Chronology

The U.S. signs Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty).
26.05.1977
The signing of the Treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Arms.
26.05.1972

International Security Index iSi

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PIR PRESS NEWS

26.05.2020

«The circumstances in which the whole world has found itself today have changed, but the importance of nuclear nonproliferation issues and U.S.-Russia dialogue on the NPT review process continues to bring together both young and major experts. I am very glad that modern technologies help us in this. Could anyone predict a year ago, at the last meeting of the working group, that the Review Conference would be rescheduled? Hardly. But this gives us time, and by “us” I mean Russia, the USA and the whole nonproliferation community, time to think creatively about how we can better prepare for it. And our Track 2.5 meetings are devoted to exactly such ideas, fresh and bright, from the next generation of experts», – Director of PIR Center, Head of the Center for Global Trends and International Organizations at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation, Professor at MGIMO University, Co-Chair of the working group Dr. Vladimir Orlov

25.05.2020

“I am a grounbreaker by nature. I need to create something new that will emotionally and intellectually resonates with millions of people”,  - said Lyubov Soldatkina, Head of the Department of expert analysis and control of the implementation of priorities and national projects of the All-Russia People's Front.

22.05.2020

The report presents the Russian Foreign Ministry views at the role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the current non-proliferation regime. The importance of NW and WMD-free zones as tools to strengthen regional security and stability is considered. Key contemporary challenges to the non-proliferation regime are noted. The author draws special attention to the fulfillment by the Russian side of its commitments under international agreements in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.

Transparency in Nuclear Arsenals and Doctrines

Implementing any measures contained in the future “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” mandated by Article VI of the NPT will clearly take a lot of time. It will in fact take longer than the implementation of all the other nuclear disarmament treaties put together.

The two preconditions required for the launch of negotiations on such a treaty are effective confidence-building and transparency measures, and verification measures. Transparency and verification are therefore closely interlinked; after all, the main principle of any effective disarmament agreement is that transparency must be verifiable.

The reverse, however, is also true. If a country fails to provide information about the numbers and other characteristics of its nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, it becomes impossible for the expert community to develop effective verification mechanisms.

During their bilateral nuclear disarmament process, theUnited StatesandRussiahave already developed a comprehensive set of measures for the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems. But verifying the elimination of the actual nuclear warheads is a problem that has yet to be resolved.

The following steps will have to be undertaken in that regard:

- Identify a universally acceptable definition of the term “nuclear warhead”,

- Release information about the numbers and types of warheads (both actively deployed an held in reserve) held by every individual country, and develop a system of monitoring that information,

- Develop a mechanism of inspections and verification measures for the facilities where the warheads are being held,

Find a balance between the national and global security interests,

- Develop technical means which can ascertain that the warhead being destroyed is a genuine explosive nuclear device,

- Develop technical means to ascertain that every individual explosive nuclear device has been destroyed.

PIR Center in its work pays much attention to studying the mechanisms for transparency in nuclear arsenals and doctrines and future nuclear weapons reductions, holding events and organizing discussions in the Security Index journal on the subject.

Publications:

1. Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia Group

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