Chronology

IAEA presented its report on Iranian nuclear program to UN Security Council
23.02.2007

International Security Index iSi

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PIR PRESS NEWS

20.02.2020

“As a journalist I know well how much more open and straight forward officials are when in an off the record modus. The upcoming discussions within the Trialogue Club International format in 2020 will give us all – so I hope – the possibility to better and deeper understand Russia’s foreign and security policy, to ask frank questions and get sincere answers”, - Dr. Elena V. Chernenko, Co-Chair, Trialogue Club International, PIR Center Executive Board member, Deputy Foreign Editor, Kommersant Daily.

 

 

17.02.2020

“The program is tailored to people with a very specific interest in nuclear issues. Getting to work with people who had been very active in the field of nonproliferation, both on the Russian and American side, is an opportunity few students get”, Dual Degree Master`s Program student Collin MacDowell.

10.02.2020

"Strategic stability in its classical sense – understood as a state of US- Russian relations under which neither side has incentives to launch a first nuclear strike – was developed during the Cold War", - a consultant at PIR Center Andrey Baklitskiy

This paper has been produced for the joint PIR Center – CSIS project “Reducing nuclear risks during Great Powers Competition”. We thank our partners in CSIS for their cooperation and support for this publication

Transparency in Nuclear Arsenals and Doctrines

Implementing any measures contained in the future “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” mandated by Article VI of the NPT will clearly take a lot of time. It will in fact take longer than the implementation of all the other nuclear disarmament treaties put together.

The two preconditions required for the launch of negotiations on such a treaty are effective confidence-building and transparency measures, and verification measures. Transparency and verification are therefore closely interlinked; after all, the main principle of any effective disarmament agreement is that transparency must be verifiable.

The reverse, however, is also true. If a country fails to provide information about the numbers and other characteristics of its nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, it becomes impossible for the expert community to develop effective verification mechanisms.

During their bilateral nuclear disarmament process, theUnited StatesandRussiahave already developed a comprehensive set of measures for the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems. But verifying the elimination of the actual nuclear warheads is a problem that has yet to be resolved.

The following steps will have to be undertaken in that regard:

- Identify a universally acceptable definition of the term “nuclear warhead”,

- Release information about the numbers and types of warheads (both actively deployed an held in reserve) held by every individual country, and develop a system of monitoring that information,

- Develop a mechanism of inspections and verification measures for the facilities where the warheads are being held,

Find a balance between the national and global security interests,

- Develop technical means which can ascertain that the warhead being destroyed is a genuine explosive nuclear device,

- Develop technical means to ascertain that every individual explosive nuclear device has been destroyed.

PIR Center in its work pays much attention to studying the mechanisms for transparency in nuclear arsenals and doctrines and future nuclear weapons reductions, holding events and organizing discussions in the Security Index journal on the subject.

Publications:

1. Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia Group

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