NPT – 2010: Strengthening the Regime

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Dear readers,

The subject of this White Paper is one of the most pressing issues on the international agenda.

There is no need to explain the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The major role it plays is obvious to everyone – this treaty, which is in many ways unique, has become a solid foundation of the nonproliferation regime, and a core element of the modern international security system. It also serves as a framework for a reliable network of effective mechanisms that contain the spread of nuclear weapons and dangerous sensitive materials, which could otherwise fall into the hands of terrorists. Were it not for the NPT, the world might well have had about 40 nuclear-armed states by now. That is why we are staunch proponents of achieving universal membership of the treaty and persuading those countries that remain outside the NPT to join as non-nuclear-weapon states.

We are pinning great hopes on the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. Our ability to solve nuclear nonproliferation tasks, and the pace of further progress in nuclear disarmament will be instrumental for strengthening international stability and the security of every nation on the planet.

It is in Russia’s interests to maintain the integrity of the treaty and a balanced approach to its three pillars: nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Any attempts to revise the NPT or reverse its indefinite extension would be unacceptable.

At the upcoming Review Conference, we need the kind of decisions that would strengthen the Treaty. Compliance with NPT requirements and the implementation of its principles is mandatory not just for the P5 states or for the countries that possess nuclear technology. Every nation of the world must make its contribution. For its part, Russia is doing everything in its power - witness its recent agreement with the United States on further reductions and limitations of strategic offensive weapons, signed in the run-up to the Conference. We are expecting serious steps from our other NPT partners, too.

Nongovernmental organizations traditionally play an important role in the preparations for NPT review conferences and during the conferences themselves. In Russia, this topic remains in the focus of attention of PIR Center, which has for many years conducted systemic work on a wide range of international security, nonproliferation and arms control issues. The Center’s research is well known and respected in Russia and abroad.

I am confident that this package prepared by PIR Center in the run-up to the upcoming NPT Review Conference will be a useful instrument in finding solutions to the most complex problems on the international agenda, and contribute to the ongoing efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Sergey Lavrov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
NPT MILESTONES

1968 – opened for signature
1970 – entered into force
1995 – extended indefinitely
1995 – States Parties adopted a package of decisions to strengthen the Treaty:
• Strengthening the review process of the Treaty
• Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament
• Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
• Resolution on creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East

2000 – NPT Review Conference adopted the Final Document which includes practical steps to ensure systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament (implement Article VI of the NPT) (13 practical steps)

NPT membership dynamics

The chart lists the number of NPT States Parties at the time of the launch of the Review Conference of the corresponding year.

Source: PIR Center

NPT TODAY

NPT depositary states: Russia, United Kingdom, United States

Number of NPT States Parties as of April 1, 2010: 190 (North Korea initiated its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 and announced the resumption of NPT withdrawal procedure on January 10, 2003)

Not acceded to the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan

“With all of the history of war, and the human race’s history unfortunately has been a good deal more war than peace, with nuclear weapons distributed all through the world, and available, and the strong reluctance of any people to accept defeat, I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”

John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, 1963

KEY NPT PROVISIONS

Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices

Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Article IV
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty

Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

“Most nations now speak in favor of a world free of nuclear weapons. Russia shares that noble goal.”

Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation

Useful sources and links:
• Nuclear Nonproliferation. Ed. by Vladimir Orlov, PIR Center, 2002
• http://www.nti.org/index.php
• http://cns.miis.edu

NPT signing ceremony, London, July 1, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before the NPT was concluded</th>
<th>After the NPT was concluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons activities started</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons activities stopped</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2008
TOWARDS THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, FIRST SESSION

When: April 30 – May 11, 2007
Where: Vienna

Chair: Yukiya Amano (Japan). Currently IAEA Director General. Has extensive experience in disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy, as well as nuclear energy issues.

Main issue: • Nuclear Disarmament

Result: • Final document not approved
• Chairman’s report released

The first NPT Review Conference, Geneva, May 5, 1975

Useful sources and links:
• Rebecca Johnson, Preparing to NPT Review Conference 2010: the main tasks. Security Index: No 2 (93), Summer 2010, pp. 121-125
• http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, SECOND SESSION

When: April 28 – May 9, 2008
Where: Geneva


Main issues: • Nuclear Disarmament
• Non-Compliance
• Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
• NPT Withdrawal

Result: • Purely technical report approved

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, THIRD SESSION

When: May 4-15, 2009
Where: New York


Main issues: • Nuclear Disarmament
• Middle East
• Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development

Result: • 2010 NPT Review Conference agenda approved
• States Parties made progress towards approving recommendations for the Review Conference, but failed to reach a consensus

2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

When: May 3-28, 2010
Where: New York


Committee structure:
• Main Committee I – Disarmament and negative security assurances (disarmament)
• Main Committee II – Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and regional issues (universality)
• Main Committee III – Other provisions of the Treaty, including Article X (peaceful uses of nuclear energy)

“The main result that Russia expects is the confirmation of the Treaty as the most suitable basis for addressing the modern challenges and threats to nonproliferation; achieving universal adoption of the IAEA safeguards system, progress towards the entry of the CTBT into force and the beginning of talks on the FMCT; creating favorable conditions for disarmament and the engagement of all the world’s nations into that process, especially the rest of the nuclear five states; expanding the area of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the Middle East; development of effective mechanisms to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.”

Sergey Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
NPT WITHDRAWAL ISSUE

“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Art. X para 1

KEY CHALLENGES:

- The NPT does not specify how the IAEA safeguards system can be applied to a State Party that has withdrawn from the Treaty
- The NPT does not specify what happens to all the nuclear materials supplied from abroad in the event of withdrawal
- The Treaty does not contain any special provisions detailing possible ramifications of withdrawal

Source: Cox&Forkum, 2006

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

- If a nation wishes to withdraw from the NPT, the IAEA should conduct an inspection of the nation’s adherence to its commitments under the safeguards agreement
- Intentional activity and preparations for a withdrawal from the NPT with the aim of developing a military nuclear program should be regarded as a violation of the treaty
- Once the nation has withdrawn, all its nuclear materials, equipment, technology and facilities created for peaceful purposes should remain within the IAEA safeguards system
- Unless the nuclear technology imported into the nation is returned to the supplier upon withdrawal from the treaty, it should remain within the IAEA safeguards system indefinitely

The Russian Federation proposal (circulated in May 2009 at the Third Session of the 2010 NPT Preparatory Committee)

- The UN Security Council should severely discourage withdrawal from the NPT by making it clear that this will be regarded as a prima facie threat to international peace and security, with all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
- A state withdrawing from the NPT should not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material provided before withdrawal should so far as possible be returned, with this being enforced by the Security Council

Eliminating Nuclear Threats. A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers. International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs

Useful sources and links:
- Oleg Romanov, Legality of NPT withdrawal in the context of 2010 NPT Review Conference. For the coming issue of the Security Index journal, 2010
CTBT: NEED FOR SPEEDY ENTRY INTO FORCE

“It has been 13 years since the CTBT was opened for signature on September 24, 1996 – but the treaty still has not entered into force. The entry into force of the CTBT is more urgent today than ever before, within the broader framework of multilateral disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation efforts.”


“The over 2000 nuclear tests conducted in the four decades before the CTBT was opened for signature were a clear threat not only to peace and security, but also to human health and the environment.”

Michael Douglas, UN Messenger of Peace

Not signed:
India
North Korea
Pakistan

Not ratified:
Egypt
Iran
Israel
China
Indonesia
USA

“To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.”

Barack Obama, President of the USA

“The situation with the ratification of the CTBT is nothing short of scandalous – it has now been 14 years since the treaty was signed. All the conditions for ratification are in place, especially given the positive signals from the United States about its change of stance on that treaty. We urgently call on all the nations, especially those on which the treaty’s entry into force now depends, to sign and ratify it in the very near future.”

Oleg Rozhkov, Deputy Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Russian Foreign Ministry

Useful sources and links:
• http://www.ctbto.org
NUCLEAR SECURITY
NUCLEAR TERRORISM

International efforts against illegal trafficking in nuclear materials should be aimed at the three core elements of that problem:

- Safe and secure storage of nuclear materials and reliable security, accounting and control measures to prevent proliferation
- Joint intelligence, customs and law-enforcement measures to prevent international transit and sale of stolen materials
- Joint efforts to identify and eliminate illegal supply and demand for fissile materials


- All States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery
- All States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials

Resolution 1540 (2004) adopted by the UN Security Council

KEY CHALLENGES:

- The level of security, accounting and control of nuclear materials in countries with active nuclear programs is not adequate to the growing threat
- Lack of proper international coordination and information exchange
- The release of large amounts of weapons-usable nuclear materials as a result of the ongoing global nuclear arms reductions
- Growing number, influence and financial might of various non-state actors, including terrorist groups, transnational organized crime syndicates, ethnic separatist movements and religious cults
- Nuclear weapons in the politically unstable Pakistan

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

- Making it more difficult for non-nuclear weapon states and non-state actors developing military nuclear programs to obtain the necessary materials by strengthening international export controls
- Improving the resistance of nuclear arsenals and weapons to emergency situations and attempts of unauthorized use
- Addressing the risk of terrorist attacks with regard to nuclear arsenals
- Further improvement of the existing physical protection systems, installation of modern nuclear arsenal security systems

“Participants of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit <...> recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement and the development of new technologies.”

Washington Nuclear Security Summit, April 12-13, 2010
Are You Concerned That Weapons of Mass Destruction, if They Fall into Hands of International Terrorists, May Be Used against Russia?


«Acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace and security».


The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (May 29, 2009) takes the decision for the establishment of a Programme of Work for the current session. The Conference on Disarmament takes the following decision: to establish a Working Group under agenda item 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” which shall negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Useful sources and links:
• Bilyana Tsvetkova, Disproving a Conventional Wisdom: Why Nuclear Terrorism Originating from Russia is a Myth. For the coming issue of the Security Index journal, 2010
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

“There is a danger that while Russia and the United States reduce their nuclear arsenals, other countries will increase their own. We have discussed this with the Americans and arrived at a joint conclusion that such a scenario is possible. America’s NATO allies, as well as China, India and Pakistan, all have substantial nuclear capability. For example, France and Britain have four nuclear-armed submarines each, with the full complement of weapons, plus aviation. That is quite a substantial number. So the next step after the signing of the new START treaty would be to involve all the nuclear weapon states in the nuclear arms limitation process. We need a treaty that would put an end to the arms race throughout the whole world.”

Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

“Discussing nuclear disarmament problems purely in the context of Russian-US relations would be an oversimplification. Nuclear disarmament requires the involvement of every single NPT state. We cannot accept a situation whereby the nuclear weapon states which have signed the NPT proceed with their disarmament, while other nations not bound by that treaty continue to maintain and increase their nuclear arsenals.”

Anatoly Antonov, Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Russian Foreign Ministry

“The conference agrees on ... an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document

“CTBT has not entered into force
• FMCT talks have not begun
• The new Russian-American START treaty has been signed but still awaits ratification
• There is a clear risk of other nuclear weapon states (both NPT Parties and not parties to the Treaty) increasing their own nuclear arsenals
• Some nations still have their nuclear weapons stationed on foreign territory
• Offensive weapons issues are not always linked to defensive weapons
• There are no guarantees of non-deployment of weapons in outer space. Such weaponization of space would have extremely negative implications for strategic stability

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

1. The nuclear weapon states undertake not to increase their nuclear arsenals from now on
2. The nuclear weapon states commit not to station their nuclear weapons beyond their national territories
3. The nuclear weapon states agree not to develop new and enhanced types of nuclear weapons
4. Russia and the United States ensure a prompt ratification of the new START Treaty
5. All nuclear weapon states launch the work on a new treaty that would ban the placement of weapons in outer space
6. The Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) should become multilateral

SIX URGENT STEPS

Early entry into force of the CTBT and, pending its achievement, maintaining the moratoria on nuclear test explosions
• Commencing negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable treaty on fissile materials
• Implementing declared moratoria on the further production of fissile material for weapons pending conclusion of the treaty
• Undertaking by all nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals
• Reducing the operational status of nuclear forces

Recommendations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference drafted during the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (draft not approved)

Source: PIR Center
NEW START

The following new ceilings on nuclear forces have been agreed under the new US-Russian START Treaty:

- 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads
- 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers
- 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORT-RANGE MISSILES

Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly (October 25, 2007): We are concerned with the proliferation of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. An ever-greater number of countries are acquiring missile production technologies and adding such missiles to their arsenals. At the same time, the Treaty, being of unlimited duration, is limiting the actions only of a few states, primarily Russia and the United States. The Russian Federation and the United States call on all interested countries to discuss the possibility of imparting a global character to this important regime through the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs. Such a renunciation would serve to strengthen the international nuclear missile nonproliferation effort.

REDDUCING OPERATIONAL STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (DE-ALERTING)

“Large numbers of nuclear weapon system remain on high levels of alert in both Russia and the United States. These are legacy postures from the Cold War. Alert levels are a function of political will; they are not an intrinsic military or technical condition. Current alert levels do not accord with the present political relationship between Russia and the United States. De-alerting has to be seen not only as a technical fix but also as a strategic step in deemphasizing the military role on nuclear weapons.”


“Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: [including] Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.”

Practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

PREVENTION OF PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE

On February 12, 2008, Russia and China proposed a joint draft of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. The proposed treaty includes the following fundamental commitments:

- Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons
- Not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner
- Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects

Useful sources and links:

- Jean de Gliniasty, Every nation must contribute to nuclear disarmament.” Security Index. No. 3-4 (90-91), Autumn-Winter 2009, pp. 17-20

“The signature of this new Treaty and its hoped for ratification lends great credibility to the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It also strengthens both the nonproliferation and disarmament norms embodied in the NPT. It is a new and more durable Prague Spring – harbinger of more nuclear disarmament treaties both bilateral and multilateral.”

Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, PIR Center Advisory Board member, Chair of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

“...a peaceful and tranquil outer space free from weaponization and arms race serves the common interests of all countries. It is therefore necessary for the international community to formulate new legal instruments to strengthen the current legal regime on outer space. China and Russia had drafted the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. China hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will start substantive discussion and reach consensus on it as soon as possible.”

Yang Jiechi, Chinese Foreign Minister
REGIONAL CHALLENGES: MIDDLE EAST

The Conference <...>:
1. Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction
2. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirms in this connection <...> the recommendation, urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International IAEA safeguards
3. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
4. Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapons States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems

1995 NPT Review Conference resolution on creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East

"By the 1980s Israel had acquired nearly all the “sensitive” technologies, including the production of heavy water, separation of plutonium and, according to some reports, uranium enrichment. At present, Israel has the scientific and technical capability to create new types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems without any substantial assistance from abroad, especially since almost all the key Israeli nuclear facilities remain outside the IAEA controls system. Civilian and military nuclear research is conducted at two nuclear centers in Dimona and Nahal Sorek. According to some reports, nuclear warheads R&D is conducted at Nahal Sorek, and the actual assembly at Yodefat. It is safe to assert that Israel is a de facto nuclear weapon state. Its nuclear arsenal is estimated at 60-80 warheads. Technically they are thought to be fairly advanced, although there have been no confirmed reports of nuclear tests by Israel. Most experts have no doubts that Israel possesses nuclear forces built according to the nuclear triad principle."

Nuclear Nonproliferation. Encyclopedia. PIR Center, Moscow, 2009. p. 44

"While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA, February 18, 2010

"Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. <...> Since the November 2009 inspection, Syria has not fully cooperated with the Agency to facilitate the resolution of the issues concerning the MNSR. <...> At both the Dair Alzour and MNSR sites, the Agency has found particles of anthropogenic natural uranium. Given that Syria has no reported inventory of natural uranium, this calls into question the completeness and correctness of Syria’s declarations concerning nuclear material and facilities."

Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in Syria, IAEA, February 18, 2010

"The biggest obstacle to creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is the position of Israel, which has not signed the NPT and is unofficially considered a nuclear weapon state. Israeli territory is not covered by the IAEA safeguards system, and the country essentially exists outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime."

- The situation with the Iranian nuclear program is another obstacle to creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Iran is in contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803
- Egypt, Israel and Iran have signed but not ratified the NPT

Definition of the “Middle East” — from Libya on the west to Iran in the east, and from Syria in the north to Yemen in the south
Document IAEA-GC (XXXIII)/887, August 29, 1989
“There is nothing more consistent than Russia’s position on Iran. We have always advocated resolving any problems arising in relation to the Iranian nuclear program through dialogue, and, as far as possible, through cooperation with the Iranian side.”

Sergey Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister

Resolution 1803 (2008), Adopted by the UN Security Council:
“Solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.”

Useful sources and links:
• Roland Timerbaev, The Middle East and the nuclear problem. Yaderny Kontrol, No 2, 2005, pp.15-48

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:
• Israel should agree to put its nuclear facilities in Dimona under the IAEA safeguards
• The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be preceded by a clear commitment by the nations of the region not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities
• The system of regional verification and the monitoring structure should make use of the experience of Euratom and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Zone coverage</th>
<th>Land area</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>In force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antarctic</td>
<td>Antarctica</td>
<td>14,000,000 sq km</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 June 1961</td>
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<td>Space</td>
<td>Space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 October 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tlatelolco</td>
<td>Latin America, Caribbean</td>
<td>21,069,501 sq km</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Seabed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rarotonga</td>
<td>South Pacific</td>
<td>9,008,458 sq km</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>43,465,501 sq km</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27 March 1997</td>
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<td>MNWFZ</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1,564,116 sq km</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28 February 2000</td>
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<td>NWFZ in Central Asia</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>4,003,451 sq km</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21 March 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pelindaba</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>30,221,532 sq km</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15 July 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REGIONAL CHALLENGES: EUROPE

“The United States has tactical aviation nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Those weapons have a strategic function with regard to Russian territory. American tactical weapons must be returned back to the US territory. Only then can we talk about tactical weapons reduction, elimination and security of their storage.”

Yury Baluyevsky, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation

“Unlike the United States, which shares its borders with Canada and Mexico, we share our borders with nuclear weapon states, and Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent against potential aggressors. Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with the United States on reducing tactical nuclear weapons arsenals, but on the condition that other NATO countries become involved. That includes the UK and France.”

Vladimir Verkhovtsev, Head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

The period of transition from the obsolete bipolar architecture of European security to a new architecture that would take into account the present situation is taking far too long. As a result, the opportunities for building a climate of trust on the European continent and in the three Europes – from Vancouver to Vladivostok are not being used to the full extent. Meanwhile, four of the five nuclear weapon states are situated in Greater Europe and have military presence there.

KEY CHALLENGES:

• The United States has tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe
• Attempts to give NATO’s power-projection capability a global role, which would be in contravention of international law
• Lack of a new legally binding agreement on European security
• The new generation of high-precision weapons arriving in Europe is forcing Russia to consider tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

“Security should be shared. No nation can strengthen its own security at the expense of the security of any other nation in the Euro-Atlantic. None of the organizations active in the Euro-Atlantic is preeminent, there is no hierarchy of international organizations on our continent. We propose that these political commitments should become legally binding commitments.”

Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

“A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the territory of any other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or Parties to the Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”

Draft of the European Security Treaty (November 29, 2009)

“Russia cannot remain indifferent to the deployment of ABM infrastructure on the territory of America’s European allies and in their offshore areas, because all this could eventually pose a real threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability, as many of the components of the Russian nuclear deterrent are based in the European part of our country’s territory.”

Viktor Mikhailov, Director of the Institute of Strategic Stability of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom

“Russia advocates not just the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of the countries where they are stationed, but also the dismantlement of the related infrastructure on the territory of those countries. All the warehouses, all the related infrastructure on the territory of the NATO countries should be dismantled and destroyed. I have never seen any indications that the United States is prepared to accept that.”

Yevgeny Bushinsky, Head of the International Treaties Directorate, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Russian Defense Ministry (2002-2009)
Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

KEY CHALLENGES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>NPT State Party</th>
<th>CTBT status</th>
<th>Number of nuclear tests</th>
<th>IAEA membership</th>
<th>Transfer of nuclear technology to other countries</th>
<th>Physical protection of military nuclear infrastructure facilities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Signed, not ratified</td>
<td>n/a*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Not signed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Since 1985**</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Probably did not conduct any nuclear tests, though Israel’s complicity in the mysterious 1979 “flash” in the South Atlantic cannot be ruled out
** North Korea initiated its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 and announced the resumption of NPT withdrawal procedure on January 10, 2003
*** Pakistan has conducted two underground nuclear tests, detonating a total of six nuclear devices

Source: PIR Center

NATIONS OUTSIDE THE NPT

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

**ISRAEL:**
- Adherence at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to the recommendation to put under the IAEA safeguards all nuclear facilities in the Middle East
- Speedy ratification of the CTBT
- Granting IAEA inspectors access to the Dimona nuclear center
- Beginning of talks without delay on creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East
- Gradual accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state

**INDIA:**
- Signing and ratifying the CTBT without delay
- Compliance with the commitments undertaken under the US-Indian agreement on cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy uses signed on October 10, 2008 (123 Agreement)
- Actions in the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group decision of September 6, 2008
- If the nuclear five nations undertake commitments not to increase or improve their nuclear arsenals, India should make a similar unilateral commitment in parallel with the official NWSs; a commitment not to create new types of nuclear weapons; to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national military strategy

**PAKISTAN:**
- Joining the CTBT and observing a moratorium on nuclear tests pending the treaty’s entry into force
- Stop blocking the commencement of talks on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
- Granting IAEA inspectors immediate and full access to all the evidence in the case of the A.Q. Khan network
- Gradual accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state

**DPRK:**
- Supporting the moratorium on nuclear tests and eventually join the CTBT
- The implementation of agreements reached at the six-party talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States) will enable DPRK to resume its full accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state
- Reviving, jointly with Republic of Korea the concept of establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula

Useful sources and links:
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

“Global demand for nuclear energy will rise by 40 percent by 2030. Neither should we forget about another challenge facing the international community: the global warming. The use of nuclear energy, which helps prevent global warming, will contribute to solving energy and environmental problems.”

Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France

“Nuclear energy involves the creation of an industrial, organizational, technical and skills base, which would spur the development of various other sectors of the economy. In addition to that, nuclear energy will raise the level of the scientific and technical potential, and the quality of the training of various specialists. So much has been demonstrated by international experience.”

Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart, Science Advisor to the Chairman of the State Council of Cuba

“It would not be right to put entire nations and peoples into a tight corner, taking away their legitimate right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and infringing upon their national dignity. It should be in every country’s own economic interests to remain within the international law and develop only peaceful nuclear programs. We are not going to limit ourselves to the role of suppliers of nuclear raw materials to our foreign partners – we shall strive to secure a more worthy place for ourselves in the world’s technological supply chain.”

Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan

437 nuclear power plants are operating in 29 countries
55 nuclear power plants are under construction
11 more states are expected to join nuclear energy club by 2020. In addition to that currently 23 more countries seriously consider the development of peaceful atomic energy industry

On 29 March 2010, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano and the Director General of the Russian Federation’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyenko, signed an agreement to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for supply to the IAEA for its Member States to be located at the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk, Russia. The LEU reserve of 120 tons is valued at roughly $250 million.

KEY CHALLENGES:

- Non-nuclear weapon states could become hostages to political situation and refused access to nuclear fuel and technology from foreign suppliers
- The development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle is proceeding at a slow pace, partly due to skepticism in a number of developing countries

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

- Creation of international centers similar to the existing International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk
- The existing situation on the nuclear fuel market is a cause for concern in the recipient countries; these concerns must be alleviated
- There must be no actions in contravention of Article IV

“Nuclear energy involves the creation of an industrial, organizational, technical and skills base, which would spur the development of various other sectors of the economy. In addition to that, nuclear energy will raise the level of the scientific and technical potential, and the quality of the training of various specialists. So much has been demonstrated by international experience.”

Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart, Science Advisor to the Chairman of the State Council of Cuba

“The creation of the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk is a constructive step which can alleviate concerns over nuclear proliferation by obviating the need for national enrichment capability.”

Sergio Duarte, High Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs

Useful sources and links:

International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk
Source: www.aecc.ru
ROLE OF THE IAEA

• At present, the IAEA safeguards system is not comprehensive. The agency cannot give a 100 percent guarantee of the absence of secret nuclear research even on the territory of those countries where the IAEA safeguards are in force in accordance with the NPT
• Articles 73 and 76 of the Safeguards Agreement, which allow IAEA inspectors to conduct special inspections in the event of suspicions about any specific nuclear facility, are not working
• The Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement was negotiated in 1997, but its effectiveness is much reduced because some countries are in no hurry to join it

KEY CHALLENGES:

“The Additional Protocol is voluntary. The IAEA safeguards under the NPT are compulsory for those countries which have no nuclear weapons, but the Additional Protocol is voluntary. As of March 3, 2010, 128 nations have signed it, and only 95 have ratified it - that is only about half the NPT states parties. Countries such as India, Iran, Mexico, the UAE, Brazil, Argentina, and Egypt, which are all very important for the nonproliferation regime, still haven’t joined. Their explanation is that they would be willing to join the Protocol only if there is clear progress by the nuclear weapon states towards disarmament.”

Roland Timerbaev, member of the PIR Center Advisory Board, Chairman of the PIR Center Executive Board (1999-2009)

PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS:

• In the future, the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol should become a universal norm for verifying the compliance of NPT states with their nonproliferation commitments, and a new standard in the area of nuclear supplies agreements
• The UN Security Council should pass a binding resolution that would in no uncertain terms oblige every nation to join the Additional Protocol

Useful sources and links:
• http://www.iaea.org

Conclusion of Additional Protocols
1998 - 30 June 2009 (cumulative)

Source: IAEA, 2009
“...Education is at the heart of human progress... The enhancement of skills, and the generation of new ideas are essential to the development of human capital and are key engines of economic growth, drivers of market productivity, and sources of cohesion for all nations...”

Education for Innovative Societies in the 21st century. G8 Document
July 16, 2006

TRAINING OF THE HIGH-SKILLED YOUNG SPECIALISTS ON NONPROLIFERATION

UN Secretary-General: “There has never been a greater need for education in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction. The overall objective of disarmament and nonproliferation education and training is to impart knowledge and skills to the achievement of concrete disarmament and nonproliferation”
(Kofi Annan, UN General Assembly 57th session, 2002)

“Regional organizations, academic institutions and NGOs are encouraged to develop and disseminate material online in languages other than English.”
(Report of the UN Secretary-General A/57/124 on disarmament and nonproliferation education)

Over 650 specialists from regional universities, research institutes, government structures of 15 states have become PIR Center Alumni

“Nuclear Nonproliferation” textbook – for the first time for the Russian-speaking audience

PIR Center President Dr. Vladimir Orlov - Consultant to the UN on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation education (2001-2002)

Training Program on nuclear nonproliferation for diplomats, the military, university professors, postgraduate students, and the media

Distance Learning – External Degree Program on WMD nonproliferation

PIR Center Education and Training Program

New level of nonproliferation culture

New generation of experts

International Summer School on Global Security and Russian Training Center on Global Security operated by the PIR Center

Joint Education Program together with over 40 universities of Russia and the CIS
PIR Center is a leading Russian think tank in the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For the past 16 years WMD nonproliferation (nuclear, in particular), arms control, and international security remained the top priorities for PIR Center’s research. Among PIR Center’s research projects:

- **Ways towards Nuclear Disarmament**
- **The Future of the NPT: Shaping Russia’s Position**
- **Iranian Nuclear Program**
- **Prospects of New Architecture of the European Security, and others**

*Security Index* journal is PIR Center’s business card. It is a leading Russian publication on foreign policy and international security issues. Among our authors: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Head of Rosatom Sergey Kiriyenko, academician Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy, parliamentarians Mikhail Margelov, Konstantin Kosachev, Victor Zavarzin, and many others. The geographical scope of contributors is also wide – from Turkey to Japan, from Bulgaria to Germany, from the United States and Kuwait to Russia and Switzerland. The topics covered by the journal vary: from the future of the Russian Armed Forces to nuclear program of Iran, from the situation in Central Asia to the developments on the Korean Peninsula, from the arms trade in Africa to global warming.

Starting from 2010, the *Security Index* journal (international edition) has been published by the leading global publishing house in the area of international relations – Routledge, a member of the Taylor & Francis group.

Due to the globalization process and broadening of international cooperation, training of the highly skilled specialists in international security is considered to be a necessary prerequisite for successful alleviation of emerging challenges and threats. Such need is clearly reflected in the international law. The UN General Assembly Resolution #57/60 without a vote on the basis of the First Committee Report # 57/510 emphasizes an important role played by the organizations dealing with nonproliferation education.

Training of the highly skilled specialists in international security and WMD nonproliferation, development of innovative education techniques remain a priority and a dynamically developing area of activities for the PIR Center.

*For more information about PIR Center’s Education and Training Program, see page 16.*
The objective of this nongovernmental White Paper published by the PIR Center on the eve of the 2010 NPT Review Conference is to define the hot issues currently affecting the nuclear nonproliferation and to suggest the set of specific policy recommendations on how to break the deadlocks and strengthen the regime. Some of these ideas and initiatives have already been incorporated into existing documents and reports – we retranslate the provisions that we support and consider priorities. Other recommendations have been elaborated by the PIR Center within the framework of applied research projects. We realize that some of the proposals may spur the debate. Hence, we invite our colleagues from governmental and nongovernmental sectors to take part in further discussions on improving the recommendations and developing practical mechanisms of their implementation in 2010-2014.

Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov
President, PIR Center