%. Definitely, these are good results and good indicators. Nonetheless, if we take the fundamental tendencies and processes in the economy and in the social sphere, then, sadly, the situation is significantly more serious. In the economic sphere, one of the basic problems is the low level of the diversification of the Russian economy, especially our exports. Just look at one number, in the same period between 2000 and 2004 the proportion of the fuel and energy complex in Russian exports grew from 49% to 54.5%. Another figure is in the social sphere: this is the income gap between the richest 10% of the people and the poorest 10%. As is well known, this indicator is considered one of the basic tools for estimating the social stability of any societal organism. Although there are various valuations, the ratio of 1:10 is, as a rule, considered the maximum acceptable limit. In Russia in 2000 this ratio was 1:13.9. Today, this autumn, this ratio is 1:15. What is the use of this collection of figures? There was one goal - to show that the picture is very mixed, and that we need to take into consideration this diversity when devising the new national security concept. In any case, one can argue on the substance of this stage, but, judging by our preliminary consultations, which we conducted in 2004, almost everyone agrees about one thing: the country has truly come to a principally new stage in its development. The main objectives of this stage have been set in the last Presidential address to the Federal Assembly. They are: the doubling of the GDP of the country within a decade; reducing poverty; increasing the standard of living of the people; and the modernization of the armed forces. To this we can add, although it is of another order and is related to the political sphere, but it has the same level of importance: the formation of a normal, functioning party system. The tasks are complex, and demand the exertion of not only all of the government’s strength, but also all the strength of our nation. Realizing this agenda in a regular fashion will require the government to have a clear strategy of action, of what is to be done. Next, the situation in the world. Here the major and fundamental change we have had is before everyone’s eyes. The threat of terrorism has come to the forefront. Today this already seems obvious, even banal; but some 4 or 5 years ago, if the threat of terrorism was present at all in such documents, than it was in the fifth or seventh place, in the same place with organized crime. However, the changes in the world situation cannot be reduced to only the rise of the terrorist threat. We can say that the system of inter-state relations that began to emerge after the end of the Cold war has, more-or-less, taken a clear shape. The system of threats, challenges, and risks that human-kind is facing has also become clear. In the first place, I would put three threats that are sufficiently of the same level and sufficiently interrelated. These are: terrorism, the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal migration. These are serious problems, which we, unfortunately, underrate. We should not forget about organized crime and narco-trafficking, because there is currently a fusion between terrorism and organized crime occurring, (this occurred earlier, only now it is all the stronger and more dangerous), which is supplying money. Further, the configuration of force in the world has, more-or-less come, together, the tendencies can be seen. Of course, we are talking about the current period. We see a sufficiently serious tendency towards multipolarity, but at the same time, we also see that together with this is the manifest and clear aspiration of a concrete great-power, the one possessing the most meaningful strength - the United States. I would like to say a few words about the situation in our close neighbors on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Here again, there is a mixed picture, because, on the one hand, we see the sprouts of normal, healthy integration, that which, unfortunately, was lacking for the better part of the 1990’s. The current integration is not developing within the framework of the CIS, but more often at the bilateral level, or within the framework of sufficiently concrete and narrow groups. But what is principally important, is that this has a practical foundation beneath it. On the other hand, we can see on our TV screens that in a number of the former Soviet states there is still serious instability. “Potential for instability” - because this potential presupposes that at a critical moment this instability may splash over. For understandable reasons, I will not give any examples, but they are sufficiently obvious to us all. There is another aspect concerning the former Soviet space. This is the growth in the presence of the United States and NATO. One cannot say that Russia sees a threat in this. But this is the new reality, which requires us to take it into consideration and to properly react. That is to say, in these four years (or a little more, depending on what one takes as the point of departure), serious changes have occurred. All of this has to be evaluated and accounted for within the new concept. So, how do we see the national security concept of Russia, what kind of document should it be? First of all, it is to be the honest document, which truly reflects the situation in Russia and the world. Second, this document should have a clear, practical orientation. Unfortunately, Russia, like a majority of other countries in the world, does not have a tradition of formulating national security concepts. The National Security Act was adopted in United States in 1947: the United States has over fifty years of experience in formulating their national interests and forming national security concepts. Therefore I can openly say that when we started this work, we had to deal with the most unexpected problems, because we simply had to clarify what a national security concept is in general, what kind of document it is, and what role should it play. Who should generate this document, and to whom should it be addressed. Here, probably, it would be fitting to repeat one more banal remark, which, unfortunately, is sometimes forgotten. Whether a national security concept is a strategy or a doctrine, because there are definite nuances between them, in any case, national security documents are documents with which the authorities address civil society. The authorities explain to society what they are planning to do. This is a document with which the President goes to the country and says how he sees the ensuring of national security in the period ahead. Therefore, in essence, this document should formulate the tasks, the resolution of which stand before the country in the next historical period. This document should become the core of a whole system of programmatic documents that are to be drafted and adopted in the coming years. There is no secret in the fact that in recent years our country has adopted an enormous number of different conceptual documents. These are various concepts, doctrines, and basic government policies; if one made a list of such documents, it would take up several pages of small print (and this is only documents adopted at the governmental level, not even speaking of those at the departmental level). The majority of these documents are no longer operational; therefore, the very first requirement the President gave us in the development of this concept, was to build a normal, working system of strategic documents defining the life of the Russian state. Another principal aspect. Yes, with this document the authorities address society, but on the other hand, this document is also addressed to the authorities themselves. The authorities are addressing themselves, since this document should become a program of action for the authorities, according to which they are going to regulate their concrete decisions and steps. There is still one more principal aspect: this document should be understandable to the world, because Russia is interested in being correctly understood in the world, most of all by our friends and partners. We are interested in having no misunderstandings when this document is read; that is why I can clearly state that it will be published as an open document. We will do our best to make sure it is written in normal, understandable Russian, with sufficiently short sentences, not half a page long. Finally, its length will be guided by common sense. We will try to keep this document to 35-40 pages, because experience tells us that an ordinary person who is interested in politics, but who is not an expert, simply will not read a long document. It is easy to explain our interests in working together with civil society. Such a document, as it is viewed by the President and as he gave the task to us, can only be developed in cooperation with civil society. We have already started large-scale consultations with civil society. The key role in the system of these consultations will be played by the series of round tables on various aspects, as well as themes and methodologies. Thus we already conducted the first roundtable at Moscow State University. The next we are planning to dedicate to economic security because, unfortunately, this is one of the principal topics which we have generally under-evaluated. We also plan to conduct a number of roundtables on methodological approaches, because much remains unclear, and on military security and the military-industrial complex. Overall, it is a sufficiently long and complex system. We do not have too much time, but nevertheless, we do have several months. The work before us is truly large and complex. And I want to repeat that this is not only due to the ambiguous and complex nature of the changes going on in our country and in the world. To a significant degree, these complexities are connected to the genre of the document itself. In state service we do not criticize our predecessors. Nonetheless, one has to acknowledge (such basic things should be acknowledged and spoken of in open texts), that the previous concept has played a positive role, because, in essence, this was the Russian Federation’s first attempt in this genre. Nevertheless we have to acknowledge that, in general, the concept has not resolved its main tasks, and from this viewpoint, the past years have been lost. It was too separated from real life and too scientifically formulated. I just want to give one example, because, in my view, this example is the most direct way to characterize the differences between that which we have, and that which we are trying to do. I do not say “what we will do” because, as they say, God willing; we want to come to that document that the country needs. Practically on each page of the former concept we can see such formulations as: “the state must facilitate the establishment of equal conditions for the development” or “in a short timeframe mechanisms to support the sustainable life and economic development of the crisis regions of the Far North should be developed.” These are completely defective formulations because when the state writes for itself that “the state should” or “measures should be developed,” who will develop them. The distinctive feature of this document is that the authorities, or more concretely - the President, will concretely say what it will do, so that later, civil society can ask it, was this accomplished or not. I could continue to speak on this problem, but I will close on this. I want to say again that this is not just a polite phrase - we are truly interested in an inflow of ideas and in practical joint work in the most normal manner. Therefore, there will be concrete meetings to work on the text. Any help, any practical participation will be accepted with gratitude. Nikolai Spassky - Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation BOUT THE NEWSLETTER This newsletter is published every month (except for January and August). It is dedicated to the problems of WMD proliferation, megaterrorism, arms control, nuclear energy, military technical cooperation, and global security. Statements of fact and opinion expressed in this newsletter are responsibility of authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the PIR Center. This newsletter and all the information herein is a subject to the copyright and may be reprinted fully or in part only with written compliance from the PIR Center. The publication of this newsletter is supported by the Ploughshares Fund.
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