

**NUCLEAR ENERGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NONPROLIFERATION CULTURE: COVERING NEW REGIONS**

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR

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STATEMENT

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“The development of the culture of nuclear non-proliferation”

**Distinguished colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,**

On the way of achieving the goal of a safer world for all people, a world without nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation is of vital importance, in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security.

Preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is one of our top priorities, because as the world has already recognized, the proliferation of WMD represents a major threat to international peace and security. Politicians, governments and civil societies all over the world are determined to strengthen the global non-proliferation architecture and culture of nuclear non-proliferation, by supporting all multilateral treaties and arrangements which help to prevent and combat proliferation, and by promoting their implementation and universalization.

In April 2011 the United Nations Security Council has adopted Resolution 1977 reinforcing previous Resolution 1540 which aims to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations of the States, including with their IAEA safeguards agreements and relevant IAEA Board of Governors and United Nations Security Council resolutions is of utmost importance and plays a key role in addressing proliferation issues.

Talking about the culture of non-proliferation, I would emphasize that it does not start from the scratch. It builds on a step-by-step implementation of the decisions adopted since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

In this context, I would also like to recall that the last year was a very important benchmark for the NPT review process, which is essential for the topic we discuss today. I would even qualify it as a definite watershed for the whole nuclear issue.

At the 2010 NPT Review Conference member States have reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and is the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-

proliferation in all its aspects play a vital role in promoting international peace and security.

The consensus outcome of the NPT Review Conference 2010 is a balanced Final Document which sets a practical agenda with the Action plan covering all three pillars of the Treaty. In particular, twenty four steps on non-proliferation have reflected the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the best understanding of the new challenges to international security and non-proliferation regime.

In the light of the upcoming follow-up of the NPT Review Conference meeting of the P5 States which will take place in Paris on 30 June this year, let me try to highlight the main developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation over the past year.

First, the State parties of the NPT Review Conference reaffirmed that the IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, remains an essential tool for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear co-operation.

According to Article III of the NPT the acceptance of safeguards is of paramount importance in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and providing effective control over sensitive materials and activities. I believe that an increased number of countries which have brought into force the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol over the past year is a positive sign in development of the culture of non-proliferation. Universal adherence to both instruments strengthen the non-proliferation regime and contribute to further enhancing nuclear safety and security worldwide.

In this regard, I would like to stress that every country should work hard to receive the broader conclusion by the IAEA on the implementation of the safeguards obligations. This year according to the Safeguards Implementation Report 2010 of the IAEA my own country Ukraine has received such a conclusion for the first time. Let me assure you that Ukraine stands firm in its choice and will consistently undertake steps aimed at making nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation work. The next challenging task for us – is the introduction of a state level integrated safeguards approach for Ukraine and we are determined to pursue this course. I sincerely hope that the case of my own country will become an example for others to follow.

Second, last year we have acknowledged the implementation of decisions of the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010, which underlined the importance of nuclear security as an integral part of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The most recent contribution of Ukraine to the course of non-proliferation and disarmament was a decision announced by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich to get rid of all national stocks of highly enriched uranium by 2012. As the first step, we have already removed a substantial part of our stock for its downgrading to the low enriched uranium to be used by the Ukrainian nuclear research facilities.

According to Plutonium Disposition Protocol signed between two nuclear States – the Russian Federation and the United States of America – the International Atomic Energy Agency has started the preparations to undertake a verification role concerning the management and disposition of plutonium no longer required for defence purposes.

A number of other initiatives are aimed to facilitate multilateral solutions for the expanding need for minimizing the risk of proliferation. The main objective is to prevent "replication" of sensitive technologies around the world while ensuring the respect of legitimate rights of complying Parties to the NPT to develop nuclear power production. It is along these lines that we take the idea of the establishment of the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank (LEU Bank).

This fuel bank is an important part of an equitable and sustainable international nuclear fuel cycle regime. It is fully in line with countries' rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and beneficial to energy security without distorting the existing fuel market - while at the same time furthering the goals of non-proliferation and a world free of nuclear weapons. It also reflects the positive outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

Third, I would like to underline that an effective non-proliferation regime is a matter of common security interest for all nations. In this context, the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

In March 2011 the Russian Federation has ratified Protocol I and II of the Pelindaba Treaty. The ratification by a nuclear-weapon State of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties such as Pelindaba Treaty play a vital role in strengthening non-proliferation regime and assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in article VII of the NPT.

The recent turbulences in the Middle East and North Africa and their impact on the architecture of international peace and security prove once again the crucial need to promote further creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in line with pending requirements for the organization in 2012 of the special conference agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference with a view to creating a peaceful environment in the region.

Forth, another important mechanism in strengthening the culture of non-proliferation is an effective nuclear-related export controls. Such controls are a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing States' Party obligations under Article III of the Treaty, in order not to contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or acts of nuclear terrorism. Non-compliance with the existing regulations in this field, in particular in the region of the Middle East, is a matter of concern of the international community.

In this regard, the State parties to the Treaty should make the best use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings, such as Nuclear Suppliers

Group and Zangger Committee provide, in developing their own effective national export controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as relevant materials and technologies.

It is also clear that effective export controls are intended to provide an environment of confidence for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Extended access to the peaceful nuclear energy is only possible in strict compliance with the highest non-proliferation standards. The implementation by the States of the IAEA's most current recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities will contribute to further development of the culture of non-proliferation.

Having in mind the nuclear accident in Japan, I would also highlight the necessity to pay particular attention to nuclear safety. It is evident that safety must be integral at every step of the way we design, build and operate our nuclear facilities. I believe that the outcome of Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, which is now being held in Vienna, will be crucial for the future of nuclear power.

The consensus reached last year by the NPT Review Conference on the forward-looking Action plan proves that co-operative, multilateral non-proliferation efforts can work if there is a necessary political will. The key players should work hard to implement effectively relevant action plans and allocate essential resources in order to meet proliferation challenges and, eventually, move towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

By doing so, we will make stronger the belief that all the decisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference can and should be further duly implemented. I sincerely hope so and I look forward to the next review cycle to make it real.

Thank you.