Unilateral Measures for Bilateral Cooperation

US-Russia Cooperation Towards the 2025 NPT Review Conference

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The NPT Review Process: A Crisis of Legitimacy

• 1995 bargain remains unfulfilled

• Disarmament proceeds at a glacial pace:
  • 2000: 13 Practical Steps remain unfulfilled (some no longer exist)
  • 2010: 22 Disarmament Points in Action Plan remain unfulfilled
  • Step-by-Step Approach/Progressive Approach/Building Blocks/Stepping Stones out of favor in US

• 2005-2016 humanitarian disarmament goes nuclear

• 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) Adopted

• 2020 NPT RevCon postponed due to COVID-19 Pandemic
Dim Prospects for US-Russia Cooperation

- Differences vis-à-vis Iran and JCPOA
- Middle East WMD-Free Zone
- Counteraccusations: INF, CTBT, Open Skies
- Lack of strategic stability dialogue
- Incompatible negotiating positions at present
- Modernization/development of new weapons systems
Other Considerations

• On both sides: COVID-19 Pandemic and Economic Crisis
  • CBO: US public debt will reach 108 percent of GDP by the end of 2021
  • FT: Russia spending up to $300m a day to deal with crisis, could exhaust national wealth fund by 2022

• On US side: Renewed debate in Europe over nuclear deterrence
  • States of concern: Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany

• On Russian side:
  • Prolonged low price of oil could cause acute economic pain

Estimated 2019 Nuclear Weapons Spending

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<tr>
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<th>Spending</th>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$8.5 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>$35.4 billion</td>
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Precedent for Unilateral Measures: The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)

- July 1991 – START I signed
- August 1991 – Soviet Union coup d’état
- September 1991 – Bush pledges unilateral reductions
- October 1991 - Gorbachev reciprocates
- December 1991 – Dissolution of the Soviet Union
- January 1992 – Bush State of the Union Address (PNI II) and Yeltsin reciprocates
- 3 January 1993 – START II signed
### PNIs: Relevant Drivers and Results

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<tr>
<th>US</th>
<th>Soviet Union/Russia</th>
<th>Results</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>• Benefiting from a peace dividend</td>
<td>• Concern over economic crisis and the cost of maintaining nuclear forces</td>
<td>• Reduction of 25,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons</td>
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<td>• Assuaging anti-nuclear sentiments among some allies</td>
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<td>• Achieved disarmament when conditions precluded arms control negotiations</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• But… no legally binding agreement, verification, or accounting</td>
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Towards 2021: Unilateral Measures

- Disarmament
  - Transparency: provide accounting of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons removed from deployment and dismantled under PNIs
  - Temper rhetoric where possible (both against one another and the TPNW)
  - *Pledge not to exceed New START deployment limits*
Towards 2025: Disarming while Rearming

Cost Reduction
Scale back modernization/development plans

Transparency
Report numbers for warheads awaiting dismantlement and military fissile material stocks

Conversion
As modernization progresses, increase dismantlement of non-deployed warheads and transfer excess fissile material to civilian control

FMCT
Launch Open-Ended Working Group to find areas of convergence
Peaceful Use and Nonproliferation

• Zlauvinen: “we need to level up our consideration of the peaceful uses. This is a set of issues that is fundamentally relevant to the development of our societies and have been relegated in the debate for too long.”

• Promote new technologies as contributions to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
  • Russia: Floating Nuclear Power Plants
  • US: Highlight innovations by TerraPower and NuScale Power
  • Offer financial assistance to developing states

• Nonproliferation: include entry into force of the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply for all new nuclear projects
  • Also include signature of the CTBT as a condition of supply
### Why?

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<th>For the US and Russia</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Alleviate pressure off the NPT</td>
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<td>• Positively frame cuts to defense plans that will occur anyway</td>
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<td>• Promote the norm of a “responsible nuclear-weapon state” and pressure China to limit fissile material production</td>
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<td>• Build trust for future negotiations when conditions improve</td>
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<td>• Provide cover for allies facing disarmament pressure</td>
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<td>• Advance nonproliferation agenda</td>
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<td>• Encourage US restraint in modernizing</td>
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<td>• Lessen damage to strategic stability</td>
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