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**NEXT STEPS FOR RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES ON NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT**

A Policy Memo

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In May 2010, Russia and the United States, together with other parties to the NPT, agreed on the final document of the NPT Review Conference, including the list of concrete actions to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) in the area of nuclear disarmament.

Though significantly weakened by the delegations on NWSs, primarily, by France, Russia, and P.R. China, compared to the original proposals of NAM, NAC and similar-minded nations, this list, in its final format, is, in any case, an important “roadmap” on nuclear disarmament for the next five to ten years. I have summarized the key *disarmament requirements* of the NPT 2010 RevCon applicable to the United States and Russia below:

<i>Actions to be implement in accordance to the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document</i>	
1.	Reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures
2.	Russia and the United States commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the START Treaty and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals
3.	Move towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear

	weapons
4.	Diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies
5.	Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination
6.	Reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security and reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons
7.	Enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence
8.	Refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained Promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels
9.	Support cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament
10.	Submit regular reports on the implementation of the present action plan and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference

However, today it is obvious that neither United States nor Russia is ready to implement even such modest steps in its integrity, and would instead prefer a pick-and-choose approach addressing only those required actions which do not contradict their national security policies.

At the same time, already later this year, soon after entry into force of the New START – which was close, though not there yet, at the time of writing – both United States in Russia will face a dilemma: either to put an indefinite *pause* button after the success with the new treaty or to aggressively jump into the next phase of bilateral arms control negotiations.

The current political situation gives almost an equal, 50/50, chance for each of these scenarios, with a slight advantage for the *pause* scenario. However, in case both leaders, Obama and Medvedev, agree to move forward and to stay in line with their April 2009 London joint

declaration on their joint leadership towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the new agenda for negotiators would be much more complex than it was for the New START.

I see five baskets for such new negotiations:

The *first* basket should contain further reductions of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The goal should be to reduce them down to 1,000 warhead limits or below.

The *second* basket should contain defensive strategic armaments issue, i.e. missile defense. United States and Russia should move from talking about cooperation in this area to real, though inevitably limited, cooperation. Mutual approaches towards missile defense should be formulated and put in a legally binding format. The issue of non-weaponization of outer space may also become part of this basket.

The *third* basket should contain a combination of issues related to other types of nuclear weapons (TNW), strategic weapons with non-nuclear munitions, and reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The issue of CFE “re-writing” should be originally part of this package but further on has to be separated as a subject for multilateral talks.

The *fourth* basket should address joint, coordinated efforts in re-assessing national nuclear policies, including ban on development of new types of nuclear weapons; reducing the role of nuclear weapons; better transparency and reporting; and, finally, perhaps, reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. This basket should address all nuclear weapons, both deployed and non-deployed, both strategic and non-strategic. The work of this basket should be facilitated by a mechanism involving expert community through track 1 ½.

The *fifth* basket should provide preparatory work for other nuclear nations eventually joining United States and Russia in their way towards nuclear disarmament. It should include a consultative mechanisms with other nuclear nations – U.K., France, and China, and, arguably, with India as well.

While the two nations are in the process of negotiations (and working on the five baskets will be a long-term task), they should work, in parallel, in a series of multilateral steps which should both themselves and other nuclear nations as well.

The *first* such step should be a joint declaration by the nuclear five at the UN Security Council, in a format of a resolution, that they are agree not to increase their nuclear arsenals from now on. India may make a unilateral statement of the same nature in parallel.

The *second* step should be a joint declaration by the nuclear five at the UN Security Council, in a format of a resolution, that they are agree from now on not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their respective national territories.

The *third* step should be decisions by two remaining NWSs still outside CTBT to finally ratify it which should open the door toward its entry into force.

The *fourth* step should be a joint agreement by United States, Russia, and P.R. China to work together on building a new treaty that would ban the placement of weapons in the outer space.

The *fifth* step should include joint lobbying by Russia and the United States of making the INF Treaty multilateral.

I understand that such a list of bilateral and multilateral efforts, initiated jointly by Russian and US leaders, looks too ambitious which puts a question on how realistic it is. But the paradox is that if both leaders choose action instead of inaction/*pause*, they will have to act boldly and ambitiously. Nuclear weapons agenda items are so deeply interconnected that it would be impossible to expect successfully addressing only one or two issues with keeping other (more difficult and controversial) ones untouched or unnoticed – in case if really deep, dramatic reductions of strategic weapons are in mind.

In this sense, New START was the last arms control treaty which could allow addressing strategic offensive arms independently from others (I do not count a soft touching of missile defense). Now, when the PR job on the importance of the New START is done and we do not need any longer to persuade our legislators, I think many experts would agree with me that it was a very modest, mostly symbolic success story.

New bilateral nuclear arms control steps by Russia and the United States have no chance of success if they are not really bold. NPT RevCon 2015 will be a good checkpoint for this progress – if of course both countries do not prefer inaction to boldness which, as I have already mentioned before, very much can become the case.