NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

© PIR CENTER

There is increasing discussion of late regarding questions related to the role and place of nuclear deterrence policy in the contemporary world, as well as the prospects for its use. These questions have also been considered within the framework of Russian-American relations.

The preparation and then the signing of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty further accelerated this discussion.

While the Russian and U.S. delegations worked on the text of the treaty, adjusted its provisions, and searched for points in common and mutually acceptable compromises, experts actively formed their own versions of the treaty, evaluated the prospects for the further development of Russian and U.S. strategic weapons, and determined their possible quantitative and qualitative parameters. The poignancy of such research was aggravated by a number of essential factors. On the one hand, there was the U.S. declaration of withdrawal from the 1972 INF treaty and of plans to implement the large-scale development of antimissile systems in the immediate future-by 2004-2005-as well as the attempt to realize not real, but “virtual” reductions in offensive weapons by means of the adoption of the concept of “operationally deployed nuclear warheads.” On the other hand, there was Russia’s difficult economic position, and the hardships and challenges faced by its armed forces and military-industrial complex.

Many opinions, at times in direct opposition to each other, were expressed. This can probably be explained by the fact that questions relating to strategic weapons reduction and the development of antimissile systems are not only important but interest the public at large.

I believe that today we are participants in a “qualitative jump” in both the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. New forms of such deterrence are appearing, such as deterrence by threatening not the use of, but merely the acquisition of nuclear weapons. And not only direct military action is being deterred, but also political and economic pressure.

Thus we can conclude that we will not part with nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. We must live with them, but live in accordance with strict rules, elaborated collectively by the entire global community.

Here is precisely the value of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, in our view. Its signature emphatically signaled the need for firm rules of behavior, as well as for stability and continuity in the policies of the leading nuclear powers, in the sphere of nuclear weapons.

Of course, problems in the sphere of the reduction and limitation of strategic weapons cannot disappear in a moment. We will have to continue to work to reduce the nuclear danger for a rather long time. But, probably, one of the most essential moments of this process will be that at long last we have abandoned the concept of the “quantitative parity” of nuclear forces, and have ceased counting individual warheads and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and scrupulously comparing missile throw weights and ranges.

We understood that national security is not only obtained by mountains of weapons

(which, incidentally, swiftly become obsolete thanks to the accelerating scientific and technical revolution, and the breakthroughs in one or other sphere or another that occur on nearly a daily basis), but by the entire capacity of each country.

Although they remain a most important part of the provision of national security, nuclear weapons, in our view, have ceased nevertheless to be its sole guarantee. Humanity now has a great deal to lose in the blaze of a nuclear war. The contemporary world has become too complex and interdependent for such a conflict, even were it to be a local nuclear conflict, not to reverberate practically in all countries and upon all peoples. Any rational politician would find the losses to economic, ecological, humanitarian and other aspects of our civilization that would result from such a conflict to be unequivocally unacceptable. All the more so, since there have been many examples of catastrophes and crises that have been far smaller in their consequences and qualitatively different and yet have proven similarly unacceptable. For instance, there was the economic crisis in the late 1990s in Southeast Asia, the Chernobyl NPP accident, and the SARS epidemic. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, also showed the danger and depth of consequences to such acts.

It has become obvious that strengthening strategic stability cannot be conflated with consolidating and strengthening nuclear deterrence policy. On the contrary, a reduction in the role of the nuclear element in providing security could occur only after the substitution of other, primarily nonmilitary, elements. This decrease became possible only as a result of a fundamental change in the nature of international relations brought about by the nuclear powers, primarily Russia and the United States, re-examining a number of the strategic elements in their general policies.

Today much is said about the need to abandon the concept of nuclear deterrence in Russian-American relations. It is generally argued that the concept belongs to the “Cold War” era and, therefore, must be rejected. However, let us consider: is it possible to reject this concept, i.e., is it possible to actually exclude the fear of nuclear weapons from our lives?

This fear can only be eradicated when nuclear weapons are destroyed. But can we say today that nuclear weapons might forever disappear from our lives? That, having reached the current level of development, we will forego nuclear weapons, and that no one, no terrorist or dictator, will ever want to create such a weapon anew in order to use it to dictate his conditions to the world?

This scenario is unlikely. Most likely, we will be forced to preserve some minimum level of nuclear weapons, just as we preserve strains of pathogenic bacteria and viruses like anthrax and smallpox. Without such collections we cannot create effective vaccines against this danger and new, similar dangers.

These circumstances are all the more important today, as we anxiously watch the revival of a new type of nuclear element in global politics, and the return of these weapons to the foreground of world developments.

These developments include the attempt of the United States, during its preparations for the second war in Iraq, to legitimize possible applications of tactical nuclear weapons, as, in its opinion, extreme yet unavoidable methods of fighting such enemies as Usama Ben-Laden or Saddam Hussein. It also includes the attempt of North Korea to conduct a type of nuclear blackmail of the global community in an effort to ensure its security and the preservation of the current regime. In this unique Korean “nuclear deterrence,” there is not so much a threatened use of nuclear weapons that really exist, as the possibility of their creation in the near or not-so-near future.

At the same time, many other non-nuclear countries, observing the methods by which the United States is attempting to achieve its goals in its relationship with them and the way the tone of the dialog between the Americans and India and Pakistan changed after the latter’s acquisition of nuclear status, have begun to think about their own entrance into the “nuclear club.” The form of entering this club, as the North Korean example suggests, can vary.

As for the future of nuclear deterrence in Russian-American relations, one can certainly point to many technical yet familiar terms, refer to the work of scholars and the statements of political figures, or cite the “classics of the nuclear era.” Such discourse, however, might well be intelligible only to a comparatively small circle of specialists who do not need these explanations. Instead, a rather straightforward analogy should elucidate this very complex question far more simply.

Figuratively speaking, we have already left a “nuclear dead end” and are traveling along a new road. The current system of agreements for the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is, if we continue our analogy, a “road map” of nuclear policy showing that “nuclear traffic lanes” on this road have become somewhat narrower and are no longer priority lanes for fast vehicles. At the same time, the good quality surface of these lanes, clear markings, and intelligible traffic rules prevent unskilled or excessively reckless drivers from slipping off the road into a ditch or getting into an accident, including one with catastrophic consequences for the majority if not all other drivers. Besides the fact that the “nuclear lane” is a reliable and proven path to maintaining one’s security, it provides a good example to those constructing and repairing all other traffic lanes to similarly strengthen road surfaces and produce intelligible and acceptable rules of the road.

This, essentially, is how the value of nuclear weapons in contemporary global life is determined. And one should clearly recognize that nuclear weapons are unlikely to disappear from face of the earth, at least in the foreseeable future. The possibility of their threatened use will not disappear, and, consequently, the natural fear that they cause. Therefore, nuclear deterrence based on mutual fear will not go away either.

But we face a peculiar paradox. The nuclear factor, which for a long time led to confrontation and to a worsening in relations, mutual suspicion and distrust, is now working in exactly the opposite direction. This is primarily true not in the relations between countries that are members of the “nuclear club,” but between countries that are striving, both de facto and de jure, to join this club.

Threats and dangers exist until individuals and countries, and even humanity as a whole, perceive them and become afraid. Fear is a very strong and dangerous feeling that is further aggravated by ignorance or incomprehension.

When we feel ourselves threatened, at least potentially, by one or another process or weapons system, we fear it. Therefore even defensive weapons, particularly those that not only ensure the protection of the possessing state from external attack but also provide a sort of “impunity” in the case of various actions, cannot but give rise to completely natural fears.

Too much here depends on subjective factors, such as the particular leaders of states and their mutual relations. As former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara correctly said, not one rational, cool-headed political or military leader is likely to resort to nuclear weapons first. But political and military leaders at moments of sharp crises are neither rational, nor cool-headed.

Surely, it is best to avoid conflicts. The best way is by reliance on negotiations, dialogue, clarification of one’s position to one’s partner, and close attention to others’ points of view. The existence of concrete, legally binding agreements is one way to guarantee that many dangers and threats will be averted.

To be sure, any treaty borne as a result of complex negotiations cannot but be a mutual compromise. Thus, as expectable, the SORT treaty was unable to address all possible issues related to strategic stability, issues that had been discussed in Russian society for a long time. For example, questions of space weapons, antisubmarine warfare, and high-precision weapons were not addressed. However, we continue to be concerned with all of these questions and discussions on these topics will continue, in particular within the framework of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security chaired by the Russian foreign and defense ministers and the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, which was created by the two countries as stipulated in the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship.

One of the most important aspects of this treaty is that it represents a truly new type of agreement, a “post-Cold War” agreement.

During the U.S.-Russian negotiations a new type of negotiating process was elaborated, together with new negotiating principles that can serve as an example and a basis for the formation of Russia’s relations with other states-with nuclear states, first and foremost. This process is directed toward the solution of concrete problems within concrete time periods set by political leaders, and is not aggravated by tunnel vision, mutual distrust, or obsolete approaches.

Oriented toward rejecting Cold War principles, we did not strive for any sort of “bargain,” or linkage between positions adopted by our negotiating partners in one sphere with concessions in another, but instead based our approach on respect for each other’s position. Taking into account our many years of negotiating experience in the area of strategic weapons reduction, we understood perfectly well that the old negotiating process, based on the negotiating partners’ advancement of deliberately high demands and the gradual decrease of these demands to a mutually acceptable level-even though it led to positive results-did so only with great difficulty and after a very long time. Clearly recognizing that success in this important sphere would allow us to advance more rapidly in other areas as well, we firmly charted a course towards the obligatory attainment of a positive result.

We have rejected the principle of a “quantitative parity” of strategic armaments, and have made our chief concern a new qualitative parameter of state power, strategic offensive potential, or the capabilities, reserves, and other possible means that could be used to solve particular strategic problems.

This term, strategic offensive potential, appeared in the name of the treaty,

^{and is the result of a compromise achieved in the course of negotiations during the process of developing a common concept of reductions. Within the SORT framework, it combines warheads, delivery systems, and everything that determines the capabilities of strategic offensive armaments to solve a variety of problems. Of course, this term opens up the possibility of a fairly wide and ambiguous interpretation of the spirit and letter of the treaty. On the other hand, however, it also makes it possible for participating countries to display and prove its adherence to radical and irreversible reductions of strategic weapons. Thus, we found a mutually acceptable compromise, making it possible for us to continue the process of reducing the nuclear threat, since the very name of the document, in which the term "strategic offensive potential" appeared for the first time, made it possible for us to place emphasis on that aspect of our approaches that we hold in common, while putting off the resolution of exacting questions until they can be handled by the Bilateral Implementation Commission, which is to be created under the terms of the treaty.}

Nuclear weapons have always been, are, and will remain strategic weapons. They are strategic in the sense that they are used to solve strategic and national-level problems, to achieve the goals of wars, and ensure strategic stability.

In sum, the distinctive feature of the new SORT treaty is that it answers basic questions about the future development of strategic weapons, determining their levels and the time frame for the further reduction of both parties’ nuclear forces. Nevertheless, practically all of the mechanisms for strategic weapons reduction and monitoring remain as they were in the START I Treaty. This is the real agreement ensuring the extension and continuity of the processes of limiting strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, its format, which differs from the format of the START I and START II agreements, is determined by the current state of Russian-U.S. relations and global military-political circumstances, as well as by the entire history of the development of the negotiating process involved. This history began 30 years ago with the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), reached on July 1, 1972, which stopped the quantitative growth of strategic weapons by both parties. Afterwards, there were other agreements and treaties, SALT II, START I, and START II, that allowed us to reduce considerably the level of nuclear confrontation. We traveled a long way during those years, not only developing mechanisms and procedures for reductions, but also altering the perception of the role and place of nuclear weapons in our relations and in guaranteeing global strategic stability. True, there were losses: the START II treaty which, in my view, became the object of political horse-trading in both Russia and the United States, was overloaded in the nine years after its signature with a pile of conditions and requirements, until it quietly passed away under the weight of its irrelevance for both states. Thus, the new format of this treaty emerged as a natural consequence of the path we took, as well as of the current state of Russian-U.S. relations and our present understanding of the way to further reduce nuclear weapons.

As for the absence of concrete quantitative indices and the halting pace of intermediate reductions, we believe given the realities of today that these are not drawbacks, but the advantages of the document. Thus each country can select the reduction method optimal for itself, primarily from an economic point of view. A similar approach, in our view, is very important not only in this agreement, but also in the entire process of reducing and limiting weapons, which, I hope, both our countries sincerely want to continue and to deepen, all the more so, since the positions of the leaders of our countries are providing the foundations for this to occur.

It is also very important that the new SORT treaty make it possible for us to reduce our strategic nuclear forces to a level of minimum sufficiency, without fear for our security. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly declared the readiness of our country to reduce our nuclear arsenal to a level much smaller than that provided for in the signed treaty: to 1,500 warheads and even lower. I believe that today, and also for the long term, that this will be wholly sufficient to undergird our national security. This level is what is meant by the concept of minimum sufficiency, which has been discussed so much of late. I hope that Russia’s position will be understood, approved, and supported by the world community.

Finally, one of the main consequences of this agreement is that today we have the possibility of continuing the dialogue not only on strategic offensive weapons, but also on defensive weapons, taking into account their interrelation and reciprocal effect. Further dialogue must be conducted not only on the determination of the directions for the continued reduction of the global nuclear threat and the reduction of nuclear forces, but also on the problematic questions of antimissile defense. In this regard we believe that it is necessary to draw other countries, including European members of the NATO alliance, into the discussion.

Colonel General Yuri Nikolayevich Baluyevsky is the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces