Position of the Russian Federation on the issues related to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Moscow, 2021
Three Pillars of Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

- Nonproliferation (Art. I, II, VII)
- Disarmament (Art. VI)
- Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Art. III, IV, V)
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (1)

- Maintaining strategic stability, strengthening peace and security along with legal foundations of international relations;
- Maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrence;
- Strengthening international peace and security, preventing the use of military force in violation of the UN Charter, eliminating the preconditions for unleashing a global war and the risks of nuclear weapons use;
- Creating conditions for the fullest realization of the combat capabilities of troops (forces), development of requirements for promising formations and new means of armed struggle;


*July 2, 2021.*
The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2)

- Increasing the level of anti-terrorist protection of defense institutions, nuclear power, nuclear weapons, chemical, fuel and energy complexes of the country;
- Prevention and suppression of terrorist and extremist activities of organizations and individuals, attempts to commit acts of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism;


*July 2, 2021.*
The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

The decision to use nuclear weapons shall be taken by the President of the Russian Federation.

Russia affirms its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of December 16, 1971, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of January 13, 1993, as well as supports the efforts to make them universal; works to expedite the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of September 24, 1996.
The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

*The President of the Russian Federation Executive Order N 355 of 02.06.2020 "On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence*
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
RUSSIA’S POSITION
We consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to be the most important international legal instrument for ensuring international security and one of the pillars of the modern world order. Our common task is to prevent the final collapse of the system of international disarmament and arms control agreements that has been developed over decades and the regimes based upon them.

In this regard, we attach primary importance to the viability of the NPT. We call on all States Parties to make every effort at the 10th Review Conference postponed until 2022 because of the new coronavirus pandemic to strengthen the Treaty and to help achieve its goals rather than cause more controversy around it. The ultimate goal is to draft a document that would reaffirm the viability of the Treaty and the willingness of the States Parties to strictly abide by their commitments.

Source: Russia's position at the seventy-sixth session of the UN General Assembly. August 4, 2021.
As a sponsor and depositary of the NPT, we view this Treaty as a fundamental element of the international security system. We are looking forward to the Tenth NPT Review Conference to be held in early 2022. It is our hope that the Conference will serve to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and bridge the existing differences.

Russia is of the view that any challenges to the non-proliferation regime should be addressed through peaceful means and on the basis of the NPT. A striking example is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 seriously undermined this agreement. It will not be easy to restore it. We call on all participants to show political wisdom in order to revive the JCPOA.

The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in various regions of the world is an important element of maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Our country has ratified all signed protocols to the NWFZ Treaties, granting security guarantees to more than 100 NPT States parties. We support the earliest possible establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, as envisaged in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference resolution.

“We support the IAEA's efforts to verify the fulfilment of the NPT States parties' non-proliferation obligations. This Agency is the only international mechanism authorized to carry out such activities. We support a stronger IAEA safeguards system that maintains its impartiality and welcome the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, on the understanding that accession to the Protocol is a voluntary measure.

We are examining possible consequences of the establishment of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership. It is already clear that this partnership will not contribute to strengthening the NPT. There is a potential risk that another non-nuclear-weapon State will be used to deploy nuclear-weapon States' military nuclear infrastructure. This leads to greater international instability and runs counter to the efforts to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals”.

“The NPT is one of the pillars of today's international security system. This is a unique international treaty that harmoniously combines the tasks of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and equal interaction in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT is an example of effective multilateral diplomacy, a model of positive interaction between states parties in addressing global international problems”.

Source: Statement at a media briefing by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov on preparations for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Moscow, April 26, 2019.
NPT ARTICLES I AND II

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
NATO “Nuclear Sharing Arrangements”

“One of the most serious challenges to the nuclear regime are the so-called “nuclear sharing arrangements” employed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which directly contradict the spirit and letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. **Article I** of the Treaty prohibits nuclear-weapon States from transferring to any recipient whatsoever control over nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, directly or indirectly. **Article II** prohibits non-nuclear-weapon States from receiving the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of control over such weapons, directly or indirectly. In our view the other NWS should withdraw nuclear weapons to their territories, eliminate any infrastructure in place outside their borders that enables the rapid deployment of such weapons, and discontinue preparations for such deployment that involve non-nuclear-weapon States. Doing so would bolster international security and encourage the further reduction and limitation of nuclear stockpiles”.

“**It got to the point that the US conducted military exercises to imitate use of nuclear weapons against targets on the Russian territory. Europeans are also engaged in these exercises**.”

DPRK and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

“We are convinced that South and North Koreas, just as the US and the DPRK, should focus on normalising bilateral relations and strengthening mutual trust rather than attempt to solve the entire backlog of the subregion’s old problems all at once and entirely between themselves. The latter is a task for all the states involved and it can only be achieved by joint effort, given a respectful attitude to each other’s legitimate interests. The well-known Russian initiatives on Korean settlement are aimed at getting this multilateral work started”.

“Russia remains fully committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to resolve the Iranian nuclear program (JCPOA), the conclusion of which in 2015 was a major political and diplomatic achievement, made it possible to avert the threat of armed conflict and strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We propose holding an online meeting as soon as possible between the heads of permanent Member States of the UN Security Council, including the leaders of Germany and Iran. The goal is to outline steps to avoid confrontation and aggravation of the situation in the UN Security Council. It is important to provide collective support for the continued smooth implementation of the UNSC Resolution 2231, which established the international legal basis for the implementation of the JCPOA”.

Source: Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin "On Russia's Proposal to Convene a Meeting of the Heads of Permanent Member States of the UN Security Council with the Participation of the Leaders of Germany and Iran". August 14, 2020.
• “Claiming that the provisions of the resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran have now been reinstated is wishful thinking. We hope that our US colleagues will have the courage to finally look the truth in the eye and stop speaking on behalf of the UN Security Council. The illegitimate actions by the US cannot have any effect in terms of international law on other countries or bind them to curtail their legal cooperation with Iran”.

• “Efforts to preserve and ensure a steady implementation of the JCPOA will carry on. The UN Security Council Resolution 2231 remains in force, unaltered, and the commitments arising from it have to be fulfilled as originally agreed by all states based on the principle of reciprocity”.

• “We believe the way to restore the agreement, fixed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, lies only in consistent and full implementation by all parties based on the initially recorded balance of interests”.

• “Both Moscow and Tehran believe the Vienna talks must be resumed as soon as possible. My colleague confirmed to me that Iran is ready for this. There is also an understanding that the talks are not an end in itself. The international community is waiting for the US to return to the legal field of the nuclear deal and the abrogation of illegal restrictions on Iran and its trade and economic partners”.

• “We consider pointless the attempts by some countries to link the JCPOA’s preservation to Tehran’s consent to make concessions on other issues that are unrelated to the deal. We are convinced that we must discuss the situation in the region all-together, at one negotiating table and beyond the JCPOA’s framework”.

Source: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of Iran Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Moscow, October 6, 2021.
“On November 29, the parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for resolving the situation around Iranian nuclear program are scheduled to resume talks. We will advocate that the agreements that were concluded under this document in 2015 be implemented. That their implementation be resumed in full”.

“This involves the U.S. returning to meeting its obligations, including lifting all sanctions that were imposed in the context of the JCPOA”.

“There is and can be no reasonable alternative to restoring the JCPOA. This was confirmed today by all participants, including the Iranians and the Americans”.

“The Iranians, for whom, of course, the main issue is the lifting U.S. sanctions, agreed that parallel work should also be done on the second track, the nuclear track, which involves Tehran returning to the original parameters of the nuclear deal concluded in 2015”.

Source: Lavrov: Russia shall support the full restoration of the Iranian nuclear deal. TASS, Moscow, November 16, 2021.

Source: Mikhail Ulyanov, answers to questions by the press. TASS, November 29, 2021.
Iran and JCPOA (5)

• “The report by Director General on Iranian inspections in connection with UNSC Resolution 2231 demonstrates that Iran's nuclear activities are increasingly deviating from the parameters agreed on in the JCPOA. We understand that such Tehran's line is dictated, among other things, by the December 2020 Majlis Law "On Strategic Measures to Remove Sanctions and Protect the Interests of the People of Iran," which aims to counter subversive actions against Iran and the ongoing "maximum pressure" policy on the part of the United States. At the same time, we are concerned about the further qualitative and quantitative expansion of Iranian nuclear program.

• This situation requires urgent correction. This requires, first of all, addressing the root causes that prompted Iran to deviate from the terms of the nuclear deal, namely the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the massive sanctions imposed by Washington on Iran, which remain in place to this day.

• The only way to solve this problem is through the Vienna talks on restoring the JCPOA. We welcome their resumption on November 29. We believe, it is important that the participants have every opportunity not to start the dialogue from scratch but to use the significant achievements that took us effort to achieve during the previous six rounds. We trust that all participants in the process will be guided by this. This approach will ensure dynamic progress in the negotiations in the interests of quickly restoring the JCPOA to its original framework - without any amendments”.

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (1)

Source: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Russia has ratified the Protocols to the Treaties on the Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

- in Latin America;
- in Africa;
- in the South Pacific;
- in Central Asia.

Russia, like other nuclear Powers, has not signed the Protocol to the Treaty on the Establishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone

- in Southeast Asia.

The reason for refusing to sign the Protocol is the clause of the Treaty, according to which the nuclear-weapon-free zone extends to exclusive economic zones.
Russia's reservations on the ratification of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

- The traditional reservation was made that Russia would not consider itself bound by the obligations provided in the Protocol in the event of an attack on it, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies or the State with which it is bound by security obligations.

- Russia reserves the right not to consider itself bound by the obligations provided for by the Protocol if a State party to the Treaty allows foreign military vessels and aircraft with nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices onboard to enter its ports and land at its airfields, as well as their transit through its territory.

“We have always actively supported the idea of forming a WMDFZ in the Middle East and, as co-authors of the 1995 resolution, we have taken all steps depending on us to find a compromise between the supporters of the formation of the zone and its sceptics.

For us, the complexity and uniqueness of the task of forming a WMDFZ is obvious. In addition to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are also covered. Naturally, in this context, it is important to use the experience of already functioning nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the developments of other relevant international agreements: NPT, BTWC, CWC”.

WMDFZ in the Middle East

• “This conference represents the first real step in moving in this direction, which will take a very long time. It will not be an easy process, but the beginning has been made”.

• “The session was more successful than could have been expected because the participants were able to overcome disagreements on procedural issues and approve the rules of procedure”.

• “[Consensus] is a guarantee that the opinions, interests, concerns of each country will be taken into account and the only way forward is to find generally acceptable solutions. That is, each country will have veto power”.

• “This is especially important in view of the fact that Israel has so far avoided participating in this event. Now, if it doesn't want to be left out of the process, it has to get involved in some form, because its interests are fully protected by the rule of consensus, not only on all the substantive issues, but even on the procedural ones. <...> This is the outstretched hand of Israel's neighbors for dialogue. And, probably, to such a kind gesture on their part we should respond accordingly”.

Source: Mikhail Ulyanov, answers to questions by the press. RIA Novosti, December 4, 2021.
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
RUSSIA’S POSITION
NPT ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Sculpture "Good conquers evil", Zurab Tsereteli. The monument was created from fragments of dismantled American and Soviet Pershing-2 and SS-20 missiles.
Russia's participation in Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties

- **Multilateral Treaties:**
  - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – 1968
  - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – 1996

- **Bilateral Agreements (Russia-USA):**
  - Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START III) - 2010
    - **February 3, 2021 – START III EXTENSION**
      (until February 5, 2026)
Russia's Nuclear Disarmament Policy

- “The Russian Federation insists that nuclear disarmament cannot be dissociated from the host of factors that have a negative impact on strategic stability”.
- “Attempts to compel the nuclear-weapon States to give up their stockpiles unconditionally, without taking into consideration their strategic realities and legitimate security interests, are counterproductive. Such actions run counter to the principles of the maintenance of international stability and equal and indivisible security for all, and contribute to growing tensions within the international community. The Russian Federation has no doubt that a ban on nuclear weapons could be introduced as an effective nuclear disarmament measure in line with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, this can only be done in the final phase of the multilateral disarmament process, to ensure its irreversibility. Such a step would be premature in view of the current circumstances”.

We, President of the United States of America Joseph R. Biden and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, note the United States and Russia have demonstrated that, even in periods of tension, they are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.

The recent extension of the New START Treaty exemplifies our commitment to nuclear arms control. Today, we reaffirm the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Consistent with these goals, the United States and Russia will embark together on an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue in the near future that will be deliberate and robust. Through this Dialogue, we seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.
The two delegations agreed to form two interagency expert working groups:

- the Working Group on Principles and Objectives for Future Arms Control
- the Working Group on Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects.

The delegations additionally agreed that the two working groups would commence their meetings, to be followed by a third plenary meeting.

Source: Joint Statement on the Outcomes of the U.S. – Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva on September 30
Russia’s Position on the CTBT (1)

“We strictly comply with our obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and advocate for its early entry into force. We call on the eight states on which the launch of the Treaty depends to sign and/or ratify it without delay. We believe that the key destructive factor here is the position of the United States which is the only state to have officially refused to ratify the Treaty. We expect Washington to reconsider its approach to the CTBT”.

Source: Russia's position at the seventy-sixth session of the UN General Assembly. August 4, 2021.
Russia’s Position on the CTBT (2)

- The main elements of the CTBT verification regime are the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Center (IDC) and the on-site inspections.

- The Russia hosts 32 CTBT International Monitoring System facilities:
  - 6 main and 13 auxiliary seismic stations,
  - 4 infrasound stations,
  - 8 radionuclide stations and 1 radionuclide laboratory.

- As of November, 2020, 28 objects of the Russian segment of IDC have been certified.

Sources: Official websites of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense.
Russia’s Position on the TPNW

• “First, we do not see any legal void in the nuclear disarmament framework. It has to be noted that the TPNW was drafted without taking into consideration the fundamental principles set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is our belief that these principles should be followed consistently and must not be distorted.

• Second, we strongly believe that any agreements on a serious matter like nuclear disarmament can be achieved only based on the consensus among all stakeholders, including recognized nuclear powers under the NPT.

• Third, the conceptual framework of the TPNW negotiating process were unacceptable for us, since the strategic context was essentially ignored, while the topic of eliminating nuclear weapons was discussed in isolation from the current international security environment”.

Source:
# Implementation of START-III

Updated Quantitative Data

Updated quantitative data as of September 1, 2021

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<th>Russia</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>665</td>
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<td>and heavy bombers</td>
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<td>Warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs with deployed heavy bombers</td>
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<td>Deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>800</td>
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*Source: Official website of the Russian MFA*
“By February 5, 2018 (the control date under the Treaty), the Russian Federation fully fulfilled its obligations to reduce strategic offensive arms.

The United States, at the onset of the control date, also announced that it had reached the agreed aggregate quantitative levels of strategic offensive arms. However, reduction to the limits set forth by the Treaty was accomplished by the US, among other things, due to the illegitimate unilateral exclusion from the account of part of the US strategic offensive arms declared "converted".

The problem that has arisen clearly undermines the viability of the Treaty. The abnormal situation with the fulfillment of obligations under the Treaty by the US side was worked out in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), was also touched upon during a number of contacts at various levels, but so far it has not been possible to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. We continue to insist on the need to eliminate the problem of conversion and removal of the strategic offensive arms from the declared US arsenals, as well as on the strict implementation of the START Treaty by the US party.

The Russian-US New START Treaty was extended on January 26, 2021 through an exchange of notes. It entered into force on February 3, 2021, after the parties notified each other of the completion of the necessary domestic procedures.

With the extension of the New START Treaty for five years (until February 5, 2026), all of its provisions continue to apply in full.”
"The United States declares the presence in its arsenal of 800 deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers and strategic missile launchers. This figure was obtained not only due to real reductions, but also due to a number of manipulations that are incorrect from a contractual point of view. 56 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and 41 B-52N heavy bombers were simply removed from the arsenals set forth in the Treaty as "converted" and no longer nuclear-capable. However, Russia does not have the opportunity to verify and confirm or refute the results of the "conversion", as provided for in paragraph 3 of Section I of Chapter Three of the Protocol to the Treaty. Washington's refusal to include four mine launchers intended for training in the arsenals, under the pretext that these funds allegedly belong to the category of "training mines" not provided for by the Treaty, is also unlawful.
Russia's comments on the US compliance with the INF Treaty

- A direct violation of the Treaty is the ground deployment of MK-41 universal launchers at the European facilities of the US global missile defence system as part of the Aegis Ashore complexes, which allow the combat use of Tomahawk medium-range cruise missiles and other ground-to-ground/surface-to-surface missile systems;
- Unilateral US removal from the INF Treaty coverage of heavy strike unmanned aerial vehicles, that fully meet the definition of ground-based cruise missiles set forth in the Treaty and capable of solving tasks comparable to the INF, is also unlawful;
- Maintaining and developing the technological potential of the United States in the field of ground-based ballistic missile systems by testing it on a wide range of so-called "target missiles", which are often tested even without the damaging effects of anti-missiles on them, i.e. they are actually tested as weapons delivery vehicles within the meaning of the INF Treaty.

Source: Comment by the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to the US report on compliance with agreements and obligations in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. July 4, 2020.
Russia’s Position on the Missile Defense Systems

• “After the United States scrapped the ABM Treaty, Russia has more than once come up with initiatives designed to remove any “annoyances” and to establish cooperation in the anti-missile sphere. Washington and its allies have refused to move in this direction and are reluctant to take Russia’s interests into account. So, the desire to shift onto us the responsibility for the situation created by the United States is at least unseemly.

• Once again, we urge Washington to take a responsible position and to take a critical look at its missile defense plans, which, if implemented, will not be beneficial for the security of either the United States or its allies. It would also be helpful to abandon these tactics of shifting responsibility to others, which is undignified behavior for a great power, in order to divert the attention of Americans and the entire international community from their own actions of seeking to ratchet up tensions and break the international stability system”.

"No country in the world has hypersonic weapons at all, and hypersonic weapons of continental range - even more so. We already have air-based hypersonic “Kinzhal” (Dagger) complexes in our troops, and the “Peresvet” laser combat complexes are already in the troops”.

"The RVSN has begun to receive the newest, hypersonic strategic range missile system with a gliding “Avangard” cruise unit. These weapons of the future are capable of overcoming both current and prospective missile defense."

Source: Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense held at the National Defense Management Center, December 24, 2019.
"When Vladimir Putin presented our new hypersonic and other weapons, he clearly said that the command to start working on them came exactly when the United States announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, because it was clear that if they wanted to completely isolate themselves with an "anti-missile shield", they would focus on already known types of weapons. And it is necessary to overcome this "shield" with other systems, from which there is no "antidote", or, at least, it is not expected in the near future."

**Hypersonic missile complex “Kinzhal” (Dagger)**

- The Complex delivers a missile to the target in minutes;
- The missile, flying in hypersonic speed, exceeding the speed of sound by 10 times, can change its direction at any point of its flight trajectory.

**Strategic Missile Complex with hypersonic wing unit “Avangard”**

- The “Avangard” missiles can fly across continents through hard layers of atmosphere in a hypersonic speed;
- The win unit carries out ‘deep maneuvering’ (up to several thousand kilometers) at any direction, which makes it absolutely invincible.

**Military Lazer Complexes**

- Such complexes exponentially increase Russia’s capabilities in providing for its national security.

*Source: Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Defense Ministry board held at the National Defense Management Center. December 24, 2019.*
Russia’s Initiatives against the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space (1)

• 2008 – The Russian-Chinese Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which provides for a ban on the placement of weapons of any kind in outer space and on any forceful actions against space objects, was submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

• 2014 – Russia and China updated the PPWT, taking into account the proposals of interested states.

• 2020 – At the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to conclude a legally binding agreement that would prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space.

Source: website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Russia’s Initiatives against the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space (2)

“Russia is taking the initiative to conclude a legally binding agreement with the participation of all the leading space powers, which would provide for a ban on the deployment of weapons in space, on the use of force or threat of force against space objects”.

Source: Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin with a video message at the plenary session of the 75th anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 22, 2020.
“The procedure for the conclusion, execution and denunciation of international treaties is governed by the Federal law "On international treaties of the Russian Federation" of July 15, 1995".

Paragraph 1.g of Article 15 of the Federal law No. 101 states that the treaties “on matters involving the defense of the Russian Federation, disarmament and international arms control, international peace and security” shall be subject to ratification.

Today, it would be right for parliaments to discuss the consequences of the deployment of American missiles in the territory of European countries. It is quite obvious that the United States has assigned them the unenviable role of countries that will be forced to take on a retaliatory nuclear strike. Do the citizens of European countries want this? Does such a role correspond to their understanding of ensuring the security of their States? It would be right not only to think about this, but also to understand that if American missiles are deployed in Poland and Romania, Europe will lose what it has been able to achieve in the framework of global security for decades.

Provoking the world to a new arms race, the United States remains true to its idea of super-superiority and complete impunity. Russia will not remain indifferent in such a situation.”

Source: Comment by the Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin on the situation that developed after the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty. August 23, 2019.
The breakdown of the INF Treaty is a serious blow to strategic stability. The prospect of deploying intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, poses the greatest danger. The risk of a nuclear conflict "by mistake" becomes considerably higher.

If Washington begins to deploy land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region, there will likely be an arms race between the United States and China, a significant portion of whose nuclear arsenal is precisely made up of INF. This will further complicate the task of maintaining control over strategic nuclear weapons and weaken the nonproliferation regime.

However, termination of the INF Treaty does not in itself mean a critical weakening of Russia's security. A reliable nuclear deterrent is assured for years to come. Russia's latest weapons, including hypersonic weapons, guarantee the ability to destroy a potential enemy regardless of the quantitative parameters of American nuclear missiles and missile defense systems.

In this connection, the "demise" of the INF Treaty should rather be perceived as a reason to begin serious work on strengthening strategic stability in the new military-strategic conditions. These conditions should primarily include the factor of "third" nuclear powers (not only China, but also Britain and France) in the U.S.-Russian dialogue, the absence of a line between nuclear and strategic non-nuclear weapons, the growth of confrontation in Washington's policy, and the gradual withering away of nuclear arms reduction treaties.
The extension of START III will lay the foundation for further negotiations – no matter how difficult relations between Russia and the United States are today, ensuring that strategic international stability is in the interests of both parties to the treaty,” – Sergey Kislyak, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs.


Reasons for the inevitability of the START III extension: “First, if the START III treaty had not been extended, the ceilings and quantitative limitations would have disappeared, and this would have opened up entirely different opportunities for the arms race to continue.

Second, this agreement stipulates the conditions for mutual inspections. This mechanism, too, would be a thing of the past, which would be disastrous for the transparency of the parties to this agreement.

And finally, the third, in my view, critical element. There is an obligation in this agreement for the Parties not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside of national territories. The Americans, with more than 700 military bases abroad, probably would be tempted to place their nuclear weapons anywhere near Russia's borders.

The Treaty has been extended for five years without additional conditions. Let me repeat: this position is absolutely in the national interests of the Russian Federation”. Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs.

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

RUSSIA’S POSITION
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes **without discrimination** and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to **facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.** Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
NPT ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
Russia’s Policy in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (1)

“In the difficult times of the pandemic and the resulting economic crisis, nuclear power has once again demonstrated its stability, environmental friendliness, safety, and cost-effectiveness.

During the epidemic, none of our construction projects stopped. Not only in the country, but also abroad. In August, the second unit of Leningrad NPP-2 with a PWR-1200 reactor was brought to its minimum capacity. Construction of two power units under the innovative VVER-TOI project is also underway at the Kursk NPP-2 site. I take this opportunity to congratulate our Belarusian partners on the start of the physical commissioning stage of Astravets NPP, which took place in August. This is the first plant with a Generation 3+ PWR-1200 reactor outside of Russia”.

Russia’s Policy in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2)

- Russia attaches great importance to the development of cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This creates the necessary basis for the implementation of specific bilateral projects;

- The application of IAEA safeguards at the facility of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) continues in strict accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Russia and the IAEA and its Additional Protocol. The Agency’s Secretariat annually confirms that the nuclear material in Russia to which safeguards were applied is still used in peaceful activities;

- Russia supports the efforts of States to introduce peaceful atom technologies in industry, science, medicine and agriculture.

Sources:


Rosatom. Global Presence, 2021

**URANIUM EXPLORATION AND MINING**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLYING**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**NUCLEAR FUEL AND ITS COMPONENTS SUPPLYING**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**PRODUCTS AND SERVICES BASED ON RADIOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGIES**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**NPP CONSTRUCTION**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**CONSTRUCTION OF RESEARCH REACTORS AND SMALL ENERGY REACTORS**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**MODERNIZATION AND SERVICES**
- In Progress
- Prospective

**BACK-END**
- In Progress

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**WESTERN HEMISPHERE**
- Argentina
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Canada
- Mexico
- USA

**EASTERN HEMISPHERE**
- Australia
- Armenia
- Bangladesh
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Great Britain
- Hungary
- Vietnam
- Germany
- Egypt
- Zambia
- India
- Indonesia
- Jordan
- Iran
- Iraq
- Spain
- Kazakhstan
- China
- Lithuania
- Malaysia
- Nigeria
- Netherlands
- UAE
- Poland
- Russia
- Saudi Arabia
- Slovakia
- Tanzania
- Turkey
- Ukraine
- Ukraine
- Uzbekistan
- Ainland
- France
- Czech Republic
- Switzerland
- Sweden
- South Africa
- South Korea
- Japan

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**Global leader in terms of energy blocks constructed abroad**

>133

million US dollars

- Foreign orders as of the year 2017

**Uranium stockpiles in the world**

33

**Nuclear energy blocks built abroad**

16% of global nuclear fuel market

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**Source: Rosatom Website**
(http://www.rosatom.ru/)
“We support the IAEA's efforts to verify the fulfilment of the NPT States parties' non-proliferation obligations. This Agency is the only international mechanism authorized to carry out such activities. We support a stronger IAEA safeguards system that maintains its impartiality and welcome the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, on the understanding that accession to the Protocol is a voluntary measure”.

Russia’s Position on IAEA Safeguards (2)

“The IAEA must remain a professional, technical mechanism for verifying compliance with safeguards commitments and play the key role in international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are certain that the system of IAEA safeguards must remain unbiased and depoliticised. It must rely on international law and the related agreements”.

Objectives:

• Increase non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle;
• Preserve assurances of supply and services around the world could be achieved through a set of gradually introduced multilateral nuclear approaches:

Five suggested approaches (1):

1. Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case-by-case basis through long-term contracts and transparent suppliers’ arrangements with government backing. Examples would be: fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, as well as commercial fuel banks.

2. Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with IAEA participation. Different models should be investigated, notably with the IAEA as guarantor of service supplies, e.g. as administrator of a fuel bank.

Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (2)

Five suggested approaches (2):

3. Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of NPT non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, and non-NPT States.

4. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also serve this objective.

5. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might call for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements – by region or by continent – and for broader cooperation, involving the IAEA and the international community.

“We need to create a global infrastructure that would provide all interested States with equal access to nuclear energy, ensuring reliable compliance with the requirements of the non-proliferation regime, among which there is creating a system of international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under the supervision of the IAEA, on the basis of non-discriminatory access as a key element in the development of this new infrastructure.”

The International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk was established on September 5, 2007, in pursuance of the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin to create a global infrastructure that will ensure equal access of all interested parties to nuclear energy, expressed at the EurAsEC Summit on January 25, 2006. The Center was established on the basis of an Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan dated May 10, 2007, in order to ensure guaranteed supplies of enriched uranium.

**Objectives**

- Establishment of a network of international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under the supervision of the IAEA, on the basis of non-discriminatory access;
- Ensuring guaranteed supplies of uranium enrichment services to its shareholders through guaranteed access to the separation and sublimation capacities of all Russian enterprises;
- Strengthening the role of the IAEA in the global production of nuclear energy.

*Source: IUEC Website.*
“A global security architecture has been created on the principles of the NPT, and the IUEC is a brick in this architecture. Our task is to prove that this brick is correct, solid, tightly stacked in the building. We have to show the inviolability of the principles that are inherent in the ideology of the IUEC as a center providing guaranteed services in the field of the nuclear fuel cycle - uranium enrichment - to the states as an alternative to the development of their own enrichment technologies”.

“Building on the foundations of the concept laid in the Russian president's initiative, we have proven that the Center operates not just as a legal entity issuing shares, but as a working mechanism. Over the past year, we have become even stronger and able to find ways to work and develop in a very difficult external environment”.

Source: "We have moved into the cohort of experts”. Gleb Efremov on the development of IUEC at the new stage of the organization's leadership. Yaderny Control, 12 (58), 2019.
Sources:

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    - Russian State Duma: http://duma.gov.ru/
    - Russian Council of Federation: http://council.gov.ru/
  - International Atomic Energy Agency: https://www.iaea.org/ru
  - State Corporation on Nuclear Energy Rosatom: https://www.rosatom.ru/
    - International Uranium Enrichment Center: http://www.iuec.ru/
    - PIR Center: http://www.pircenter.org/
    - CTBTO Map: https://www.ctbto.org/map/
    - United Nations: https://undocs.org/