HEU Elimination:
The Time and Occasion for the EU to Become Engaged?

Lars van Dassen
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI
Background

• Based on a report on the threat posed by the abundant amounts of HEU in Russia
• Initiated in May 2002, in the context of a Pugwash conference
• Support from the Swedish MFA and SIDA
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"The HEU Elimination Study Group"

- Gunnar Arbman, FOI (Pugwash)
- Francesco Calogero, Pugwash
- Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Pugwash
- Lars van Dassen, SKI (Pugwash)
- Maurizio Martellini, Landau Network (Pugwash)
- Morten Bremer Maerli, NUPI (Pugwash)
- Alexander Nikitin, CPIS (Pugwash)
- Jan Prawitz, SIIA (Pugwash)
- Lars Wredberg, ILG/SKI (Pugwash)
Why bother?

• HEU is dangerous in the hands of for instance terrorists
• HEU exists in large quantities
• HEU is easy to handle
• HEU is hard to detect when smuggled
• HEU is expensive to store
Why the EU or European states

• At risk
• The costs for elimination of Russian HEU are large
• The EU, the ”European G-8” and European states need to do more in CTR/GP
Possible limitations on the EU

• Finances
• No ”old strategic dialogue” on nuclear disarmament
• Less developed in the field of non-proliferation assistance
• Different views on nuclear power
What can be done?

- US-Russian HEU-Deal cannot be copied
- Initiate a dialogue with RF regarding ”excess material”
- down-blending of HEU to 19.9 %
- Buy *only* services for down-blending - not the material as such
- Continued Russian ownership
What can be done? (2)

- LEU (from HEU) stored in Russia under multilateral control
- Provision: No re-enrichment and no military uses
- RF can market the LEU as fuel as it wants to
- Use revenue for other security work
- Thus: Security before commercial concerns
Interests?

**EU:**
- Irreversability of disarmament steps
- Reduced nuclear terror threat
- Reduced proliferation threat

**Russia:**
- Economic security and cooperation
- Reduced nuclear terror threat
- Reduced proliferation risk
Report:

”Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium: Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation”

www.ski.se

or

lars.van.dassen@ski.se