I would like to begin with some words of appreciation. I would like to thank our readers who
sent the editorial staff their congratulations on the occasion of the publication of the first issue
of Security Index. Several of these welcome letters and addresses are reprinted at the end of
this issue.

We marked the publication of the journal with two presentations that were both vivid and well
attended. The first took place in Moscow and was dedicated to the Russian-language publi-
cation. One month later a presentation occurred in Geneva, which the PIR Center conducted
together with Centre russe d’études politiques and the Permanent Mission of Russia to
International Organizations, where we celebrated the international publication of Security
Index (in English). I was so very pleased to greet so many friends and partners of the PIR
Center during these two evenings in two different cities!

No less important to me were the letters from readers who moved from congratulating us to
providing specific proposals on how we could be sure not to drop the plan that we raised so
highly in our first issue. The editorial board is discussing all of the interesting proposals and
ideas, and will soon begin to realize some of them in upcoming issues. I am counting on the
future flow of ideas from our readers continuing to be as rousing.

I am also glad to note that serious support to the development of the journal and its distribu-
tion in Russia and abroad is being provided by the journal’s regional representatives: from
Vienna to Vladivostok, from Delhi to Baku, from Tokyo to Wellington, and from Kiev to Algiers.
Sometimes it is hard for me, as well as for other editorial board members, to reach out to our
readers in various corners of Russia and the world, to listen closely to their preferences as well
as to obtain materials for the journal from these far-flung locations. Here the assistance of the
journal’s representatives could not be more important.

And now, about the issue that you hold in your hands. As the journal’s mission calls for, it is
diverse and has multiple styles. There is a very practical conversation about manned space
flight (an interview with Alexei Krasnov), and a question about further NATO expansion (an
interview with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer)...

But I nevertheless would like to point to three cross-cutting issues that dominate the issue—
not without editorial design.

The first is disarmament—a term that seemed to disappear from the political lexicon over
the course of the last decade. The problems of arms control and disarmament, both bilat-
eral and multilateral, have gradually been pushed into the background.

“The rapid speed of improvements in military technology, the swift adoption of these new
technologies by the armed forces of many states and, as a result, the amendment of mili-
tary doctrines to envision the use of military force to combat new threats and geopolitical
challenges have all taken the global community unawares. As a result of this already fairly protracted period of confusion, the international legal underpinnings of arms control—which took decades to form—has begun to grow antiquated. In many ways it no longer meets current needs," writes PIR Center senior advisor Lieutenant General Gennady Evstafiev. Disarmament policy is in crisis, he avers. But it is necessary to return to it given the present circumstances? We must, the author is convinced, and then proceeds to present in detail the new, complex agenda of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures that must be undertaken soon. His palette is purposefully broad: from the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and speeding up the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to averting of the development of an arms race in space. But the author cannot but recognize that returning disarmament to the global agenda will be very difficult and that there is a very high risk of a new arms race.

I would like to note that the electronic version of this article, which was posted on the PIR Center website even before the printed version was published, led to a flood of commentaries both from Russian and from foreign readers and experts, and the section “Is the CFE Needed”—written as it was by one of the drafters of that agreement—is particularly topical today.

The CTBT’s direct predecessors were the “threshold” test ban treaties, negotiated in 1975-76. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Roland Timerbaev was part of the Soviet delegation that negotiated these treaties, which limited the yield of underground nuclear explosions, conducted either for weapons testing or for peaceful purposes. Both the U.S. and Soviet delegations took seriously the need to limit nuclear tests, and undertook the complicated task of developing a detailed, though complex, system for monitoring and inspection which served the cause of disarmament well for many years.

This cause has been taken up by many brilliant individuals, not least of them Academician Lev P. Feoktistov, one of the most important Soviet and Russian nuclear scientists, who later became a supporter of complete nuclear disarmament. Mikhail Novikov reviews a new book devoted to his life, that includes both autobiography and recollections of the man by those who knew him. The other book review in this issue looks to the future of nonproliferation and disarmament: in my examination of the monograph Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War, I review the new proposals by Russian experts Vladimir Dvorkin and Alexei Arbatov to move policy forward in this area.

The flip-side of disarmament is the question of why nations take up nuclear weapons in the first place. While most typically examined through analyses of the international system and rational state actions, the choice to develop these weapons also has a clear, ethical dimension. This dimension—and the relationship of religious morality to the question of nuclear weapons’ development—is examined by Ambassador Alexei Obukhov, a man who devoted many years of his life to arms control negotiations, defending our good nuclear weapons from their bad weapons, who has clearly earned the right to conclude, “defending nuclear weapons is a terrible sin!” On the other hand, states need conventional weapons to defend themselves, particularly in regions with an unpredictable future.

The second cross-cutting topic in this issue is nuclear energy. The idea that we are now on the threshold of a global nuclear renaissance has already become commonplace. But how can the expected rapid expansion of nuclear power in certain regions be combined with ensuring international security? How can we learn to build cooperative nuclear relations? PIR Center Scheffer Director Anton Khlopkov reflects on these questions in his evaluation of what the conclusion of an intergovernmental nuclear agreement with the United States will mean for Russia and its nuclear industry. How realistic it is to expect the entry of such an agreement into force in the foreseeable future, given the current rigidity of the U.S. Congress, is another question.

Further, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Vice President Laura Holgate provides the outlines of the idea for the establishment of an international reserve of nuclear materials, originally proposed by NTI and now under consideration at the IAEA. Whatever the prospects for the practical realization of this proposal prove to be, posing the question of international assurances for
the delivery of nuclear fuel to those states that voluntarily forego the creation of their own nuclear fuel cycle, and thus prove potentially vulnerable to external pressure, is legitimate and long overdue.

A third important topic debated in this issue: Sino-Russian strategic relations and their prospects. This is a question that is being asked by all analysts of Russian foreign policy and defense priorities, though sometimes it seems that there are those who shy away from making their views known. But I have asked the authors in this issue to depart from diplomatic neutrality. Vitali Tsygichko, co-author of our series of duelling viewpoints notes: “I say without reservation: in my view, the openly hegemonic direction that Chinese foreign policy has taken poses a direct threat—or, to be more precise, an entire collection of threats and challenges—to Russian interests in the Asia-Pacific region.” But Dmitri Trenin is in decisive disagreement with this conclusion: “China is not going to be like the Soviet Union or Japan of the 1930s. Its expansion will not be predominantly territorial in nature, and basically will not be achieved by military means. The Chinese divisions will be transnational corporations with their headquarters in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and so forth. PRC military aggression against Russia is extremely improbable in the foreseeable future (let us say, 15-20 years).” Who won in this dispute? Whose arguments are more convincing? Visit the PIR Center website and vote, provide your own assessment.

Another argument is conducted on the journal’s pages by two of our regular reviewers, Dmitry Evstafiev and Yury Fedorov. As you remember from the previous issue, we conditionally dubbed the former a “Russian conservative,” and the latter a “Russian liberal.” I must say that the authors themselves do not agree with these labels—or, if not labels, then at least one might call them simplifications—coined by the editorial staff.

It could be that they are correct. But which one of them is more right (further to the right?) in his appraisal of the course of events in recent months, is nevertheless the key issue. In this issue Dmitry Evstafiev writes that one should pay attention to the imminent shift of technological eras (and warns that Russia is risking that it will sleep through it). Meanwhile, Yury Fedorov, searching for answers to present challenges, cites Bismarck: “The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches or by majority decisions... but by blood and iron!”

Graeme P. Herd and Gagik Sargsyan examine Russia’s demographic crisis, and how the uneven population decline may pose threats in the political, economic, societal, and military sphere. It is not too late for Russia to influence current trends, in particular by encouraging immigration, but this would require a far greater policy change than we have seen to date.

The articles in this issue contain a large number of unsolved problems and accumulated contradictions... however, after several alarming drops in iSi, our measurement of the global security index—drops which indicate an increase in global tension—in April and May we did not just see it stabilize, but even a slight rise, making it possible to say that the international situation, although extremely unstable, was nevertheless far from catastrophe. However, the future holds both promise and dangers, and for Russia in particular, a new danger on the horizon is depopulation.

I began by talking about how the journal is developing. I will conclude by talking about this too.

First, subscriptions to Security Index for 2008 are now being accepted. Certainly, we are glad that we have been able to provide our journal during its first year of publication under a new name to many of our readers free of charge. But this situation will change in the new year: the journal will once again be distributed via paid subscription. The Russian edition can be subscribed to through the Rospechat catalog, while the international edition can be obtained by becoming a member of the Centre russe d’études politiques—the PIR Center’s European branch in Geneva—or by joining the Trialogue Club. Information on how to do this is provided with the journal.
Second, the wish expressed by many of our readers that we return to a quarterly publication cycle have been heard by the editorial staff. Beginning in 2008, Security Index will come out—in Russian and in English—four times each year!

Vladimir Orlov