Reviving U.S.-Russia Cooperation in the NPT Context: Article VI and the Road to 2021

Vladislav Chernavskikh
Nuclear nonproliferation is the only “silk thread” connecting the two superpowers in troubling times.

- Andrey Gromyko
Why Disarmament?

1. Historically had the potential to “make or break” the review conference

2. US-Russian cooperation plays a critical role
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>States</th>
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<tr>
<td>Article VI disarmament obligations (unequivocal undertaking, legal obligation to disarm, transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility principles)</td>
<td>Austria, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, San Marino and Thailand (<strong>PCII: WP.46</strong>), New Agenda Coalition (NAC) (<strong>PCII: WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), Arab States (<strong>PCII: WP.35, PCIII WP.21</strong>), Iran (<strong>PCII: WP.27, PCIII WP.2.4</strong>), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), China (<strong>PCII WP.40</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>CTBT (entry into force, role, verification)</td>
<td>Russian Federation (<strong>PCII WP.43</strong>), China (<strong>PCII WP.40</strong>), Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iraq, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (<strong>PCII WP.28</strong>, NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), the Vienna Group of Ten (<strong>PCII WP.5, CONF.2020/WP.3</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>Disarmament education</td>
<td>NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>Disarmament verification (incl. multilateral verification research)</td>
<td>NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11, WP.14</strong>), Stepping Stones Approach (<strong>PCII WP.33, CONF.2020/WP.6</strong>), The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership (CONF.2020/WP.2).</td>
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<td>Fissile material (FMCT, Moratorium)</td>
<td>Arab States (<strong>PCII WP.15, PCIII WP.21</strong>), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) (<strong>PCII WP.45</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (CONF.2020/WP.7).</td>
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<td>Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (humanitarian perspective on security, international humanitarian law)</td>
<td>Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa and Thailand (<strong>PCII WP.9, PCIII WP.44</strong>), Austria (<strong>PCII WP.10.4</strong>), Arab States (<strong>PCII WP.35, PCIII WP.21</strong>), Iran (<strong>PCII WP.2, PCIII WP.8.4</strong>), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>Gender Issues</td>
<td>Ireland (<strong>PCII WP.46</strong>), the Vienna Group of Ten (CONF.2020/WP.3).</td>
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<td>NWFZs</td>
<td>China (<strong>PCII WP.38</strong>), Stepping Stones Approach (CONF.2020/WP.6), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>Reagan-Gorbachev principle “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”</td>
<td>NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), Stepping Stones approach (<strong>PCII WP.33, CONF.2020/WP.6</strong>).</td>
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<td>Risk reduction measures</td>
<td>Stepping Stones approach (<strong>PCII WP.33, CONF.2020/WP.6</strong>).</td>
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<td>De-alerting</td>
<td>the De-Alerting Group (<strong>PCII WP.23</strong>), NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>).</td>
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<td>Full implementation of the NPT (complementary nature of the 3 pillars, universality, role in international security)</td>
<td>NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), The Vienna Group of Ten (CONF.2020/WP.3).</td>
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<td>Security Doctrines (Diminishing role of NW, discussions on doctrine, no-first use)</td>
<td>China (<strong>PCII WP.40</strong>), Egypt (<strong>PCII WP.2</strong>), Stepping Stones approach (Sweden) (<strong>PCII WP.33, CONF.2020/WP.6</strong>), Arab States, Iran (<strong>PCII WP.8.4</strong>), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>TPNW</td>
<td>Austria, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, San Marino and Thailand (<strong>PCII WP.46</strong>), NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>), Arab States (<strong>PCII WP.35, PCIII WP.21</strong>), States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (<strong>PCII WP.32, CONF.2020/WP.7</strong>).</td>
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<td>Transparency and reporting</td>
<td>NAC (<strong>PCII WP.35, CONF.2020/WP.5</strong>), Stepping Stones approach (<strong>PCII WP.33, CONF.2020/WP.6</strong>), NPDI (<strong>PCII:WP.26.29, PCIII WP.26</strong>).</td>
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<td>US-Russia arms control architecture (INF, New START, ABM)</td>
<td>Austria, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, San Marino and Thailand (<strong>PCII WP.46</strong>), Russian Federation (<strong>PCII WP.6</strong>).</td>
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<td>Security assurances</td>
<td>China (<strong>PCII WP.36</strong>), Iran (<strong>PCII WP.28, PCII WP.2, PCII WP.8</strong>), Stepping Stones approach (CONF.2020/WP.6), Arab States (<strong>PCII WP.35, PCIII WP.21</strong>), NAM (<strong>PCII WP.11</strong>).</td>
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Non-nuclear weapon states care the most about…

1. Article VI obligations
2. Humanitarian issues
3. Role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and issues of transparency
4. TPNW
"The adoption of the final document therefore will depend on the unity of the "five" and the willingness of the anti-nuclear countries to make concessions."

- Adlan Margoev
Lessons from the past
1) US-Russian cooperation during the review conference is one of the most important elements of success

• Usually sided together against the more disarmament-minded non-nuclear weapon states
• A powerful negotiating force
• High level of preparation and cooperation = the highest degree of successful resolutions of contentious issues during negotiations
2) Cooperation between the nuclear weapons states and the NPT groupings is necessary

- Diversity of groupings after the Cold War
- Bridge-builders
- Smaller states don’t go against their groups
3) Diplomatic engagement outside of the NPT is extremely beneficial

- Diplomatic campaigns outside of the conference negotiations
- Direct bilateral diplomatic engagements, as well as multilateral forums
- Clear goal for the conference and a well-developed set of convincing arguments
4) Rhetoric on Article VI obligations has to be backed up by concrete actions

- A tangible result on disarmament, no matter how small, is a perfect foundation for a position that has potential to lead to a consensus.
5) High-level engagement creates an environment that is more conducive to positive results

- Involvement of the highest levels of the government facilitates an environment more conducive for reaching an agreement
- A public political campaign
Mitigating the expiration of New START

1. Agree to retain the transparency measures included with the treaty (data exchanges)
2. Make public joint or coordinated unilateral commitments to stay under the New START numerical restrictions
3. Expand and intensify Strategic Stability Dialogue
4. Establish an expert working group to support further arms control discussions
Reaffirm the Reagan-Gorbachev principle

1. “A nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must never be fought.”
2. Incorporate language referring to humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapons
3. Strengthen the statement with commitment to maximum restraint in posture and doctrines
Launch a high-level political campaign promoting the NPT

1. Emphasize the importance of the 2021 Review Conference success on the highest political level

2. Unilateral or joint statements by the countries’ leaders, increased media attention, public informational campaigns and permanence of the topic in high political officials’ public speeches
Refrain from inflammatory rhetoric against each other at the Review Conference

1. Reach an agreement on refraining from inflammatory attacks against each other.
Develop a joint P5 position

1. Pursue a coordinated and clearly defined position towards the key Article VI issues
2. P5 process needs to be rejuvenated and relieved of squabbles
3. Reinforce NWS commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament
Start a dialogue with NNWS on critical issues

1. A sustained dialogue outside of the NPT
   1. Discuss a list of the most important issues and possible common ground before the conference
   2. Discuss alternatives to the traditional consensus final document

2. Conference sessions where NWS and NNWS can discuss transparency and confidence-building actions

3. Involve NPT groupings and key players
Next-generation experts
1. Build connections
2. Gain experience, insight and practical skills to get into positions of influence
3. Civil society and academia can also exert great power over decision-makers
4. Raise public awareness, promote disarmament education
5. Never lose sight of what’s important