TPNW To Become An Acute Issue at 10th NPT RevCon

30.10.2020

"On October 24, Honduras ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), becoming the fiftieth State-Party of the Treaty," which anticipated not only the entry into force of the Treaty scheduled for January 22, 2021, but also an immediate negative reaction from Russia and the United States. Stressing its adherence to the balance of power formed within the NPT framework, Russia expressed a number of warnings regarding both the substantive and ideological parts of the Treaty: “there are no actual legal lacunas in nuclear disarmament that need to be filled with the TPNW, nuclear disarmament can only be built on the basis of consensus of all interested parties, the TPNW ignores the strategic context and the current state of international security." In particular, the point of view was supported by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova. The American administration proceeds from a similar position, pointing out that the treaty not only "lacks the necessary verification mechanism", but also "undermines regional security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region." These prerequisites clearly indicate that the TPNW will become a sensitive subject of acute debates at the upcoming NPT Review Conference 2021. - this is the main note of the 526th issue of the Yaderny Kontrol bulletin.

“However, in order for the Collective Security Treaty Organization to prevent the real existential crises that are common thing to other international security organizations (e.g. NATO, which faced the problem of maintaining "transatlantic integrity"), it is necessary to develop measures to breathe new life into the work of the CSTO. Such a new breath, as well as an indicator of the CSTO's maturity, could scale its activities throughout Eurasia through the development of a dialogue formats system with state actors and regional organizations in the Eurasian space. The agenda of such dialogue formats and the CSTO, in general, would be shaped by the strategic issues of "hard security" and various aspects of "soft security"". Elena Karnaukhova - on the prospects for the development of the CSTO.

“The final document should reflect the position voiced by a number of non-nuclear states that the TPNW does not contradict the NPT and does not represent any alternative to it. The TPNW should not weaken the NPT, and the shortcomings of the 2017 Treaty should not negatively affect the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its versatility." - Sergey Semenov, coordinator of the Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Program, examines the potential impact of the NPT on the negotiation process under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

“As Rose Gottemoeller admits, there was no great need to continue continuous monitoring activity in Votkinsk, including due to the high cost of maintaining the inspection team. However, opponents of the New START Treaty among the Republicans note that this is only an attempt to put a brave face on a sorry game. The telegrams published by Wikileaks on the results of the talks testify that the United States was interested in continuing the practice of continuous monitoring after 2009, but they could not break the resistance of the Russian negotiators on this issue." - Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russia Program Coordinator Sergey Semenov and PIR Center Intern Evgeny Kholodnov on the history of American presence at sensitive Russian facilities..

The issue is available here. Since 2000, the subscription and archive of issues are available on the newsletter page.

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