Strategic Stability in a New Era: Identifying Pathways for U.S.-Russia Dialogue and International Cooperation

VCDNP
Donau-City Strasse 6
Andromeda Tower, Floor 13/1
Vienna, Austria

December 8, 2018

AGENDA

In a world in which arms control is fading and critical infrastructure is at greater risk to cyber threats, strategic stability assumes even greater urgency. This meeting seeks to promote a more constructive U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability especially as it applies to cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and nuclear risk reduction.

09.00 – 09.30 – Welcome Coffee and Registration

09.30 – 09.45 – Introductory Remarks

Dr. Vladimir Orlov, Founder & Special Advisor, PIR Center, Member, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

Prof. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies


10.15 – 11.45 – Session 1. Cyber threats to critical infrastructure and their impact on strategic stability: How should Russia and the United States respond?

The United States, NATO, and Russia do not provide clear guidance to their military forces regarding a potential kinetic response to malicious cyber activity attributed to another state or a state-sponsored actor. Publicly available reports on military doctrines and national security policies of the two states only indicate that such options are reserved and might be used under certain circumstances (i.e., a policy of strategic ambiguity).

- Does such a policy jeopardize strategic stability regime in under conditions in which cyber conflict may develop between Russia and the United States?
- Do the nuclear powers’ strategic documents or international law norms provide any “emergency brakes” that could potentially prevent or retard the response escalation chain “cyber impact – kinetic response – nuclear response” from taking place?
- Can Russia and the United States negotiate specific criteria for kinetic-to-cyber military responses in order to prevent cyber-to-nuclear escalation in potential conflict scenarios?
Is it possible for Russia and the US to restore the NRRC-based cyber emergency communication channels established by 2013 cyber-TCBMs agreements or to put in place a similar procedure? Are there any alternative options to provide two countries with dedicated communication channels aimed at preventing potential cyber-to-nuclear conflict escalation? Is it feasible to adapt the US-Russian military-to-military emergency communications experience in Syria to cyberspace for the purpose of prevent or, at least, retarding strategic escalation?

Moderator: Mr. Adlan Margoev, “Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation” Program Director, PIR Center

Panelists: Dr. Heather Williams, Lecturer, Defense Studies Department and Fellow, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS), King's College London

Mr. Oleg Demidov, Consultant, PIR Center

Dr. George Moore, Scientist-in-Residence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

11.45 – 12.00 – Coffee break

12.00 – 13.30 – Session 2. International law as safeguards against cyber actions that could potentially undermine security of critical infrastructure. Assessing the contribution of international organizations and the private sector.

Do existing international laws provide specific norms or guidelines that could reduce nuclear risks associated with cyber operations during war time and/or peace time?

How can international organizations and legal frameworks (e.g., involving the UN, GGE, OSCE, IAEA) contribute to establishing clear rules and thresholds to reduce the possible negative impact of cyber activities on critical infrastructure?

Is there a role for industry in providing technical and/or normative solutions to decrease cyber risks to the security of critical infrastructure?

Moderator: Ms. Sarah Bidgood, Senior Research Associate and Project Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Panelists: Mr. Velimir Radicevic, Project Assistant, Transnational Threats Department, OSCE

Mr. Raja Adnan, Director of the Division of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, IAEA

Mr. Scott Purvis, Section Head, Information Management Section, Division of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, IAEA

Mr. Evgeny Grigorenko, Head of Public Affairs, Europe, Kaspersky Lab

Dr. George Moore, Scientist-in-Residence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
13.30 – 14.30 – Lunch


- How can one bridge the gap between U.S. and Russian approaches to strategic stability?
- How will new U.S. and Russian weapons influence strategic stability?
- How will the demise of the INF Treaty affect strategic stability?
- Is there any prospect for extending New START or for the concluding a follow-on arms control treaty?

Moderator: Prof. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Panelists: Ms. Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation

Gen. Evgeny Buzhinskiy, Chair of the Executive Board, PIR Center

Hon. Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board of Directors, Arms Control Association

Dr. Andrei Malov, Member of the Advisory Board, PIR Center

15:45 – 16.00 – Coffee break


A moderated discussion will be conducted to brainstorm new ideas on how to advance the U.S.-Russian dialogue on arms control and strategic stability. A summary of the project results and recommendations will precede the discussion to facilitate the exercise.

Moderator: Dr. Vladimir Orlov, Founder & Special Advisor, PIR Center; Member, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

Report presenter: Mr. Adlan Margoev, “Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation” Program Director, PIR Center

Discussion: All participants in the meeting

17.30 – 17.45 – Closing Remarks

Prof. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Dr. Vladimir Orlov, Founder & Special Advisor, PIR Center; Member, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

19.00 – 21.00 – Dinner

Address: 57 Restaurant & Lounge, Donau-City-Strasse 7.