The goal of SuPR Group is to provide assessment of level of sustainability of US-Russian partnership in key areas of international security agenda and to summarize policy recommendations for policy makers in both countries on how to improve such sustainability. At the SuPR Group meeting in Gstaad, Switzerland, on February 2, 2011, the drafting work on the matrix began. We are open for further drafting of this matrix by e-mail discussions, your comments on http://supr.pircenter.org/eng and before the next meeting of SuPR which will take place in Washington DC in December 2011 or January 2012. We should finalize drafting this matrix by then.

Green means level of sustainability is high, and no additional urgent steps are needed.

Yellow means the situation is mixed, and sustainability is not sufficient, so further urgent steps are needed.

Red means the situation is bad and not sustainable, or it has not been yet addressed by the US and Russian governments. Then, urgent steps should be undertaken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key issues</th>
<th>What should be done urgently (2011)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Bilateral Arms Control and Disarmament</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1. New START entry into force and smooth implementation</td>
<td>• Accelerating the reductions mandated by the New START ahead of 2017 implementation deadline</td>
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| 1.2. Going further with bilateral strategic arms reduction talks | • Launching new negotiations on reduction of strategic offensive nuclear weapons down to 1,000 level  
• Increased transparency by making unilateral declarations on the process of elimination of nuclear warheads and amount of material converted  
• Reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons |
| 1.3. Agreement on non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons | • Aiming for an overall limit of 2500 warheads (not including those awaiting dismantlement) |
| 1.4. Addressing other types of nuclear weapons (sub strategic, or tactical) | • Establishing common definitions  
• Increasing transparency |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Actions</th>
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| 1.5.    | Addressing nuclear weapons deployed outside national territories | • Eliminating any requirement to station US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe  
• Adopting a UN Security Council resolution on the issue by the five nuclear weapon states of the |
| 1.6.    | Practically working on US-Russia/ NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation | • Providing a detailed plan of what zonal missile defense consists of and then taking this proposal favorably  
• Developing a US-Russia early warning system and a joint threat assessment before developing a common European missile defense system going |
| 1.7.    | Addressing non-nuclear strategic armaments | • Including CFE- and non-strategic nuclear weapons-related issues in the re-building of the European security architecture |
| 1.8.    | Re-building Adopted CFE Treaty or working on a new one | • Start negotiations on a new CFE treaty  
• Avoiding large-scale exercises near borders |
| 2.      | Contributing to Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Agenda |  |
| 2.1.    | CTBT entry into force | • Ratification of the treaty by the remaining countries  
• Leading role of the US in pushing for such ratifications starting with its own |
| 2.2.    | FMCT negotiations started | • Giving FMCT negotiations a legally-binding status  
• Taking a multilateral approach towards the issue of national fissile material production facilities |
| 2.3.    | Working on prevention of placement of weapons in outer space | • Opening of multilateral negotiations on the issue  
• Trilateral (US-China-Russia) consultations as a starting point |
| 2.4.    | Making INF Treaty multilateral | • Joint US-Russian lobbying on the issue |
| 2.5.    | Agreement by NWSs not to develop new types of nuclear weapons | • Banning the development of new types of nuclear weapons by signing a UN Security Council resolution  
• Reassess national nuclear policies |
| 2.6.    | Rethinking of nuclear deterrence | • Deemphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons (de-alerting)  
• Evolving from a numerical deterrence (comparing number of warheads and increasing budgets) to a minimal or virtual one |
| 3.      | Nuclear Nonproliferation |  |
| 3.1.    | Reducing the risk of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons | • Re-energizing bilateral US-Russian consultations on Iran’s nuclear program as well as on the whole ME  
• Rendering conclusions public to prove to Iran their common position on the issue |
3.2. Contributing to a success of the 2012 Conference on the Middle East zone free of WMD

- Discuss a common understanding, intensify diplomatic actions and prevent military strikes
- Complete fabrication of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor if negotiations become positive

3.3. Bringing DPRK back to the NPT as a NNWS

- Not discussed. To be discussed at the next meeting

3.4. Minimizing risk coming from nuclear weapons in Pakistan

- Not discussed. To be discussed at the next meeting

4. Nuclear cooperation

4.1. Implementation of the 123 Agreement

- Not discussed. To be discussed at the next meeting

4.2. Cooperation on nuclear security in preparation for the 2012 Soul Nuclear Security Summit

- Not discussed. To be discussed at the next meeting

4.3. Cooperation on reducing the risks of nuclear and other WMD terrorism, including suppression of WMD terrorism financing

- Not discussed. To be discussed at the next meeting

5. Other

5.1. Cooperation in information security area and on prevention of cyberterrorism

- Not discussed. To be discussed at the next meeting