Position of the Russian Federation on issues pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Moscow, 2018
The Three Pillars of the NPT

Disarmament (Article VI)

Non-proliferation (Article I, II, VII)

Peaceful uses of nuclear technology (Article III, IV, V)
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

DOCTRINAL BASIS
• The main threats are the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear terrorist attacks;
• The need to maintain the nuclear deterrence potential at a sufficient level, to develop nuclear energy;
• Conditions conducive to the steady development of the Russian Federation for the long term are formed by ensuring strategic stability, including by phased progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, in conditions of strengthening universal reliable and equal security, bearing in mind all factors influencing global strategic stability, and on the basis of common and just principles of international law.
• Promoting the involvement of other nuclear-weapon States in the process of ensuring strategic stability;
• Participating together with other states in a strengthening of international mechanisms for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related goods and technology;
• Prepared for further discussion of a reduction of nuclear potentials based on bilateral accords and in multilateral formats and also contributes to the creation of fitting conditions permitting a reduction in nuclear arms without detriment to international security and strategic stability.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

«The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when under threat the very existence of the state. The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken President of the Russian Federation».

«Russia maintains an unwavering commitment to strengthening the political and legal foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, given the risk that elements of such weapons could fall into the hands of non-State actors, primarily terrorist organizations».
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

RUSSIAN POSITION
«Along with international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the main threat to peace in the 21st century. And the situation is particular dangerous in which weapons of mass destruction can be available to terrorists…

Competent and effective policies in the sphere of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction means the safety of our nation as a whole and of our citizens, and ensure international stability and increase the authority of Russia in the world».

Source: Opening address by President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Security Council, December 3, 2003.
«The importance [NPT] to international peace and security cannot be overestimated. The NPT played a key role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, laid the foundation for consistent movement towards disarmament, primarily nuclear, and the development of broad international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It can rightly be considered an example of the efficacy of multilateral diplomacy, and a standard for interaction between members of the international community in overcoming global international challenges».

Source: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s remarks at the Conference marking the 50th anniversary of the NPT being opened for signing,

Moscow, June 14, 2018.
Russia’s Policy on Nuclear Nonproliferation (3)

«Russia consistently implements all the provisions of the NPT, including Article VI». 

«We are convinced that the equilibrium between the three main pillars of the NPT — nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy — remains a pledge of its viability in the future».

Source: Welcome address by Vladimir Putin to the 2015 NPT Review conference
Articles I and II of the NPT

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
NATO and Nuclear Sharing

«Nuclear disarmament is hampered by the US non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe as well as the destabilizing practice of so-called NATO nuclear sharing. Within its framework non-nuclear NATO Member-States participate in planning of employment of the US non-strategic nuclear weapons and get involved into appropriate skills training in grave violation of the NPT. Everyone should understand that by doing so the US military train the armed forces of the European countries to employ tactical nuclear weapons against Russian Federation».

«North Korea has taken certain steps to denuclearise – it blew up its nuclear test site, destroyed it, but it apparently expects something in return. And it seems counterproductive if North Korea is required to do so much while the other side does nothing at all. It sounds like North Korea has to take their word for it that in the long run it will benefit… If North Korea is satisfied with US guarantees alone, that is also fine with us, but it is probably unlikely to happen, we have to be realistic. It seems to me that international guarantees would be more relevant in this case, and we can talk about it».

Iran is rigorously fulfilling its obligations under the JCPOA. It should be noted that the “nuclear chapters” of the agreement consist of two parts – legal obligations stemming from the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and temporary limitations on peaceful nuclear activities, including on the number of centrifuges, that Iran voluntarily assumed. We have no doubts that Iran will keep its promises provided that the JCPOA is persistently implemented. But the other parties to the agreement have to think about the way to ensure the long-term sustainability of the nuclear agreement».

• «We are deeply disappointed by US President Donald Trump’s decision to unilaterally give up commitments to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme (JCPOA) and to reinstate the US sanctions on Iran».

• «Russia is open to further cooperation with the other JCPOA participants and will continue to actively develop bilateral collaboration and political dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran».

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones (1)

Source: presentation of the Russian Ministry of Defense at the 2015 NPT Review Conference
Russia has ratified the protocols to the treaties on NWFZ in:

• Latin America
• Africa
• South Pacific Ocean
• Central Asia

Russia, like other nuclear States, has not signed the Protocol to the NWFZ Treaty in:

• South-East Asia

The main reason for not signing the Protocol is the clause of the Treaty which extends the nuclear-weapon-free zone to the exclusive economic zones.

Source: 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
• Russia made a traditional stipulation that it will not consider itself bound by the Protocol’s obligations if an attack is launched against it, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies or a state toward which it has security commitments.

• Russia made another traditional stipulation that it will not consider the Protocol binding if a participating state allows warships to enter its ports or aircraft to land on its airfields if they are carrying nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The same applies to the transit of these weapons or devices.

Source: Comment by the Information and Press Department on Russia’s ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, 2015.
All the concerned countries of the region, as well as the three co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution and the UN Secretary-General, have to calmly come to the table and negotiate convening the conference. After all, nobody speaks about any drastic changes. Everyone understands pretty well that the establishment of the WMD-free zone is a long-term process, and one has to define own position for years, if not decades ahead.

Source: Interview with Vladimir Yermakov, Head of the Russian Delegation at the Second Session of the 2020 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee; Yaderny Kontrol. Issue № 6 (500), June 2018
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
RUSSIAN POSITION
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Russia’s Participation in Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties

- **Multilateral treaties:**
  - Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – 1968
  - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – 1996

- **Bilateral treaties (Russia-US):**
    (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are members of the INF Treaty)
«Russia will continue to pursue the goal of achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament – we have been confirming this statement at the highest level. We are confident that future progress in nuclear disarmament can be possible only if all interested parties make necessary efforts to it». 

Russia’s Policy on Nuclear Disarmament (2)

• Russia is committed to nuclear disarmament and shares the goal to ultimately achieve the global “nuclear zero”.
• Other nuclear-weapon states should remove non-strategic nuclear weapons to their territories and eliminate all infrastructure abroad providing for their rapid deployment.
• Russia transferred its tactical nuclear weapons into the non-deployed category, with all its nuclear weapons being “de-targeted” or assigned “zero flight missions”.
• The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) cannot make any positive contribution to the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons without taking into account the views of nuclear-weapon states.

Sources: statement by Mikhail Ulyanov at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, statement by Vadim Smirnov at the Second session of the 2020 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee.
We believe the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an important element of the international system of security and stability, in particular, its aspects regarding nuclear safety and non-proliferation. We keep pressing for the early ratification of the treaty and lending it a comprehensive status.

Russia’s position on the CTBT (2)

- The main elements of the CTBT verification mechanism are the International monitoring system (IMS), the International Data Centre (IDC) and on-site inspections.

- The Russian segment of the IMS consists of 32 facilities:
  - 6 main and 13 auxiliary seismic stations,
  - 4 infrasound stations,
  - 8 radionuclide stations and 1 radionuclide laboratory.

As of July 16, 2018, 28 facilities of the Russian segment of the IMS had been certified.

Sources: official websites of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense
Russia’s position on the Ban Treaty*

«Russia does not intend to join the [Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty] NWBT. We believe that complete elimination of nuclear weapons is only possible in the context of general and complete disarmament amid equal and indivisible security for all, including those possessing nuclear weapons, as it is stipulated in the NPT.

The provisions of the NWBT, which is open for signature, do not conform to these principles. The NWBT disregards the importance of taking stock of all the current factors that influence strategic stability. It has also provoked an international controversy and may have a destabilizing effect on the non-proliferation regime».

* The official name of and abbreviation for the Ban Treaty are the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW.

Source: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at a UN Security Council meeting on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Confidence Building Measures, New York, January 18, 2018
New START Implementation

Source: Kommersant daily; Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, February 5, 2018; Webpage of the US Department of State.
Russian Reservations about the US Compliance with the New START (1)

«To further the nuclear disarmament process it is necessary to focus the international community’s efforts on resolving urgent problems of international security and stability. One of them is the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty followed by unimpeded unilateral deployment of the US global missile defence systems, refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the development of high-precision offensive strategic weapons, and the possible deployment of offensive weapons in space, increasing quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional weapons».

Source: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s remarks at the Conference marking the 50th anniversary of the NPT being opened for signing, Moscow, June 14, 2018
Russian Reservations about the US Compliance with the New START (2)

- Irreversible conversion of 56 Trident II SLBM launchers and 41 B-52H heavy bombers cannot be confirmed;
- Some ICBM silo training launches are arbitrarily renamed as “training silos,” a category not specified by the Treaty.

Russian Reservations about the US Compliance with the INF Treaty

- Deployment of Mk-41 launchers as part of Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense assets at its BMD base in Romania;
- Production and employment of UAVs with strike capabilities without legally settling this issue within the INF Treaty;
- A large-scale testing programme, involving Hera target missiles that are similar in characteristics to ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles.

Source: Russia’s assessment of the US Department of State’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, April 24, 2018.
Russia’s Position on Missile Defense

«However hard has Washington tried to cover its activities in developing its missile defense, to exercise in delivering statements on absence of any links between the U.S missile defense and Russian actions as well as on the missile defense system being targeted at countering missile threats from other directions, all this chatter and jabber is not worth listening. All the more so because it is now getting evident what the real design of the American military strategists is…

We have never had any doubts that this American ploy to develop a global missile defense system to a significant extent is aimed against Russia and at depreciation, in the military sense, of the Russian strategic forces and deterrent capability».

Source: comment by Sergey Ryabkov, TASS, August 14, 2018.
**New Russian Weapons (1)**

**KREMLIN’S DEADLY ARSENAL**

**AVANGARD**

Intercontinental hypersonic missile that would fly at 20 times the speed of sound and strike 'like a meteorite, like a fireball', according to President Putin. During the descending section of that trajectory, with only a few hundred miles left to the target, the warhead suddenly takes a dive, loses altitude, and continues the approach as a cruise missile following the contours of the ground to avoid detection.

**SARMAT ICBM**

The new rocket can hit any target on the globe. Currently under testing it has a range and number of warheads exceeding the capabilities of its predecessor the SS-18 Satan. It is claimed no missile defence system will be able to withstand it.

**UNDERWATER DRONE**

The high-speed submarine also has an 'intercontinental' range and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that could target both aircraft carriers and coastal facilities.

**KINZHAL**

Already deployed in Russia's Southern Military District, Putin said that the hypersonic missile carried by an aircraft flies at 10 times the speed of sound and has a range of 1,250 miles.

«I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defences and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives».

Source: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018.
Russia Against the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (1)

«The tendency observed in U.S. doctrinal and practical documents points in this direction (placement of weapons in outer space), which is deeply concerning. It is not by chance that Russia proposed a series of initiatives to prevent arms race from spilling over to outer space, for instance, the Russian-Chinese draft text of a legally-binding treaty in this field, which we have recently updated and submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva».

Russia Against the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (2)

• 2004 – Russia unilaterally assumed a political obligation not to be the first to deploy weapons in outer space. In 2005, such obligation was taken on by the rest members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

• 2008 – Russia and China submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a joint draft of a Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).

• 2014 – Russia and China updated the draft text of the PPWT to accommodate suggestions made by interested states.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
«It was neither our fault, nor our initiative that the U.S.-Russian parliamentary dialogue was discontinued for several years. We can only welcome any steps towards its reestablishment, bearing in mind the significant disagreements with our American colleagues on a whole range of issues. However, we are ready to discuss them, and, of all things, we primarily want to avoid confrontation caused by ignorance, when our counterparts and even opponents simply do not know our real position, did not obtain it firsthand, but relied on media coverage or analysis by experts, whose level of expertise on Russia has catastrophically dropped over the past years».

Source: blog entry by Chair of the Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs Konstantin Kosachev, June 28, 2018.
«It is necessary to prevent a global strategic arms race, and it is the joint efforts by Russia and the United States that the state of international security depends on. Although we have a range of disagreements, we still have some points of agreement. Hence the critical importance of overcoming mutual mistrust, with dialogue playing the key role in this process».

Source: comment by Coordinator of the Russian State Duma Group of Friendship with the U.S. Congress, Member of the Committee on International Affairs, Inga Yumasheva, August 9, 2018.
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

RUSSIAN POSITION
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy...
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency... The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
Russian policy on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (1)

• Nuclear energy is doomed to be an integral part of the world energy balances.

• Russia seeks not just presence, but leadership in the world nuclear energy market.

• Russia conducts its international cooperation in this field in strict compliance with the IAEA regulations.

• If the nuclear energy field develops in accordance with the NPT, norms and recommendations of the IAEA, and with due application of safeguards, then it strengthens, rather than erodes, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Source: statement by Nikolay Spassky, Deputy Director General for International Relations at the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation, at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017
Russian policy on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (2)

- Russia advocates broad access of the States Parties to the NPT to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, development of international cooperation in this field, especially with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states;

- Russia assures uranium supply to countries that have opted to join the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) instead of developing their own enrichment facilities;

- Russia considers the development of infrastructure for nuclear medicine, including equipment for diagnostics, treatment and production of radiopharmaceuticals, as well as the supply of isotope products, as an exceptionally promising area for the peaceful use of nuclear technologies.

Source: Statement by the Russian delegation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference (Cluster 3: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy)
Rosatom`s Global Presence (2018)

Geographic coverage: 50 states
Foreign orders: $ 133,50 bln
Portfolio of projects implemented abroad for 2018 year: 36 units

Source: the website «Rosatom»
(http://www.rosatom.ru/)
«The confidence of the NPT States Parties in the IAEA safeguards is pivotal to render the whole nuclear non-proliferation system sustainable. This confidence has always been based on the IAEA unbiased verification mechanism of compliance with non-proliferation obligations, its technical feasibility and political impartiality.

If we wish to see the NPT strengthened, the IAEA safeguards system must further meet the above requirements. It is important to keep it unaffected by politics and bias.»

Russia believes it is important to ensure consistent strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system through universalising the Additional Protocol, which, together with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, is intended to become a universally recognised standard for verifying compliance by non-nuclear states with their non-proliferation commitments;

Any reforms, changes and improvements in the system of safeguards should not call into question the objective and depoliticised nature of the IAEA oversight mechanism;

The IAEA’s system of safeguards remains the basis for verifying states’ performance of their obligations under the NPT.

Source: The Russian delegation’s remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and IAEA Safeguards at the 2nd session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 27, 2018
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (1)

Goals:

• Enhancing nuclear non-proliferation safeguards;
• Maintaining security of supply and provision of nuclear fuel cycle services (NFC).

Five suggested approaches(1):

1. Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case-by-case basis through long-term contracts and transparent suppliers’ arrangements with government backing. Examples would be: fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, as well as commercial fuel banks.

2. Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with IAEA participation. Different models should be investigated, notably with the IAEA as guarantor of service supplies, e.g. as administrator of a fuel bank.

Five suggested approaches (2):

3. Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of NPT non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, and non-NPT States.

4. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also serve this objective.

5. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might call for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements – by region or by continent – and for broader cooperation, involving the IAEA and the international community.

«We need to create the prototype of a global infrastructure that will give all interested countries equal access to nuclear energy, while stressing reliable compliance with the requirements of the non-proliferation regime, of course.

The creation of a system of international centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, on a non-discriminatory basis and under the control of the IAEA, could become a key element in developing this new infrastructure. Russia has already made just such a proposal and is prepared to establish an international center of this kind on its territory».

Source: Vladimir Putin`s speech at the Inter-State Council of the Eurasian Economic Community Session, 2006.
The International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) was established in the Russian Federation in 2007 jointly with the Republic of Kazakhstan upon the initiative of the President of Russia.

**Goals:**
- Establishment of a network of international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under IAEA control, on the basis of non-discriminatory access;
- Ensuring non-discriminatory access to nuclear fuel cycle products through long-term supply agreements with its shareholders (member states);
- Strengthening the role of the IAEA in the global promotion of nuclear energy.

*Source: The website of the IUEC [http://www.iuec.ru/]*
Sources:

- President of Russia: http://en.kremlin.ru/
- IAEA: https://www.iaea.org/
- IUEC: http://eng.iuec.ru/
- PIR Center: http://www.pircenter.org/