

**«LONG-RANGE PRECISION-GUIDED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY»**

*Joint meeting of members of the Centre russe d'études politiques and the Trialogue Club
International*

April 24, 2013, Geneva, Switzerland

**Amb. Anatoly I. ANTONOV, Dr., Deputy Minister, Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation**

ANTONOV: Vladimir has asked me to present on a very unusual issue. As I know that maybe many of you have no opportunity to look at this issue from the angle, which the Russian delegation and Russian experts are looking at. I will try to explain the program. Excellent, we have a map. It will be easier to explain where we are and what kind of problems we have regarding strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration (SOANNC).

One of the burning issues during the United States and Russian negotiations of the New START treaty was the issue of non-nuclear strategic offensive arms, which we sometimes call strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration. In our work, we are going to adhere to the interpretation of these arms as provided for the new treaty. What does this mean? Any kind of ballistic missile – missiles, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) – with non-nuclear warheads. Although considered strategic offensive arms, heavy bombers do not pose such a serious threat in the context of the issues under consideration due to a number of peculiarities of their use. It would be wrong to say that the issue of SOANNC came as a surprise for Russian negotiators during work on the New START treaty, for it had not been there before. It is important to point out that the New START treaty, as well as START I, is a treaty on the reduction and limitation of *strategic offensive arms*. It is not a coincidence that the word “nuclear” is not here. It is not an omission on the part of the delegations, but the result of an uneasy compromise with the United States that has always tended to have new arrangements which would not relate to so-called conventional arms nor cover SOANNC, but would apply only to nuclear weapons.

On the contrary, the Russian side insisted that the new treaty cover all strategic offensive arms. We are constantly emphasizing that it is unacceptable to compensate for nuclear reductions by building up conventional strategic systems. This is not an equal exchange. The thing is that the destructive capabilities of SOANNC are increasingly getting closer to those of nuclear weapons. The Russian side closely traces plans related to advanced conventional strategic missile technologies. The incoming information unequivocally testifies to the fact that the United States is looking for a new considerable segment of strategic arsenal capable of solving a wide range of tasks that used to be assigned exclusively to strategic nuclear weapons. This work is carried out in the framework of the so-called prompt global strike concept. Let us remember that the United States started to develop this concept in the late

1980s – early 1990s. Its bottom line is the achievement by the United States of America of global full spectrum dominance, including by designing new, effective, non-nuclear strategic weapons while preserving its nuclear deterrent arsenal. Should the prompt global strike concept be successfully implemented, the United States will have the power to carry out conventional strikes against targets anywhere in the world within one hour of making the decision. The changing nature of possible threats to the United States coming from not only Russia or, for example, China, but also from so-called rogue states, terrorists, and extremist groups was also taken into account, while the use of nuclear weapons against them was considered counterproductive. In essence, the issue is the transformation of the United States' military potential to better suit future conflicts.

Those who advocate for such plans believe that SOANNC will be the best deterrent against aggressive enemies on the regional level, as far as their use is more probable. It is the suitability of high-precision long-range conventional strikes that makes the potential use of such arms against a possible aggressor more acceptable and thus improves its deterrent effect against state and non-state actors. If the deterrent does not work, targeted long-range non-nuclear strikes may be the only way to prevent an attack with weapons of mass destruction or further attacks after such an act of aggression. As a matter of fact, good range, speed, damage and efficiency characteristics, together with the prompt reaction capacity, will enable the armed forces to implement virtually the same tasks as with the use of nuclear weapons. The American military men believe that SOANNC will help make a swift shift to planning and carrying out strikes against targets thousands of miles away in the case that the United States president makes such a decision based on operational intelligence data. They claim that for a prompt strike to be possible, the data collection, decision making, and its implementation should be provided in no more than several minutes.

Another advantage of SOANNC, according to American experts, is that they are relatively cheap in comparison to the incalculable costs of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

I would like now to critically examine these arguments. The United States continues to state that it is necessary to solve individual tasks in the framework of the war on terrorism. At the same time, when speaking about possible particular cases of the use of such missiles, the United States primarily cites possible strikes against bases, places where terrorists gather or where their leaders meet. However, the indicated type of weapons does not seem to be very effective for such purposes. First, such gatherings and meetings rarely take place in isolated areas, so the use of such weapons, due their high-damage capabilities, would lead to many victims among civilians.

Secondly, such targets are quite mobile. The long flight time of ICBMs, as well as the time necessary for the preparation and authorization of similar launches, would hardly guarantee the destruction of moving-point targets. It is enough to look at the situation with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Afghanistan against Taliban troops. In spite of their incomparable small size, low management efficiency, and limited firing power, the so-called collateral effects of the use of UAVs including use of weapons among civilians are quite

considerable. What would be the consequences of the use of *strategic* missile systems to carry out targeted lethal strikes? However, the humanitarian aspects of the use of such weapons for targeted destruction of militants and terrorists raised huge doubts. What would be the price of a possible intelligence mistake?

Thirdly, the United States already has its military forces here and Navy close to, or in the case of the globe, that are of vital interests. This allows them to carry out a powerful strike against the enemy with the use of high-precision weapons in case of a crisis. Therefore, it can be stated with a high degree of certainty that the probability of the situation in which the United States will have to resort to SOANNC is extremely low, especially if compared with possible side effects in terms of strategic stability. The cost efficiency of the development and creation of such expensive weapons systems just to eliminate terrorist leaders raises serious doubts too. Therefore, the United States' arguments in support of the production & deployment of such weapons do not seem convincing.

This brings us to an important question. What is in reality behind the United States' plans to build SOANNC? It's not their ambition to secure the leading position in the world in the military sphere by building up potential with the help of modern, high-precision weapons that other countries are not even planning to design.

It seems evident that in the case of successful prompt global strike implementation, based largely on SOANNC, the United States Armed Forces will be strengthened by powerful, modern offensive arms as a solid foundation to enable them to perform global missions at sea, on land, or in space. Due to their good characteristics, such missile systems will be capable of performing tasks that today are supposed to be carried out by strategic nuclear arms.

At the same time, the level of decision-making on the use of SOANNC could be lowered significantly in comparison with nuclear deterrent systems. We would like especially to emphasize the fact that in the case that SOANNC are accepted, the key factor of the so-called nuclear uncertainty and unpredictability will remain. It is necessary to point out that all the United States' declared global strike-related targets are located in immediate proximity to the Russian and Chinese borders. This is why any launch of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs in the direction of the territory of the Russian Federation or China might be viewed as a missile attack, thus dramatically raising the risk of the launch of a counterattack strike. We believe that the American military experts understand well that it is impossible to identify the real arming of an ICBM or SLBM, both nuclear and non-nuclear, after launch. Does the United States intend to use its SOANNC solely in the interest of its own nation's security, bypassing international law and without UN Security Council sanctions? If it is thought, what about the role of international laws and leading rules of international institutions, in particular the United Nations and Security Council? the primacy of diplomacy in the resolution of international conflicts? the legitimacy of the use of force for self defense or the promotion of peace and security, as it is provided by Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter?

We are very concerned of the American attempt to give broader interpretation to the definition of the so-called direct threat by including in it the actions of hostile states and terrorists. The Russian side has never supported such actions, nor will they hardly do this in the future. Therefore, the missile warning system is designed in such a way as to ensure maximum decision-making time for the military and governmental authorities. That is why the system facilities are located as close as possible to the national borders, and their zone of action covers the air of several thousand kilometers away from the stand point. Taking into account that most dangerous terrorist regions are adjacent to Russian territory, any end-point launches of missiles in those regions will be detected by Russian means and considered, as a rule, as offensive. This is dictated by the physics and geography of the missile launch detection.

How will the Russian side act in the case of detection such a ballistic missile launch? The answer is clear. When taking the decision to respond, the Russian military men will act on the assumption that the missile carries a nuclear warhead. Moreover, under the condition of the obvious lack of time to make a comprehensive assessment of the operational situation, the basic response actions will be carried out in the automatic regime. A legitimate question then arises. Does everybody fully understand the disastrous nature of the risk burned by such unidentifiable warheads?

In the context of problems, serious questions remain as for the consequences of partial equipment of launches on American SSBNs with non-nuclear SLBMs. In this case, a problem remains of how to prevent accidental and unauthorized launches of SLBMs equipped with nuclear front sections during combat patrolling of SSBNs equipped with missiles of mixed configuration. The repeatedly duplicated launch and launch implementation of authorizations are already needed. If this is possible from a technical point of view, frankly, I don't know. It also remains unclear how to notify other states on the launches of ballistic missiles over their territory, as well as on the areas where missile stages drop. This brings excessive conflict potential and tensions in international regulations.

Another supposed trouble of legal nature arises from the fact that the flight of ballistic missiles will go through the air and possibly space of other countries. Today, the profile the US committees discuss the limitation of (42:03) space. It's hardly possible that many countries in the world will accept foreign missiles unconditionally flying over their territories.

One of the potential options to reduce Russian concerns with regard to SOANNC for the Americans is to consider the possibility of basing ICBMs in non-nuclear configuration in places located away from nuclear bases of such missiles. For example, Vandenberg or Cape Canaveral, or maybe another place. It goes without saying that non-nuclear ICBMs should have a distinctive feature to distinguish them from their nuclear brothers and be subject of inspection or demonstrations. However, such verification procedures do not give a full guarantee that under certain circumstances these non-nuclear ICBMs will not be reconverted to carry nuclear warheads. Besides, there is an impression that no transparency measures will

be sufficient in the case of very limited timelines, lack of comprehensive information in the case of conflict when the United States makes the political decision to deliver a non-nuclear strike using SOANNC. I would like to know that many ways of advancing the Russian side's concerns relating to non-nuclear ICBMs are not applicable to SLBMs. For example, non-nuclear SLBMs are supposed to be mounted on SSBNs carrying nuclear missiles. Therefore, the possibility of separate basing, as in the case of ICBMs, gets lost. It's illustrative that this sensitive progress in developing conventional arms systems is accompanied by the emergence in the United States of doctrinal prescriptions aimed at a gradual shift of the deterrent function from nuclear to conventionally-armed high-precision weapons.

If we have a broader look at the situation with strategic stability, a rather unfavorable picture shapes up from the point of view of Russian security. The implementation of global BMD-related plans, outstanding CFE programs and obvious imbalance in relation to conventional arms within NATO and Russia, ambiguous intentions of the United States in relation to placement of an arms race in outer space, dramatic take-off in the development of military information technologies, prospects of implementation of the prompt global strike with the use of SOANNC, with further reductions of Russia's and the United States' nuclear arsenals, can undercut strategic stability and can make Russian defensive capabilities vulnerable. Such evolution does not correspond, of course, to Russian national interests.

The reference of the United States to the new quality of bilateral relations that do not suppose military conflict between our countries cannot address our concerns either. The Russian side has repeatedly noted that the military arts should take into account first and foremost the real potential and not the intentions of the parties that can change in time, including depending on the existing military capabilities. The American plans to create SOANNC can serve as a serious impetus to missile proliferation. What if other missile countries will be tempted to move forward and develop and improve their strategic missile armaments? We know the missile proliferation situation, we know of some countries who are capable of producing such missiles. For example, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, I can name Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. You can look at a map and see how many other countries can develop such armaments. Therefore, we are talking about the possible launch of a new dangerous turn of the arms race based on the most advanced technologies. At the same time, there are no internationally recognized restrictions on such weapons. It is not hard either to imagine how such plans of the United States can affect missile programs of the countries that possess the military and space capabilities.

Taking into account the above stated, we believe it is absolutely possible to consider as reasonable all the concerns of reliable experts in relation to the development and improvement of conventional high-precision strategic missile systems, especially along with the improvement of ballistic missile defense systems, cannot only freeze the reduction of nuclear armaments, but reverse it. It's hardly possible that such a scenario corresponds to the interests of the international community.

The development of SOANNC can give a start to the strategic arms race on the parallel tracks that is nuclear and non-nuclear. Moreover, the research and development efforts in both directions can be mutually complemented and fuelled. It is illustrative that the United States builds scientific and technical capacities related to the design of high-precision missile systems of delivery of conventional military equipment to the intercontinental range can be used also to develop high-precision nuclear combat blocks, or ICBMs and SLBMs.

To sum up, it can be stated that strategic missile systems in non-nuclear configuration are capable of providing a serious negative impact on international security and really undermine strategic stability. Their use cannot only impede the soonest conflict resolution the American developers are thinking about so much, but vice versa can aggravate the international situation by increasing the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction due to the incorrect perception by Russia or China of the objectives of the launch of SOANNC.

I would like for you to look at the situation in the military concept in Russia and the United States, and I would like you to think why Russia today is so reluctant to start a new round of negotiations. If there will be a new element in the strategic plans of the United States, for example to replace nuclear capabilities with conventional missiles that can fulfill the same tasks as the nuclear weapons – for us it's rather difficult to think about further reductions.

Frankly, you say that I am not criticizing the United States, that I just decided to take the situation like it is. I would like to say, and I already said it to my American friends, taking into account such compensation in conventional arms, you see that negotiations for the next treaty on nuclear disarmament is not right.

I think I will stop now, and maybe we will discuss it.

ORLOV: Thank you very much, Ambassador Antonov, for this very detailed discussion on a topic which, unlike you, needed introduction. A topic which some of us work with very closely while others are just looking at. I would like to go first and to ask you about your final part, your conclusions. As far as I understand, and Scotty may correct me if I'm wrong, just a few days ago, there was a senior US delegation to Moscow, headed by Mr. Donilon, the National Security Advisor. If I heard it correctly from my colleagues, in a letter from President Obama to President Putin, on the prospects of preparations for the St. Petersburg bilateral summit between the two presidents, as part of the package of discussions, not only traditionally strategic nuclear arms control was mentioned by President Obama, but also, inter alia, exactly the issue that we discuss today, as he called, global prompt strike weapons, conventional strategic weapons. Do you see that there is recognition on the side on the fact that this or that way, a new round of arms control cannot be traditionally concentrated only on those issues you dealt with on New START? Do you see that there is understanding that the package should be broad, including Russian concerns which you just so well articulated? Or is it still a long road to go? So this is both a question on the current status of events and also on how long or how short road you expect to make our position close if at all possible?

ANTONOV: It would be incorrect for me to make comments on the papers which Mr. Donilon brought to Moscow. I hope that you understand. But I understand at the same time that you would like to learn something from me. I will try to go along with the line adopted by my president, taking into account how I understand the situation with the United States. I hope that you will understand.

I'll start from 2010, when we finished our treaty. Rose and I discovered a lot of problems, which were not possible to solve during negotiations because they were not the subject of our negotiations. They were not the subject of our treaty. And we made it clear to the United States openly, that without a solution to these issues, the next round of negotiations is impossible. Not difficult, but impossible. One of these problems is, of course, missile defense. If you look, for example, at our treaty, you will see how many times we made reference to missile defense. In the preamble, we agreed that the current status of missile defense does create any problems to Russian nuclear deterrence. In the body of the treaty, we mention that all missiles at Vandenberg, which were converted to implement non-nuclear missions, were under strict control, and in the end of our treaty, the Russian side made a statement – if in the future there are some changes regarding missile defense and we understand that these changes could undercut Russian deterrent capability, then we will have the right to withdraw from the treaty.

Second, we made it clear to the United States about the problem, which I have just only mentioned. Not nuclear strategic offensive arms, but strategic stability. If you look at the bilateral document from 2009 signed by our two presidents, you will find this problem in one sentence. I remember it by heart. SOANNC is a problem which we had to solve. It's very interesting. There was no reference with what kind of effect for strategic stability we see from these arms. As to the Russian side, we cannot see that the effect would be negative. From the United States' side, they considered that this effect would be positive. We decided to delete all explanations about the influence of SOANNC on strategic stability.

The third point that you will see, which we cannot ignore – the situation with France and the UK regarding their nuclear arsenals. Of course, I know my colleagues can say today that they possess but only a few hundred warheads and delivery systems. I understand this, but the reality is that there is a lack of confidence and trust between us, between NATO countries and the Russian Federation. We have a lot to do to become real partners in various spheres. That's why for us we are looking at the potential for the capability of France and the UK from the point of view that they are in one alliance. And I would like for you to understand that that's why we are insisting that the next round of negotiations should be multilateral, at least we have to take into account the capabilities of the UK and France. We are not looking at the UK as just one country, and it's not necessary for us to compare our arsenals. I'm talking about another issue – the problem of disbalance in conventional arms. Today I present on this issue. I took from my experts' latest data, and I can tell you that there is a huge imbalance in conventional arms. We must also take into account these elements for future negotiations.

On the problem of outer space. For me, to now it is not clear whether the United States are thinking about the possibility to deploy weapons, or they decided not to do it for civil future. What am I talking about? I'm talking about predictability. Today there are many statements about the decision of the United States regarding the fourth phase of missile defense plans. Again, I would like to raise the same question that I did during our conversation with my American colleagues. Let's imagine that tomorrow we decide to launch a missile, and this missile will be considered a threat to the United States. Does it mean that the United States will turn back to the fourth phase? What about predictability? We don't know what will be tomorrow. If I don't understand what will be tomorrow, how can I start negotiations on reductions of my capabilities? Because especially now for me it's easier, I work in missile defense, I think just about the defense of my country. That's why I would like to ask my colleagues, and I will meet very soon with Jim Miller in Brussels, where we will discuss the situation with missile defense. How can I get assurances that the day after tomorrow we will not revisit again your plans? Or maybe you say that we will make a new agreement after ten years, and you will say to me "Okay Russia, because you are an enemy, that's why we need another phase of our missile system." And at the same time you say we will cut our missiles and warheads and look at the situation. It's one of the problems dealing with my colleagues from Russia. There is a lack of predictability. How to solve it? I don't know. That's why, by the way, we are asking for guarantees.

My colleagues from NATO criticize me for this, saying, "We don't want to give you legally-binding assurances." And I raise the question, while we are discussing this issue in this atmosphere – why don't you want to give us assurances? My colleagues answered to me, that the United States are against such assurances. I raise the question again – why? The answer – the Senate will block such a decision. Excuse me, my next question – why should the Senate block it? Because some Republicans consider the importance of this missile defense against Russian deterrent forces. Just only because of this. So it means that in four years, let's imagine that Republicans will come to power in the White House, or in 10 years, they will change the situation, they will change their position, they will forget about the political commitment by Barack Obama, we don't care, I don't want to look at Barack Obama's decisions on this issue. So there is no predictability again. And we will be in a very awkward situation. So, having said that, I would like to send another message. During the negotiations with my American colleagues, many times I raised just one question – I invited them to continue dialogue after the START treaty negotiations. I can see that it was Russia's mistake and the United States' mistake that we stopped talking about real problems. You see that many times I have already said during various fora that I remember *I* saw my American colleagues. There were tears in their eyes, as well as in the eyes of the Russian delegation, because we at least respect each other, and it was important for us to continue such dialogue, regardless of whether we have a difficult or easy question on the table, but at that time I was not supported. I hope that very soon we can return back to the table of discussions. But a lot of work has to be done before the next round of negotiations.

ADAMSON: You mentioned START Treaty, you mentioned your role in defense, but you didn't mention your great role in the NPT Review Conference Action Plan. I was there with

you, in the Egyptian Mission, actually, late at night, so my message is we can run but we can't hide. I wanted to pick up something around "threat assessment," because when you started your presentation, you talked about the mission of particular missile systems, and whether it was an appropriate mission. I wanted to explore a little bit, and this goes for NATO countries as well as the US. How much potential there is to explore a little bit more threat assessment, how to deter, mitigate, and counter. Because listening to the conversation and how Russia would perceive certain new systems, or targeting, I think the one thing that was there as a question was the potential for greater threat assessment, or at least exchange of views on the current, 21st century threats you face and we face.

ANTONOV: It's a very interesting question; it permits me to make my presentation a little wider. I'm very much satisfied that ten years ago, I was in the position of Ambassador-at-Large in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I participated in elaborating Resolution 1540. I remember how it was difficult, because our counterpart was the United States, Mr. Bolton at the time. I remember how Viktor at that time was in New York, and I remember how difficult it was at the time to find a consensus. It seems to me that if we look at this resolution, we can find the main threat to NATO and to Russia. It's a nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And I am 100% sure that together with NATO countries, together with non-aligned countries, we must do a lot of to protect ourselves. But, having said that, I will say that for me, it's impossible to strengthen my security at the expense of UK security. My initial point is that everything has to be done taking into account principle or indivisible security. SO, what has happened in Europe, in NATO for example? You have decided Iran is *the* threat to NATO. You decided to support the United States to create a missile defense system. But you have decided to do it in such a way that undercut my defensive capabilities, my country's defensive capabilities. So, what kind of situation do we have? From one side, you have protected yourself from Iran. But from another side, we are in quarrel with you. What is better? I don't know. I remember some bilateral documents within the United States and Russia on threat assessment. In 2009, the two presidents signed a bilateral statement. Three parts. First message – the United States and other NATO countries plus Russia have to sit at the table to make a threat assessment. Second – experts must review what kind of tools we have to tackle this problem. Third – experts have to provide other means and tools to deal with this issue. Excellent statement, but to my regret, very soon my counterpart at the time was Ambassador **Malov (1:09:41)**. In this statement, we didn't mention the word "threat." There was a problem with it, we called them "challenges." It's very important for you, I remember how I smiled. But after one month, the United States forgot about this statement, and they decided to develop this situation. So, I consider that the forthcoming threat or challenge is the situation on the territory of Afghanistan. I remember meeting with the NATO Minister of Defense. He was a little surprised after a conversation with my minister a few weeks ago, because, as I understand, my colleagues at NATO are looking at the situation in Afghanistan from the south. We offered you, NATO countries, to look at the situation from the north, from Tajikistan, from Kyrgyzstan, from the point of view of our allies. It seems to me that if we combine our capabilities and our efforts, especially after 2014, it will be in the interest of the security of all European countries, as well as the Russian Federation.

As to the proliferation, for example, of missiles – of course we are very concerned, it goes without saying. My problem is that I prefer political, diplomatic means and tools to deal with this issue. I am against, as I said, the creation of such a defense that could create a problem for you, for your country. We have to forget that we *were* enemies in the past. Today we are partners. But you now how it is difficult to find a consensus in NATO on this issue. That's why it's better to look inside your house.

POTTER: I wonder if you could say a little more about Russian pursuit of or interest in the same category of weapons that you have identified as being of very considerable concern to Russia because of US activities in this sphere, because usually, although not necessarily at the same time, our countries have pursued similar kinds of weapons. I think it would be unusual were Russia not also investing considerably in the non-nuclear strategic weapons. But also if you could say a little bit about were our two countries to decide that it would make sense to limit the developments, what types of arms control approaches might be suitable? You've already indicated the difference between ICBMs and SLBMs. Are there some creative approaches that you think we should be investing in with an eye to possible reductions in the future, should we agree that it is in our mutual interest?

ANTONOV: Today I'm ready to reveal some elements of the Russian position during negotiations. You see that our initial position on this issue was prohibition of such weapons, because we don't want to start an arms race. Your country pushed on us, and we are forced to start such an arms race in the future. We will spend a lot of money. I don't know what kind of agreement on this type of missiles would be. But the best way of course is to prohibit such types of weapons. And we offered to the United States to fix this idea in our agreement, but the United States refused. And then we decided to use the experience which we got from START-I, where we consider all launchers as launchers which could carry nuclear weapons. So, they are included in the ceilings of the new treaty. I don't know when the next treaty will be, but I would like to make it clear for us that there is no option. One of our demands will be that all such weapons are included in future ceilings. It's clear that when we sell these launchers, it's impossible to understand what kind of warhead is on this missile. You see that if we look at the Russian Federation, if a missile is launched from the east or from here or from here, for us it will be an attack. What will be the reaction of China? China has it's own problems without such missiles. There will be only 15 minutes, it will be very difficult to say, "Relax, it's not against you." How is it possibly to understand my minister, who is responsible for defense, that missiles, if flying in the direction of the Russian Federation, then they will change, of course, flight, but please – relax. It is hard to imagine what will be in the Russian Federation. Our early warning system and our deterrent forces are working well, I would like to show you.

SCOTTY: First off, I would like to respond a little to both Dr. Orlov and to Dr. Antonov, although some of my observations may be to a Dr. Antonov and some to a Deputy Defense Minister Antonov. You've given us a very rich field of thought to collectively ponder. As we embarked on the conceptual approach to New START, as you all know, as we were trying to formulate how do we improve our mutual security, the concept was very much to a mutual

movement to strategic stability. You said it shows up in the title, and I'm not disputing what you said about how we came up with the formulation of the new framework, and it's a very important framework for people to understand the philosophical and conceptual shifts that it involves. I'm not sure that everyone always does when they talk about it; I think they think it's a kind of linear progression 1-2-3-4. There are actually some important shifts, and I'm glad that you highlighted that.

I think part of what's embedded in that conceptual shift to understand is that some of the answers to mutual searches we're on are going to be ones where maybe we don't come up with hard security formulaic answers. Maybe part of the answers are based on cooperation, maybe some are based on mutual explorations of intent, mutual explorations of threat, and I think that's the lens through which we approach what we hope can be the next step. I won't say anything specific about National Security Advisor Donilon's trip other than that it was a very good trip and we hope that it leads to more things.

I think that dialogue is absolutely the way forward. I know that Dr. Miller is looking forward to seeing Dr. Antonov in official and private capacities, if you will. When you talk about this category of weapons and how it figures into the broader mix, it's a very legitimate issue to raise. It's a part of our capability set that is truly intended for nothing even remotely in the Cold War lens set. But intent is an important part of the calculation, that's well understood. I think further dialogue can help both of us understand each other's intent better, and will help us maybe start to set an example for looking at how others, as you're quite rightly pointing out, it's a broader playing field that's developing. When we think about this category set, we can't help but notice that Russia's got some pretty good capabilities coming online as well. I don't think we have the intent concerns maybe, but you also point out quite rightly, as maybe Dr. Antonov, that you're using a capabilities set matrix to look at these things. I think it will be challenging if we just use that lens to look at some of this. If we look at combinations of more of the new philosophy and some of the old philosophy, maybe we can make each other feel like that indivisibility of security at work. I think that we're very interested in going down that path with you. And we're very interested in talking with our NATO allies about the potential that's in the dialogue and cooperation. We certainly see bright days ahead, hopeful days ahead for the US-Russian relationship. As Jo said in the NPT sense, hopeful days ahead for how we and the P5 can show that we take our Article VI responsibilities very seriously. We're really acting on that, it's not talk, we're really acting on that.

ANTONOV: First, I would like for you to understand me again, and I would like to repeat it a second time. I am not criticizing the United States. Please, don't consider that I am angry with the United States. I'm talking about the security of the Russian Federation. I'm talking about what kind of elements of missile defense of the United States create a problem for me. By the way, I am not against missile defense. I am *in favor* of missile defense. But in such a way that does not undercut *my* security. What we want – we don't want to see interceptors here, very close to my ICBMs. I don't want American Navy ships here and here, because they will be undercutting again Russian deterrent forces. It's up to do to decide – put it here. But sometimes it's very strange when, for example, I say, "Let's agree to not have here in the

Antarctic missile defense,” and my colleagues from the United States say, “No, Anatoly, you are very shrewd. You would like to have some limitation for missile defense of the United States. Maybe in the future we will need missile defense here? Come on.” You say that all our arguments should be reasonable, you say that we are in favor to cooperate with you. There were some proposals to NATO and to the United States, provided by only one condition – don’t create your system which could undercut my capabilities. Again, if I see in non-nuclear strategic offensive arms a problem for my security, of course, I have to explain to everybody that it is a problem for me.

Second, being Deputy Minister, I do my best to increase the security of my country, because until now you see that not all problems between the United States and Russia, between NATO and Russia are solved. And I’m sorry, but I don’t want to speak about intentions. I prefer to talk about capabilities. The United States and NATO are talking about the necessity of cooperation. I’m not against this. But at the same time, there should be some conditions of such cooperation. You can see what has happened with the missile defense plans of the United States. They decided to cancel the fourth phase, but as I said before, there is no predictability. If you don’t want to create problems for me, let’s put everything on paper. Let’s agree that we have common missile threats. Let’s discuss it. Let’s put it on paper and let’s decide what kinds of means and tools we will use to tackle this problem. That’s all that I want. The same I would like to say about conventional forces in Europe. Why some countries consider that you need a mechanism, which should contain the armed forces of the Russian Federation? Again, there is a question of who we are. We are partners, we are friends, we are not allies here. But let’s agree, because Europe is our common house. Let’s make our house more safe together.

HITCHENS: I think this is a very interesting and very serious issue, so you will forgive me for asking a rather provocative and cheeky question. In the fantasy world, or in the future, wouldn’t the answer to all of this be that everyone should have conventional weapons – conventional long-range strike – instead of nuclear weapons? So, America shares the technology, Russia shares the technology, and we no longer have nuclear weapons states, we have long-range conventional weapons with the same kind of deterrence theory processes that we have today. Wouldn’t that be a better world?

HOFFMAN: I think there is no question that this is a very important subject. I think it is very important that we discuss it so that we understand better mutual concerns. And I also understand well that Russia is looking at this with a critical eye. I myself, when I was confronted with this issue of prompt global strike for the first time a couple of years back. I felt at the time and I still feel that this issue that it is very difficult to distinguish between nuclear-tipped and conventional-tipped missiles is a big problem, and I think that is clear to anybody. But what I understand is that your key message is that there can be no more progress on reductions without a resolution of this particular issue. Now, as you know Anatoly, I always like to have a controversial discussion with you and challenge you a little bit, and I would want to do that now as well. I understand that on the purely political level, I would also try to enlist support so that the United States basically does not pursue this

project. It's obvious. You say, "We, Russia, cannot go down this route of reductions unless this problem is solved." And then other people say, "Okay, we want to have reductions, so solve this problem." That's purely political, I understand that.

But on the military-strategic level, I'm not so sure. I think that goes a bit to the heart of the matter. You seem to think that you need to have 1550 warheads deployed, which is under New START, and 800 something launchers. This is the old question "how much is enough?" A few decades back, the military taught you in the Soviet Union, and in the United States as well, into believing that you need altogether some 70,000 nuclear warheads. And at the time, you thought that was absolutely necessary to safeguard our security and all these other slogans. Now I ask you, and I do it a bit colloquially – how much bang do you need to safeguard your security? Because, if others apply your logic, where you say that we cannot go down below 1550 deployed, not talking about all the tactical nuclear weapons that you have all over the place, and thousands non-deployed. For Christ's sake, if others employ this kind of argumentation, they could say, "If they think that's good for them, why's it not good for us?" So, my challenge is – is 1000 not good enough for the next step and it still safeguards your interests?

ANTONOV: I like very much fairy tales! But it's rather difficult for me to imagine that the United States, who is the possessor today of such technology, could share such technology with NATO countries. I'm not talking about the Russian Federation. I would like also to repeat one slogan – KoKom is leading, KoKom will be forever for the Russian Federation. Look at the list of the United States' list of control where Russia is – on the same line with Iran, North Korea, and so on. What we are talking about. Is it possible to think even about the possibility to get such technology. On missile defense, I know the policy of the United States. They are very reluctant to share such technology with others. I like a world without nuclear weapons, that goes without saying, and we are committed to this goal. But we need some steps to be taken by everybody to come to this.

I don't say that without solution of this problem there will be no new treaty. I said in the middle of my presentation – there are some problems which have to be decided, discussed with the United States. This is just only one problem, and I have a solution. I said that if there is a political decision of my president and Barack Obama and the other P5 to sit at the table, our will position will be just to include such types of weapons into the future ceilings or limitations, that's all. Please, don't consider that without solution of this issue there will be no treaty. Second, you have raised the question – how many warheads or launchers we need. I would like to answer that at this stage, we need 1550 plus 700 deployed launchers. The next round of discussions and conversations with our American friends, with other P5 members, we will sit together and we will look at the situation and our military experts will say how many warheads they need. Don't forget that we just celebrated the third anniversary of this treaty. We have seven years more, and our task with the United States is to honestly fulfill our obligations under this treaty. We have a lot to do. I don't want to reveal all the details of what we're doing with the United States. But to say to you today that we just need 1000 warheads, I don't know, because I work in the Ministry of Defense, but I am a diplomat. I

need military experts' advice, because they have some calculation. My generals, as well as generals in the UK and in the Pentagon – they decide and they provide their calculation to the president. In the United States' team as well as in the Russian team, there were two parts to the team – diplomats, who were negotiating the text of the treaty, and military experts, who thought a lot of and knew a lot of, but didn't reveal some even to us, secrets. Sometimes it was really difficult to negotiate. That's why I would say that it's not possible today to realize what kind of situation should be in the future, taking into account just one parameter – the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia.

Our life is richer, we have some other problems. For example, the United States as well as other countries such as Germany are raising the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons, I remember non-deployed warheads. Okay, there is no problem. We have other problems, which I mentioned. You see, it was two years ago when I offered the United States team to continue our discussions, to not stop our negotiations. At that time, the United States didn't support me. I hope that the United States will support me now. Thank you.