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WORLD HISTORY IS NOT WRITTEN IN PROTOCOL NOTES ARMS CONTROL & SECURITY LETTERS # 7(141), September 2003 © PIR CENTER In his interview “World history is not written in protocol note” to Yaderny Kontrol, Dmitry Rogozin, the Head of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs, expresses opinions on the most topical issues of contemporary world politics. Topics include the Korean Peninsula and Iran crises, deficiencies of the nonproliferation regime, and the significance of the SOR Treaty for Russia. PIR-Center: An important outcome of the St. Petersburg summit was that the presidents of Russia and the US have exchanged instruments of ratification for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. How do you see the future process of nuclear arms reduction in the world, especially since the US Senate has authorized research and development of new types of nuclear weapons abolishing the Spratt-Furs Amendment of 1993, which banned their development? Dmitry Rogozin: There is nothing good, of course, about this program. The world will not become more durable or lasting for that. The very name of the weapon that will be developed - “low-yield nuclear warheads” - seems to lift any, even moral restrictions, on the practical employment of nuclear weapons. So far, they are perceived by many as an indicator of the country’s economic development, an element of its political status. But the perfection of low-yield nuclear weapons will very likely lift that taboo under the pretext that a limited and “proportionate” use would rule out the extermination of civilian population or fatal impact on the planet’s environment. That is bound to trigger a race of conventional arms in the countries that consider themselves to be potential targets of an attack. And think how many cruise missiles and unexploded air bombs the US armed forces “lost” during the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and what can happen to the USA itself and to all of us if absent-minded Americans again forget low-yield nuclear weapons somewhere. Then actions of “suicide bombers” will take a toll of hundreds of thousands of lives. As for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, it regulates the numerical strength of strategic offensive weapons specifically. Under the Treaty Russia has the right to determine independently the structure of its nuclear forces within 1700-2200 warheads limit until the year 2012. That number is sufficient to inflict the unacceptable damage to any country if it encroaches on our sovereignty. Moreover, the Treaty rectifies some dubious provisions of the START-II Treaty whereby we were to give up the most advanced type of strategic weapons - the MIRVed missiles, which for the foreseeable future will remain the most effective means for penetrating through any air defense or missile defense systems. In the process of preparation of the Treaty for ratification at the State Duma some of its provisions raised questions among the deputies, and these were taken into account in substantially modifying and improving the draft law on ratification. We have added some fundamentally new provisions that allow us “to keep our powder dry”, that is to ensure the security of the Russian Federation even if the strategic situation develops in the most unfavourable way. In particular, we have included a provision on the possibility of withdrawing from the Treaty if another state or group of states deploys missile defense systems that could undermine the effectiveness of the strategic forces of the Russian Federation. On the whole, I believe that the Strategic Reductions Treaty fully meets our interests in spite of the differences between Russia and the USA on issues of development and introduction of improved low- and medium-yield nuclear weapons. PIR Center: What are we to make of the Russian leadership intention to take part jointly with the USA in development and deployment of the missile defense system? Dmitri Rogozin: I am not sure that this idea has a future. The Americans are too selfish a nation. By the way, we should diligently learn such nationalism from them. They are interested in the NMD system not so much in terms of its military effectiveness as an impetus for the development of its entire military-industrial complex, science, technology and economy as a whole. They will funnel 300 billion dollars into the project and provide millions of people with jobs for ten years ahead; they will invent and craft something new. As a result, the US will make such a mighty economic leap that it will leave 50 years behind everyone, even the most loyal and economically advanced allies. What is the point for them in sharing with us? I wouldn’t if I were in their shoes. Until these projects of cooperation with Russia acquire concrete outlines and real investments are in the pipeline, I will remain a skeptic. Let us face it, the US does not have much of a reputation on this issue. PIR Center: The growing role of the so-called “non-state players” - transborder crime and international terrorist organizations - is one of the modern threats to peace. It is no secret that sometimes they form close alliances. With what states does Russia cooperate to counter that threat? And how fruitful is that cooperation? Dmitri Rogozin: This is perhaps the least explored topic in the modern world in terms of law. It would seem that everyone is ready to plunge headlong in the fight against international terrorism, banditry and transnational crime. But each time concrete decisions are to be taken all sorts of human rights groups, advocates and other “peacemakers” rise up in arms. Their impact on the political decision-making cannot be underestimated. Take the notorious case of Akhmed Zakayev who was first given shelter by the Danes, and now the British with typical British procrastination are deciding whether or not to extradite him for investigation - and I stress it - investigation to our prosecutors. And he should go on trial if only for organizing illegal armed formations for which the simple Russian word is “bands”. It is only “the oldest democratic law courts” that seem not to know what such bands are created for. They probably think that they band together to set up gardening partnerships. Zakayev is a Russian citizen and he was a bandit here. If not he personally, his underlings were killing people, our soldiers, young men who served their country. And the country must punish anyone who encroaches upon the lives of those who defend it. These “democracies” sabotage our national justice and hinder the investigation bodies. As we know, simplicity is worth than a criminally punishable deed. It is nothing if not an attempt at making banditry politically acceptable, political sponsorship of international terrorism. They bear part of the blame for the fact that the first Chechnya campaign had not been carried through. And it is indeed a major problem for international counterterrorist cooperation when the lack of universally accessible and understandable and, most importantly, effective legal norms hinder that struggle. And, come to think of it, puts into question the future of the modern Russian-European civilization condemning it to a bloody war for the right to live. World history is not written by protocol diplomatic notes. This is my stand: in the face of a terrorist threat that does not recognize the rules or norms of modern civilization Russian citizens should not be hostages to flawed legal norms. A weak legal framework cannot justify the inaction of the authorities when the life, freedom and civic dignity of a country’s population are under threat. PIR Center: Dmitri Olegovich, as a representative of the State Duma, you maintain an active dialogue with European structures. What are the main avenues for Russian-European cooperation in the security field? Does Russia intend to cooperate with Europe in creating a theater missile defense? Dmitri Rogozin: They are terrorism, drug trafficking, which must be equated to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and illegal migration as a potential spawning ground for crime. And of course, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of WMD. Everything that meets our mutual interests and contributes to security and stability. As for the theater-missile defense, for starters one should study the potential source of threats and possible actors in this “theater” and to build lines of defense matching these threats. Otherwise, it may happen that we will become preoccupied with the local missile defense systems while disaster will creep up on us from a different shore. Think of America on September 11. So, work on issues of security should be comprehensive, involving purely military resources and political mechanisms. The so-called “failing” regimes or “rogue states” can well be treated by political methods. This is much cheaper than resorting to the services of armies. In Iraq, for example, although the military victory has been achieved, it means absolutely nothing in this region. It is full of “sons-of-bitches” and Hussein’s place will easily be filled by another. And it wouldn’t be half as bad if he turns out to be like Saddam, but he might turn out to be a Bin Laden. But still one should keep one’s powder dry. The world is not as stable as we would like it to be. Theatre missile defense systems should of course be improved, including in cooperation with the European partners. But, I repeat, it should only be done after a study of the real sources of threats and in combination with political levers. PIR Center: A lot is being said about a crisis of the non-proliferation regime. The media are full of reports about a number of states seeking to obtain nuclear weapons in violation of the non-proliferation regime. How do you assess the effectiveness of the regime? Dmitri Rogozin: The non-proliferation regime cannot be verified with absolute effectiveness. Science and technology are spreading rapidly and aggressively. I am told that you can find instructions for making a crude nuclear device in the Internet. While 50 years ago the most advanced countries could only do this, today it is within reach of countries with a medium level of technological prowess. And what will happen in 15 years’ time is dreadful to contemplate. And the number of people who relish walking the razor’s edge is not diminishing in the world. On the contrary, they boldly and easily take up all the novelties in the range of goods designed to destroy their fellow humans. It means that the non-proliferation regime should be strengthened and made more effective, while all international actions must be precisely targeted and sanctioned at least by the UN Security Council, the most influential countries that are responsible for global stability. Not like it was recently - inspectors were working in Iraq, looking diligently for traces of WMD and spending the money of international taxpayers. They did not find anything, but the war began anyway. And Pakistan, India and Israel do not go to any lengths to conceal that they have nuclear weapons. But the international community is strangely silent. So, if you ask me what the main difficulty is, it is double standards. In the case of Iran, an agreement was reached in principle that no nuclear research be conducted there without the IAEA sanctions and that they should not fiddle with fissionable materials. But these technologies and this equipment did not come to Iran from Russia. Some trace them to European laboratories via Pakistan. So one can say that this is a relevant topic and there is a lot of room for work there. PIR Center: The IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program published in June 2003 questioned the assurances of the Iranian leadership that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. In the light of this information, how should Russia build its relations with Iran considering that Iran is a strategic ally of Russia and a major business partner? Dmitri Rogozin: The Iran nuclear program affair has by and large been resolved. Without hysteria, scandals or scuffles. This is a fine example of how political methods can be effective. It is possible to come to terms on many issues and with many seemingly hopeless countries. It isn’t always easy, but possible. Iran is our immediate neighbour. It does not have nuclear weapons and it is in our interest to rule out the possibility of Iran obtaining them, in spite of the fact that our current relations with Iran are good. Iran is well aware of it. It would be far better for us to build a nuclear power plant there whose content we would know better than the Iranians themselves and then we would be sure that nothing untoward can happen there even if the worst comes to the worst. For us Iran is a huge market that we can develop for years. And it has a powerful culture, which has not been much affected by quasi-cultural globalism. And this is another thing that makes it interesting for us. There is vast untapped potential for our relations. PIR Center: Tensions on the Korean Peninsula dramatically increased in mid-July over reports that the DPRK could hold nuclear weapons tests in September 2003. What, in your opinion, should be the role of Russia in the process of settlement of the situation around North Korea? Dmitri Rogozin: North Korea is our neighbour, just like Iran. And it is also a traditional partner, although our relations in recent years have faltered due to ideological differences. It is a pity. Nevertheless, there is obvious progress in our relations with Seoul in recent years. And Russia will probably have to play an important role in the process of putting inter-Korean relations on an even keel. Of course, the affair of the launching of nuclear reactors in the DPRK is unpleasant. But it is very much in line with the main world processes including the war of the US against Hussein. The Americans wanted to scare the entire world “rogue states”, but they failed. Not many countries want to stand at attention on Washington’s command. What is Pyongyang’s logic? Why “cave in” to the international community and accept cooperation, allow inspectors and lose faith before its own people if the Americans will not be persuaded anyway and will find a pretext for making use of their fists. It is much more safe - without forced smiles and diplomatic protocol to declare that we don’t give a damn for all your bans if you don’t know how to behave decently yourselves. The UN today is like sake compared to our vodka, sugary syrup for the treatment of impotence: it cannot offer any guarantees to anyone. So it is every man for himself. You have doubts? Try and fight us. Korea is not the Persian Gulf. If you venture here you will get another Vietnam, the full menu with hot nuclear spicing. North Korea is not a hamburger from genetically modified products to be to the Americans’ liking. To them it is like the proverbial rat. And to us and China it is a neighbour. A difficult neighbour, but the one with whom it is possible and necessary to come to terms. It is like a Far-Eastern tiger. You have to treat it like a cat - surround him with care and lavish with gifts. But if you try to intimidate such countries with a big stick, I am afraid, an effective precedent of nuclear blackmail by the DPRK will produce recurrence. Dmitry Olegovich Rogozin - the Head of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER This newsletter is published every month (except for January and August). It is dedicated to the problems of WMD proliferation, megaterrorism, arms control, nuclear energy, military technical cooperation, and global security. Statements of fact and opinion expressed in this newsletter are responsibility of authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the PIR Center. This newsletter and all the information herein is a subject to the copyright and may be reprinted fully or in part only with written compliance from the PIR Center. The publication of this newsletter is supported by the Ploughshares Fund.
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