

Постоянное представительство
Российской Федерации
при ООН в Нью-Йорке



Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations in New
York

Unofficial translation

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STATEMENT

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**Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation
to the Preparatory Committee
for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

(Cluster 2: non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards)

New York, 29 April - 9 May 2014

Mr. Chairman,

An efficient nuclear non-proliferation regime plays a key role in maintaining the international peace and stability as well as moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

The application of the IAEA safeguards pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT is an important element of ensuring non-proliferation regime. The sole purpose of safeguards is to verify whether states comply with the obligations they have assumed under the NPT. These safeguards are also an important prerequisite for promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as a tool for reinforcing trust among States.

We deem it important to ensure that the IAEA safeguards system is strengthened steadily, primarily through the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which, together with the Agreement itself, is to become a universal standard for verifying whether countries comply with their obligations under the non-proliferation regime. Of course, accession to the Additional Protocol is a voluntary measure.

The Russian Federation actively cooperates with the Agency in strengthening the safeguards system by providing financial and technical assistance through the national programme of scientific and technical support for the safeguards. Within the framework of this programme Russia provides support to the IAEA in analyzing the environment samples collected by the Agency during inspections. We also assist the Agency in developing new technologies for detecting undeclared nuclear materials and activities. We are paying great attention to the training of IAEA inspectors and this relates not only to certain methods for nuclear materials measurement (for instance, by means of non-destructive analysis) but to the whole range of activities required when conducting inspections, e.g. at the facilities used for isotopic enrichment of uranium. We are paying particular attention to employing Russian specialized institutions for training IAEA Member States personnel charged with accounting for and controlling nuclear materials.

Russia is taking an active part in the deliberations on a safeguards system reform the IAEA Secretariat is working on.

Distinguished representative from Brazil rightly pointed out that in its verification activities the IAEA Secretariat should be guided solely by objective and technically justified assessment criteria. An exhaustive list of which is to be approved by the Agency's policy-making bodies. It is necessary to preclude any political component in the Secretariat's safeguards activities.

We believe it is of the utmost importance to achieve a broad international consensus with regard to the ways for improving the IAEA safeguards system. Only then will it be possible to ensure the Member States' confidence in the safeguards system, which, in its turn, is a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining the stability of the non-proliferation regime. We are looking forward to the IAEA Director-General's detailed report on the state-level safeguards concept the Secretariat is working out. We would like to underscore that it is inadmissible to implement new approaches to the application of safeguards before this report has been endorsed by the Agency's policy-making bodies.

Russia is advocating a consistent implementation of UN SC Resolution 1540 by all countries with a view to countering black markets for WMDs and preventing non-state actors, primarily, terrorist organizations, from acquiring such weapons and related materials, technologies and means of delivery. We are taking an active part in the deliberations of the UN SC Committee established to efficiently implement UN SC Resolution 1540.

In the field of nuclear security we put an emphasis upon the systemic importance of such international legal instruments as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment to it as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It is necessary that all the countries which have not yet done so should sign and ratify these international instruments as soon as possible. We specifically underline that a particular responsibility is incumbent

upon those countries that aspire to play a leading role in the international cooperation with regard to nuclear security. Russia is party to all major international legal mechanisms for ensuring nuclear security, including the above-mentioned agreements. We are of the view that the universalization of these legal instruments is an inherent element of reinforcing the global nuclear security.

We resolutely believe in the inviolability of the fundamental principle stating that the responsibility for ensuring an efficient and reliable national nuclear security system rests with the relevant national authorities which define the system's optimum parameters at their own discretion. Any international assistance or aid provided to States in creating national nuclear security mechanisms can only be rendered at a request and in compliance with the national legal requirements. Such assistance should not lead to the disclosure of sensitive information about the state of national nuclear security systems, which might get into the hands of terrorists or other persons with malicious intents.

In this regard we highly appreciate the outcomes of the Washington, Seoul and Hague Summits on Nuclear Security.

We consistently support central role of the IAEA in coordinating the international cooperation in the field of nuclear security. We assume the IAEA will continue to play a leading role in fostering cooperation among States and exchange of experience in the field of nuclear security and preventing the threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism. We note the importance of providing the IAEA with adequate resources required for its activities in the field of nuclear security. Russia has been paying voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2010.

We welcome international efforts and initiatives that can contribute to countering nuclear terrorism and attracting international attention to strengthening nuclear security. We believe that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched by Russia and the US in 2006, which has become over the past years an efficient instrument of cooperation and best practices exchange in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism

and strengthening nuclear security in the world, might serve as a model of such cooperation. The GICNT greatly contributes to reaching a broad consensus on the most complicated and sensitive aspects of the international cooperation in this area. As of today it brings together 85 States.

Russia pays great attention to the implementation of paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT. In this regard we appreciate the activities of the NSG and the Zanger Committee which have proved in practice that it is possible to establish a coordinated procedure of control over nuclear export on a non-discriminatory basis and to ensure the effectiveness of efforts aimed at elaborating a control list of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies, as well as the principles of their transfers to non-nuclear countries.

We reaffirm the principled position of our country aimed at providing comprehensive support for the CTBT. We intend to continue the work with a view to establishing a solid recognition of the need to as soon as possible transform it into an effective international legal instrument. I would like to note that the responsibility for the delay in entry into force of the Treaty is fully with the States from the List of 44 countries that have not yet ratified the CTBT. We call on them to do so without delay and any preconditions.

Russia supports the launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva within the framework of the balanced Programme of Work. It should be acceptable to all and allow taking into account the differing interests and priorities of all participants of the CD as well as based on the "Shannon Mandate", which provides for negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable FMCT (document CD/1299 of 24 March 1995). For us, this wording clearly defines the scope of negotiations on a possible Treaty that should become another multilateral measure to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We view the ongoing work to return fresh and spent highly enriched uranium

(HEU) fuel from research reactors designed by Russia and the United States from third countries to the country of origin as an important area of cooperation aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and improving nuclear security. Big progress has been achieved in this field. These activities are carried out by Russia and the US with the participation of the IAEA. To date Russia has completely removed HEU fuel from 9 countries – Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Vietnam and Hungary. HEU fuel has been partially removed from 5 countries – Germany, Poland, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. In total, during the existence of the program, 790 kg of fresh and 1,269 kg of irradiated HEU fuel from 14 countries were removed. The removal of fuel from Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Poland is planned.

At the same time we would like to stress that the return of HEU fuel to the country of origin and conversion of reactors to LEU fuel is a voluntary choice of certain countries. The presence of HEU fuel in non-nuclear-weapon States does not automatically pose a threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The main thing is that all such material should be under the IAEA safeguards and covered by reliable measures of physical protection.

In our opinion, the settlement of regional challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is possible only through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. This approach has no alternative. This is attested by the fact that over the past year significant progress has been achieved in resolving the situation around the Iranian Nuclear Programme. The Joint Plan of Action of E3+3 and Iran of 24 November 2013 is being steadily implemented. This is based on the concept formulated by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. The essence of it is the recognition of Iran's inalienable right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme, including the right to enrich uranium, if this programme is put under strict international control. It also implies that all the existing sanctions against Iran should be lifted, including the unilateral ones, the legitimacy of which we have never recognized. The Geneva agreement is based on the principles of a step-by-step approach and

reciprocity, which were first put forward by Russia and which have eventually received universal recognition and support.

In parallel, the cooperation between Iran and the IAEA is also well underway with a view to closing all outstanding issues of the Agency with regard to Iran's nuclear programme, including those that may be related to possible military dimensions.

We are confident that the unprecedentedly constructive cooperation by Iran with the IAEA as well as E3+3 gives grounds to hope for a successful conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue within a time frame provided for by the Geneva agreement – until 20 July 2014. We call on all the parties concerned to intensify common efforts in order to look for specific solutions so as to resolve this issue.

Vigorous steps are needed to start moving toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. A further stalemate in the negotiation process will only exacerbate the current situation. We are convinced that the parties concerned should make every possible effort to ensure a full-fledged participation of the DPRK in the NPT and the application of the IAEA safeguards on its territory.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.