Chronology

The Additional Protocol on the IAEA Safeguards comes into force for China.
28.03.2002
The signing of the Agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on Strategic Nuclear Forces Temporarily Located in the Kazakhstan Territory.
28.03.1994
An accident at the Three Mile Island-2 nuclear power plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (U.S.) results in severe reactor vessel damage.
28.03.1979

International Security Index iSi

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PIR PRESS NEWS

27.03.2020

On March 12, 2020, an extended meeting of the Trialogue Club Internationaltookplace.Its topic was “50 Years after Ratification of the NPT by the Soviet Union and its Entry into Force: Lessons Learned and Prospects for Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime”

26.03.2020

Verification is a key and indispensable element of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. Any substantive discussion on the future of strategic stability, nuclear arms race limitation, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament becomes pointless if it fails to address verification. To answer the question of what verification should look like in the future, leading Russian and foreign experts analyze the experience of the implementation of bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United Sates and look at various international mechanisms. For the first time, Russian experts offer a comprehensive assessment of the approaches proposed by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and other new initiatives in this field.

18.03.2020

"Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) poses a real threat to public safety and well-being. Europe has become the epicenter of the outbreak. The situation in Europe is getting worse by every hour. Although the situation in Russia is yet relatively safe, the fact that the pandemic is raging along the perimeter of Russia’s borders cannot be ignored. Risks for Russia are increasing",  Director of PIR Center Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov.

Transparency in Nuclear Arsenals and Doctrines

Implementing any measures contained in the future “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” mandated by Article VI of the NPT will clearly take a lot of time. It will in fact take longer than the implementation of all the other nuclear disarmament treaties put together.

The two preconditions required for the launch of negotiations on such a treaty are effective confidence-building and transparency measures, and verification measures. Transparency and verification are therefore closely interlinked; after all, the main principle of any effective disarmament agreement is that transparency must be verifiable.

The reverse, however, is also true. If a country fails to provide information about the numbers and other characteristics of its nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, it becomes impossible for the expert community to develop effective verification mechanisms.

During their bilateral nuclear disarmament process, theUnited StatesandRussiahave already developed a comprehensive set of measures for the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems. But verifying the elimination of the actual nuclear warheads is a problem that has yet to be resolved.

The following steps will have to be undertaken in that regard:

- Identify a universally acceptable definition of the term “nuclear warhead”,

- Release information about the numbers and types of warheads (both actively deployed an held in reserve) held by every individual country, and develop a system of monitoring that information,

- Develop a mechanism of inspections and verification measures for the facilities where the warheads are being held,

Find a balance between the national and global security interests,

- Develop technical means which can ascertain that the warhead being destroyed is a genuine explosive nuclear device,

- Develop technical means to ascertain that every individual explosive nuclear device has been destroyed.

PIR Center in its work pays much attention to studying the mechanisms for transparency in nuclear arsenals and doctrines and future nuclear weapons reductions, holding events and organizing discussions in the Security Index journal on the subject.

Publications:

1. Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia Group

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