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The Security Index Occasional Paper Series came out with the new report «Strategic Offensive Arms Control: Military-Technical Aspects» by Sergey Semenov

08.10.2021

MOSCOW, OCTOBER 8, 2021. PIR PRESS. The Security Index Occasional Paper Series came out with the new report «Strategic Offensive Arms Control: Military-Technical Aspects» by Sergey Semenov.

The research is aimed at analyzing the military-technical aspects of strategic offensive arms control. By reviewing the nuclear doctrines and the available open-source data on the two countries’ respective nuclear arsenals, the author analyzes the impact of the New START Treaty implementation on the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals as well as discusses the potential implication of the two countries’ nuclear forces modernization programs on the future arms control agreements. The paper is structured into four sections, discussing the state and development of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces in 2011-2021, the two countries’ nuclear forces modernization plans and relevant discussions within expert and policymaking communities.

Key findings:

  • New START implementation led to sizeable reductions in both Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces and breakout (upload) potentials.
  • The uncertainty around further prospects for strategic arms control, the growing challenge U.S. policymakers perceive from China, and domestic pressure will complicate the further modernization planning for the United States.
  • Russian nuclear forces are expected to remain at the current level. Their composition meets the national security need for the foreseeable future.
  • The U.S. would likely seek a limit on all deployed and non-deployed warheads couples with more stringent verification procedures and more limits on Russian road- and rail-mobile ICBMs as well as on novel Russian armaments.
  • The question is what price the U.S. is willing to pay for their demands.


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