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Protecting nuclear infrastructure: the need for coordinated action in the domain of technical standardization, coordinated strategy and exchange of information

Oleg Demidov

At first glance, last couple of years added nothing new to the global cybersecurity threat landscape of the nuclear energy industry and its incident track records. The last major publicly reported cybersecurity incidents were cyber-attack on KHNP in late 2014-early 2015, and worm infection of the Gundremmingen NPP network in April 2016.

However, one hardly may say that since those incidents the cyber threat to civil nuclear facilities has not advanced or evolved. However special, the infrastructure of the nuclear energy industry has much in common with other energy sectors – particularly including ICS systems, its security policies and general weak spots might take advantage of. So a number of cases took place since 2015 proving that ICS across all sectors continue to face mounting threat of purposeful targeted cyber attacks. The Ukrainian case with cyber operation against power grid operated by Prykarpattyaoblenergo in December 2015 has become a prominent case of compromising ICS cyber security and triggering wide-scale disruption of a vital public facility.

Protecting nuclear infrastructure: the need for coordinated action in the domain of technical standardization, coordinated strategy and exchange of information (Full text)


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