Tags

Европа ДНЯО США Европейский Союз Украина START международная безопасность Япония ABM Russia-USA обычные вооружения интернет кибербезопасность кибервойна ядерное оружие Egypt civil war Middle East Kyrgyzstan Central Asia USA Department of Defense Nuclear disarmament NATO Russia Iran's nuclear program Nunn-Lugar Program Конференция по рассмотрению ДНЯО NPT WMDFZ in the Middle East NWFZ Conference NPT Review Conference League of Arab States киберугрозы киберпространство образование missile defense DPRK торговля оружием Российско-американские отношения Syria chemical weapons US-Russian relations Iran nuclear контроль над вооружениями IANA; oversight transition; NTIA; ICANN; internet governance; International Telecommunication Union информационная безопасность управление интернетом Rosatom Россия-Украина НАТО 2015 PIR Center Cold War Security Index journal Non-Proliferation Nuclear security UNIDIR ядерное нераспространение Security Index internet governance China cybersecurity Eastern Ukraine Ukraine sanctions Ukrainian crisis Europe migrants US-Russia relations Prepcom Nuclear Ban JCPOA arms control OSCE strategic stability Dartmouth Conference India Hypersonic Weapons Nuclear Deterrence Non-Nuclear Deterrence Strategic Stability TPNW France peaceful use of nuclear energy Switzerland New START ядерная пятерка nuclear nonproliferation gender perspective women agenda hard security disarmament education UN

Blog entries: Iran's nuclear program

29.03.2022

The recent developments around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Iran nuclear deal, have again sparked discussions about whether Tehran is dragging out the negotiation process to win time to produce nuclear weapons, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli. Regional neighbors of Iran, too, follow the events in Vienna with increasingly close attention and strain, worrying that, with or without a deal, Iran will pursue a more emboldened regional strategy. While empirical evidence does shed some light on Iran’s nuclear behavior, a different way of looking at the issue is through a conceptual rather than empirical lens. This essay makes such an attempt by drawing upon the argument from a newly published book, “Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation”, by Vipin Narang, a renowned expert on deterrence posturing and proliferation theory.

22.09.2021

With the arrival of Joe Biden at the White House, there have been real prerequisites for the restoration of the Iran nuclear deal. Will it be a return to the previous agreement, or it will be necessary to add new articles, because of which the United States under Donald Trump withdrew from the deal earlier in 2018, considering it insufficiently tough and not covering all vital issues. But do the additional articles for the JCPOA meet Russia's interests, and does it need the Iran deal at all?

02.09.2021

The summer in Tehran turned out to be eventful. The sixth round of negotiations in Vienna that began in June did not meet the optimistic and timid expectations of the participants for the return of Iran and the United States to the terms of the JCPOA before the presidential elections in the Islamic Republic. As predicted, the conservative candidate Ibrahim Raisi won the election. The negotiation process was delayed and was put on pause to allow the new, 8th, President of Iran to take office and establish the work of the government. All plans to restore the JCPOA were postponed to August, the period after Raisi's inauguration, however, according to some European politicians, the Vienna talks will resume in September.

20.10.2017

"All I have to say to Trump, abandon this reckless game before it’s too late! You are deluding yourself if you think you’ve been dealt all the trump cards. Your imaginary perfect is the enemy of the good. The JCPoA is a good deal. Signed not only by the United States, but also by six other countries (including Russia), it is working well. All the parties are abiding by their commitments. There can be no deal with Iran without Iran itself. Your imaginary grand bargain is a folly; it has no basis in reality."

13.11.2014

Unlike with Bushehr 1 (wherein the 10-year contract on the procurement of Russian fuel ends in 2021), Russia will deliver all of the fuel for the eight future units.  Rosatom is also undertaking the obligation to take back the spent nuclear fuel. Thus, it will not be necessary for Iran to increase its enrichment capacity in order to provide itself with material for fuel for the NPP (one of the reasons why Iranians insisted on the further expansion of their nuclear program)

loading