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Further Nuclear Arms Limitation: Factors and Prospects

Anatoly Antonov

The New START treaty between Russia and the United States stipulates a large number of measures which must be accomplished within a clearly defined time frame. The question is, what next? Are deeper strategic offensive arms reductions after the expiration of New START possible, or indeed necessary? Strategic offensive arms reductions are not an end in themselves. The notion of such reductions initially aimed to maintain the security of parties at lower levels of nuclear arsenals. Analyzing determining factors and possible scenarios, the author calls for the establishment of a new multilateral regime.

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Security Index (International Edition) NO. 2 (103), Spring 2013

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