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ration of policy makers on the whole, which can result in a schism.*
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Libya and its people have paid the dearest price during its Arab Spring revolt. Toppling their authoritarian rulers cost each of the neighbor countries several hundred people killed. Libyan casualties in the civil war with intervention by NATO and the authorities of Qatar are far greater: at least 30 thousand dead ** and thousands of missing persons and prisoners still being illegally held in prisons and concentration camps; plus great economic losses.

These facts remain a shock to the Libyans, which will not be easily erased from the memory of the current generation of people; they will undoubtedly dominate the actions of politicians.

There is also a rollback from the state of national stability and security that the ousted regime, however stigmatized at present, did succeed in maintaining, which may lead to disintegration of Libya. Under these conditions, in the presence of scores of autonomous armed groups, it's hard to imagine that the upcoming elections will be a triumph of democracy for which the West cares so much.

Key words: National Transitional Council, Qaddafi, Constituent Assembly, tribes, kinship.

* An example of this is the January attack on the headquarters of the National Transitional Council in Benghazi – the cradle and bulwark of the anti-Qaddafi uprising and the birthplace of the Council, where it originated and stood on its own feet organizationally and ideologically. A crowd of protesters dominated by ex-rebels, after throwing grenades into the building, burst through the doors and ransacked it. The motivation behind the incident was the acute dissatisfaction of the protesters, mostly wounded revolution veterans, with the attitude of the current leadership to their grievances and needs.

** According to the figure given by Naji Barakat, the NTC's health minister: http://www.korshalt.ru/main/2011/09/08/887837.html

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Culture: A New Resource for Russian Public Diplomacy

V. Murogov, A. Zalikharneev

THE YEAR 2012 MARKS the ten-year anniversary of UN General Assembly resolution 57/60 and the UN Secretary-General’s report on disarmament and non-proliferation education. At the very beginning of the 21st century, it became clear that a new wave of interest in atomic energy, dubbed the “nuclear renaissance,” is engulfing an ever greater number of states. Nuclear technologies and materials have not yet become an object of common everyday use, but access to them by new countries, companies and people is increasing. Accordingly, the risks are growing of their falling into “unclean hands.” Throughout the world, people know that one cannot walk across the road on a red light, every person traveling in a motor vehicle must wear a seat belt, and on crowded public transport you need to watch your wallet. Society develops rules for behavior that are easy to understand and taught to us since early childhood, helpful in protecting life and making it more comfortable.

The UN General Assembly declared the need for such work in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in 2000. Resolution 55/33 on general and complete disarmament requested the Secretary-General to establish an expert group and prepare a study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. In 2002, the report was presented and adopted at the UNGA 57th Session. These UN decisions marked the beginning of the development of a nuclear non-proliferation culture. While experts have special knowledge in the field of export control or nuclear security, the non-proliferation culture should become part of public and political life among ordinary citizens as well as those who make responsible decisions.

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Nuclear Technology: Global risks and National Sovereignty

DIFFERENT SCENARIOS exist for the future of energy, but many of them share common assumptions about the growth of population and energy consumption, competition for exhaustible and unevenly placed fossil fuels, the unpredictable nature of the market for organic raw materials, growing environmental concerns, and limited renewable energy opportunities. These factors explain the strong interest in atomic energy. There is also a growing understanding that nuclear technology is not just a matter of energy, it is a new level of medicine, production efficiency, and an enhanced quality of life. By 2020, eleven new countries will be added to the list of nations with nuclear power capacity. In addition, further twenty-three countries are seriously considering the prospect of building nuclear power plants. In national nuclear programs, Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian and Latin American countries see the key to sustainable development, the reduction of dependency on raw material exports, the formation of a scientific-technological elite, strengthening their independence and achieving a higher status in the region, and moving up to a new league in world politics.

Although the Fukushima accident has shaken the position of atomic energy, this has affected Europe more than the budding nuclear “newcomer” countries. Rather, the change isn’t related to atomic energy, but there is a new question now about introducing structures, management practices, and international standards in the field of nuclear security and radiation safety.

The problem of nuclear non-proliferation and international nuclear safety is due to a serious dilemma: with the global character of nuclear technologies, responsibility for their use and safety remains at the national level. Moreover, the development of the atomic industry is considered by many countries as a means for strengthening national sovereignty. The issue is compounded by how nuclear technologies are being developed and how they will be used in newcomer countries. As more breeder reactors are built, fissile materials are disposed, reprocessed and recycled, a large number of small nuclear power plants are erected, staffing at nuclear organizations is augmented, and sensitive materials are increasingly transported, the risks of nuclear proliferation will grow. Today almost all activities for developing technology for the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) can be viewed as steps in the pursuit of the non-peaceful use of nuclear technology. The problem of the peaceful development of nuclear power by newcomer countries without the spread of NFC technologies has come to the fore.

Among the many initiatives that offer a solution to this contradiction, we can distinguish at least three of the most comprehensive ones:
- Establishing a network of international NFC centers to enrich and reprocess irradiated nuclear fuel (INF), a concept put forward by Russia;
- Establishing international nuclear fuel banks to guarantee newcomer states access to the NFC products and services, a proposal of Russia, Germany, and the World Nuclear Association;
- The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, a program launched by the United States and supported by more than 20 countries.

But the attitude among countries embarking on nuclear power towards these projects is passive or even negative, for they perceive them as signs of political discrimination and the desire to earn by limiting their access to nuclear technologies. Newcomers to the nuclear market must first see their own “profit” from the realization of the aforesaid initiatives and understand exactly what needs changing in the national programs. Thus far, in countries asserting their “atomic sovereignty” there is no fertile ground for such ideas to take root.

Nuclear newcomer countries will need to be clear that economic or political goals can only be achieved by undertaking nuclear programs fully consistent with the norms of the non-proliferation regime. Such understanding must be the result not so much of international pressure as of their own awareness of proliferation threats, as well as of the fact that the non-proliferation regime offers safeguards for all countries, not just selected ones, against real dangers.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Culture: An Imperative for the Peaceful Atom

THE NON-PROLIFERATION CULTURE, as distinct from the control systems, regulatory institutions, and the technology base for supporting nuclear security, cannot be mechanically transferred to new regions. Any
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THE NON-PROLIFERATION CULTURE, as distinct from the control systems, regulatory institutions, and the technology base for supporting nuclear security, cannot be mechanically transferred to new regions. Any
foreign expert, particularly if he/she speaks a foreign language, will always be perceived as an "alien," and one to be suspected of trying to impose something. The challenge today is to establish in the Middle East, other Asian regions and Latin America, an "infrastructure" on which a non-proliferation culture will develop - education centers, nongovernmental organizations, textbooks and other materials. The key issue for these countries is to train their own experts and teachers to promote in their countries a non-proliferation culture of safety and security in their own languages and in line with their values, lifestyle, and work culture.

Similarly it ought to be understood that promoting a non-proliferation culture is by no means the donor aid of the more developed to the less developed worlds. Countries that have announced they are constructing their own nuclear programs have the money for this purpose. Moreover, by doing their own financing they ensure both sovereign control and interest in the result, making foreign experts be more sensitive to local realities. International support for non-proliferation culture projects in these countries will probably become necessary at the stage of establishing a relationship with their institutions and bodies of authority.

Some institutions in these regions have already been created, but so far their attention has been concentrated on the training of technical staff. There are centers with ongoing programs on non-proliferation and disarmament research in Algeria, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. But, first, the capacity of most of these centers is limited, and secondly, they apparently are by no means available in all countries with an agenda to forge a culture of non-proliferation.

A lot of future foreign experts are on training in Russia: students at the MIFI National Nuclear Research University and executives at the Central Institute for Advanced Studies in Obninsk. But so far they show no interest in the study of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

An outline of the development of a non-proliferation culture is given in international documents. The basic guidelines are set by the aforementioned General Assembly resolution 57/60, which had as its basis the UN Secretary-General's 2002 report (A/57/124) "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education." The report was prepared by a Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. Japan was represented in this group by Yukio Amano, now head of the IAEA. A Russian representative, FIR Center President Vladimir Orlov acted as a consultant for the group. The report contains 34 recommendations for development efforts in the realm of non-proliferation education.

The underlying idea of the study is that at issue is not just advanced training for individual groups of nuclear non-proliferation experts. The task is more ambitious, to shape a new way of thinking, a more critical thought process which empowers them to make their contribution, "as national and world citizens," to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This kind of thinking and culture must be shaped at all levels of education - from the kindergarten to academic institutions. In this case, the real result, in the view of the report's authors, can be achieved if each group of children is taught with different pedagogic approaches and methods. "What a school-age child ... needs to know about disarmament is not the same as what is required for a border guard, let alone for a political official or a high school teacher." At issue is also the adaptation of the amassed experience and available educational materials for particular countries, specific groups of users or the international community as a whole. Recommendations one and two of the report speak to this.

Another key group of recommendations deal with the need to work with all countries. They note, in particular, that "regional organizations, academic institutions and NGOs are encouraged to develop and disseminate material online in languages other than English." And further, that much of the material already needs to be translated from English into United Nations official and other languages. They are explicit in requiring that future nuclear experts use their mother tongue or that which they speak as their native language in carrying out their missions.

Of course, English-based training for specialists is an important part of promoting the nuclear industry in emerging markets. Publication of educational materials in English can both reduce costs and significantly increase the audience. Yet when the talk is not about instrumental language use for the transfer of technical knowledge, but about fostering a culture of behavior in the nuclear energy arena, a deep awareness of the threats of proliferation and the emergence of a sense of personal responsibility, there is no way you can replace the native tongue with another, even the most universal language. That's why developing their own centers to promote the idea of non-proliferation is so important in the new nuclear countries.

The report calls on UN member states to support the publication of information and education materials related to nuclear non-proliferation for all levels of education. It also urges the introduction of disarmament
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The report calls on UN member states to support the publication of information and education materials related to nuclear non-proliferation for all levels of education. It also urges the introduction of disarmament
and non-proliferation curricula and courses in both schools and universities.

New technological opportunities, especially the Internet, are highlighted. Ten years ago, it was rather a question of creating specific websites and providing access to information materials and documents of the UN and other international organizations. The effect of social networks and other channels of information dissemination is obvious today. At the same time, the report stresses that the new technologies complement rather than replace traditional education and training. Otherwise, the degree of assimilation of knowledge and the awareness of the depth of the dangers of nuclear proliferation will remain in question.

The report indicates the importance of non-governmental and voluntary organizations as the main institutions that induce state agencies and universities to concern themselves with issues of nuclear non-proliferation, and suggests the need for close cooperation between them at both national and international levels.

Every two years, UN member states and non-governmental organizations have to provide accounts of their implementation of the recommendations on the basis of which the Secretary-General prepares a report. In 2010, only Burkina Faso, Japan, Spain, Mexico, and Ukraine responded to a request by the Secretary-General, while the rest of the information came from non-governmental organizations and universities. Thus far, the governments of developing countries that are embarking on nuclear energy ventures, except for Mexico, either show no interest in the subject or, most likely, so far they have nothing to report – a great deal has been accomplished in the ten years since the recommendations were made, but more can and should be done. The higher the worldwide interest in nuclear power, the more serious is the need for more effort at promoting nuclear non-proliferation education.

That’s exactly the point made in the documents adopted at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2010. Its final document again “underscores the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty,” and highlights the need for building institutional capacity and “technical and managerial capabilities” in States parties. The Action Plan adopted at the end of the conference indicates the importance of implementing the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General’s 2007 report.

In addition to the Final Document, the conference’s Main Committee

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Education: Russia’s Experience for Newcomers to the Nuclear Market

WHY DO OUR COUNTRY and non-governmental sector actively support international non-proliferation education initiatives?

We do so, firstly, because this really strengthens the non-proliferation regime and creates favorable conditions for the development of peaceful nuclear power in new regions and, secondly, because Russia has both the experience and ability that can be used to promote a culture of non-proliferation in the new nuclear countries.

Twenty years ago, there was no modern training system for nuclear non-proliferation specialists and experts in the post-Soviet space, just as there was no efficient information work on this theme. One would think it was a key sector for the country, with thousands of professionals from major ministries on its staff, universities turning out engineers, military officers and diplomats, and whole academic institutions working on the theme – but with no independent venue for collaboration among leading specialists in each of these fields and no arrangement for how to attract young experts and thus generate and pick out new ideas. Such a dynamic system exists today, there are reputable publications, educational programs are conducted, not only to upgrade skills but also to select young talents, motivate them and provide opportunities for their growth. Close interactions among the first-ever NGOs as well as academic institutions, universities and foreign partners with support from more progressive members of the political, military and diplomatic establishment played a key role in creating the system.

During this time, about 700 students and young professionals from all CIS countries have gone through the education programs of the PIR Center alone, 250 of whom participated in one and two-week courses, and over 60 in an internship program. In addition to the PIR Center, other
and non-proliferation curricula and courses in both schools and universities.

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institutions are now also working in this area – non-proliferation programs exist at universities in Moscow, Yekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, Toms, as well as in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and other countries and regions.

In the CIS space, recent years have seen an “educational network” formed that not only helps promote the idea of non-proliferation, but also serves as the mechanism for reproducing knowledge and attracting young professionals to this sector and thus constitutes a guarantee of sustained support for the non-proliferation regime from Russia and other post-Soviet countries.

Today, in the CIS major institutes of technology train specialists for the nuclear industry, while the educational network, created by NGOs, research institutes and universities, disseminates knowledge about the non-proliferation regime and maintains the culture of non-proliferation. It is this experience that we can offer to countries embarking on nuclear energy development.

What are the components of the educational network in the area of nuclear non-proliferation in the post-Soviet space?

First is the emergence and development of national non-governmental organizations. PIR Center, the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, and the Centre for Export Controls Excellence were established as early as the mid-1990s; the Sarov Analytical Center for Nonproliferation has been in existence since 2000. Today politicians and experts alike seek the recommendations of these and other reputable institutions, both at home and abroad. Moreover, thanks to their publishing, information and educational activities, some of these NGOs have become the real centers of Russian public diplomacy. It is the NGOs that now constitute the backbone of the educational network. Their independence, mobility, openness, and ability to attract the best experts from different institutes help achieve the synergy of research, education and information work and of the creative energy of young people and the experience of senior colleagues. NGOs can also become a good bridge between government agencies, policy experts and education professionals. Independent NGO venues make it possible to build relationships between scientists and authorities, conduct a real debate and provide some with intellectual feedback, and others with first-hand information. It is clear that in countries that move towards nuclear energy, there are different political regimes and the capabilities of NGOs can be very limited. But when it comes to non-proliferation, it is just important to establish constructive, cooperative relations with the authorities and win their support. Where there is no non-governmental sector, scientific or government-related public institutions, foundations or universities can accordingly play its role.

Second is precisely the establishment of cooperation between governments, universities and civil and academic institutions. In this case, it is important to foster involvement in joint studies as well as information and education projects by regional – and not only central – educational establishments. If we talk about international security education, regional universities usually face two problems – the limited resources (in comparison with their metropolitan counterparts) and the lack of permanent direct access to those who are engaged in applied research and advise government agencies or used to work in them. NGOs and various foundations may play their part in dealing with these issues. Today, Toms, Yekaterinburg, Novouralsk, Novosibirsk, and St. Petersburg have become real centers for developing a culture of non-proliferation in Russia – just those cities where “physicists” of local atomic institutes rub shoulders with humanities “lyricists” specializing in non-proliferation.

The third component is broad international cooperation. In dealing with nuclear issues the task before every responsible member of the international community, on the one hand, is to ensure the realization of their own interests and, on the other hand, to defend and reinforce the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is an enormous field for talks and debates that are sometimes tough and principled. Collaborative research and recommendations prepared by international expert groups, the exchange of students and young scientists, other education programs conducted together by universities of different countries – these are the public diplomacy that has for years maintained a strategic dialogue between Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers.

The Russian organizations have good experience of fruitful collaboration with overseas scientific and educational institutions (the Center for Nonproliferation Studies – Monterey Institute of International Studies; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; the International Institute for Strategic Studies, etc.), foundations (MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Ploughshares, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, etc.), foreign governments and international organizations (UN, IAEA, ISTC, etc.). It is important to note that the skeptical attitude of relevant government bodies toward collaboration between Russian and foreign NGOs has become a thing of the past.
institutions are now also working in this area – non-proliferation programs exist at universities in Moscow, Yekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, Tomsk, as well as in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and other countries and regions.

In the CIS space, recent years have seen an "educational network" formed that not only helps promote the idea of non-proliferation, but also serves as the mechanism for reproducing knowledge and attracting young professionals to this sector and thus constitutes a guarantee of sustained support for the non-proliferation regime from Russia and other post-Soviet countries.

Today, in the CIS major institutes of technology train specialists for the nuclear industry, while the educational network, created by NGOs, research institutes and universities, disseminates knowledge about the non-proliferation regime and maintains the culture of non-proliferation. It is this experience that we can offer to countries embarking on nuclear energy development.

What are the components of the educational network in the area of nuclear non-proliferation in the post-Soviet space?

First is the emergence and development of national non-governmental organizations. PIR Center, the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, and the Centre for Export Controls Excellence were established as early as the mid-1990s; the Sarov Analytical Center for Nonproliferation has been in existence since 2000. Today politicians and experts alike seek the recommendations of these and other reputable institutions, both at home and abroad. Moreover, thanks to their publishing, information and educational activities, some of these NGOs have become the real centers of Russian public diplomacy. It is the NGOs that now constitute the backbone of the educational network. Their independence, mobility, openness, and ability to attract the best experts from different institutes help achieve the synergy of research, education and information work and of the creative energy of young people and the experience of senior colleagues. NGOs can also become a good bridge between government agencies, policy experts and education professionals. Independent NGO venues make it possible to build relationships between scientists and authorities, conduct a real debate and provide some with intellectual feedback, and others with first-hand information. It is clear that in countries that move towards nuclear energy, there are different political regimes and the capabilities of NGOs can be very limited. But when it comes to non-proliferation, it is just important to establish conn-

Structive, cooperative relations with the authorities and win their support. Where there is no non-governmental sector, scientific or government-related public institutions, foundations or universities can accordingly play its role.

Second is precisely the establishment of cooperation between governments, universities and civil and academic institutions. In this case, it is important to foster involvement in joint studies as well as in information and education projects by regional – and not only central – educational establishments. If we talk about international security education, regional universities usually face two problems – the limited resources (in comparison with their metropolitan counterparts) and the lack of permanent direct access to those who are engaged in applied research and advise government agencies or used to work in them. NGOs and various foundations may play their part in dealing with these issues. Today, Tomsk, Yekaterinburg, Novouralsk, Novosibirsk, and St. Petersburg have become real centers for developing a culture of non-proliferation in Russia – just those cities where "physicists" of local atomic institutes rub shoulders with humanities "lyricists" specializing in non-proliferation.

The third component is broad international cooperation. In dealing with nuclear issues the task before every responsible member of the international community, on the one hand, is to ensure the realization of their own interests and, on the other hand, to defend and reinforce the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is an enormous field for talks and debates that are sometimes tough and principled. Collaborative research and recommendations prepared by international expert groups, the exchange of students and young scientists, other education programs conducted together by universities of different countries – these are the public diplomacy that has for years maintained a strategic dialogue between Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers.

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Professional dialogue is necessary to all who work in the area of nuclear energy, safety and security. This experience of non-governmental diplomacy should also be used to develop relations with the new nuclear countries; constant dialogue provides opportunities not only to promote a culture of non-proliferation, but also to maintain the stability of cooperation in the nuclear sphere. It is important that not only the voice of Russia should be heard among others in these countries, but that we should also be able to promote our own, in the absolute majority well considered and balanced approaches and if necessary, channel discussion in a constructive direction.

Thus, the interaction of national and international institutions, educational establishments, government bodies and nuclear companies may result in the appearance of an educational network that serves to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation culture. Who is all this work aimed at, who forms the target audience? First and foremost, it is the professional “minority”: diplomats, nuclear plant executives and employees, military officers, legislators, experts, journalists – those who can determine, execute or influence policy in the area of peaceful nuclear energy and non-proliferation. The involvement of decision makers in a discussion of security issues may be a prerequisite for the development of cooperation today, but the main benefits for the furtherance of non-proliferation culture will, of course, derive from the work with young professionals. Education today means that tomorrow they will knowingly and consciously approach international non-proliferation obligations.

Working with students and all who are still planning to explore a career in nuclear energy, we must understand that not all of them will actually come into this industry, but they will all remain more or less literate users of information received from the media, from the government and other sources. The ability to critically, that is in a meaningful and balanced way, approach the issue of the peaceful atom and threats of its military or terrorist use is another important component of non-proliferation culture, and the wider the circle of people in a country who are in command of its basics, the more opportunities there are for the development of relations with that country in the nuclear sphere.

What can Russia offer to improve the nonproliferation culture in countries embarking on the development of nuclear energy? It is known that we have the entire infrastructure needed for the training of technical personnel – scores and hundreds of foreign specialists at different levels of qualification are trained in Moscow, Obninsk, Tomsk, and at existing nuclear power plants. But we also have the capabilities whereby we can promote a culture of non-proliferation and along with it lay the foundation for cooperation in nuclear energy. First of all, there are teachers and experts who are ready to conduct training in English, there are manuals and other educational materials that are already being translated into other languages, and there are organizations that have gained experience in disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. For more than ten years, the PIR Center has been carrying out such work in the CIS space; three years ago, an International Nuclear Education Center was established at the MIIFI National National Research University. Apart from their own staff, both centers get leading scientists and experts from major Russian nuclear power and international affairs oriented institutes and companies, such as Rosatom, the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, MIIFI, MGIMO, and IMEMO, involved in the work with young professionals.

Their international associations create additional opportunities to expand cooperation with overseas research and higher education centers. Based on the facilities of MIIFI, an International Nuclear Innovation Consortium incorporating 23 major research and education institutions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan has been established for the benefit of the EurAsEC countries. With support and expansion of its activities this consortium may become an analogue to the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN), i.e., a real and long-term integrating factor in Eurasia, working both within the EurAsEC and on the external education market.

With IAEA support, the Asian Nuclear Education Network (ANENT), bringing together research and training centers from 15 countries, has been set up. Among these countries are such interesting ones for Russia as Bangladesh, Vietnam, India, China, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, UAE, South Korea, and Syria. MIIFI collaborates with the network, but rather on technical issues, while progress is also required on policy approaches. It is obvious that unless we develop contacts with this network, little will be known about Russian initiatives and approaches there, and opportunities for dialogue with students and young professionals will similarly remain limited – namely those who will tomorrow set the guidelines for developing the nuclear industry in their countries and, inter alia, will pick out partners. IAEA and other international nuclear organizations have by now established such versatile platforms for the development of nuclear non-
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proliferation culture as the World Nuclear University and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN). Connecting Russian NGOs to these networks also opens extra possibilities for the development of our approaches and projects in the domain of non-proliferation.

**Russian Public Diplomacy, Equal Cooperation and Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

RUSSIA INTENDS to start pursuing its own nuclear interests in the world more actively – an institution of nuclear attachés at embassies is currently being established for this purpose. In order for these measures to bear fruit, they need the support of public diplomacy.

The development of nuclear non-proliferation culture cannot be part of advancing the interests of one country or company, but it is something that reduces the risks of nuclear cooperation and thus extends its boundaries.

At the same time, by engaging in the development of nuclear non-proliferation culture in the world, we can solve some of the tasks of Russian public diplomacy. Most importantly, Russia is a leader in nuclear power and this is our strong point; it is that which evokes genuine interest. Let's agree that there are not that many of such achievements that Russia can boast today. Moreover, our Russian diplomacy has been consistently upholding the principles of non-proliferation, including the right of all countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; this evokes respect among emerging nuclear energy countries as well. So the work at the intersection of non-proliferation culture and public diplomacy can bring good results.

The first point, as already referred to above, is the promotion of Russia’s approaches, including our international initiatives for a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle, and international science and technology cooperation. In addition, the discussion of nuclear power issues will no doubt influence the formation of the newcomers’ position on a whole array of regional and global problems. The political implications of nuclear power development in the new regions have yet to be explored. And, of course, the more actively Russian organizations will participate in and initiate discussions on peaceful nuclear energy and non-proliferation in the new regions, the more readily the views of our experts will be understood and the easier it will be to find mutual understanding.

The second point concerns the fate of our initiatives, and their implementation in international organizations, in particular the IAEA. Here, as in other institutions, many jobs, according to tradition, cannot be sought by representatives of the nuclear powers; these vacancies are reserved for the “developing” countries. The United States and others are actively pushing “their” candidates from allied countries. And what do we do? We have a large and untapped reserve – the CIS countries, especially the Eurasian Economic Community. If we pointedly build a cadre of non-proliferation and nuclear security specialists in these countries, and push them forward to nominations in international organizations, in the near future, our initiatives will have considerable support from the international bureaucracy.

The third point is that establishing deeper and broader relations between our institutions, expert centers and educational establishments and those of the new nuclear countries will help to ensure that the relationships in this area of cooperation will have a long-term and sustainable character.

In addition, the training of non-proliferation specialists is a niche in the global education market – there are several big players there, but it is still not so crowded. The target audience is expanding; Russia has its own approaches. By consolidating the efforts of specialists from different institutions, we can offer a world-class program. In today’s world, there are only four universities that offer full-fledged programs in the field of physical nuclear safety: MIFI, Tomsk Polytechnic University, the University of Texas, and the University of Missouri. With support from the centers for political and international studies based on the two Russian universities it is possible to create programs dealing with nuclear security culture and non-proliferation; these courses will be unique.

Nuclear non-proliferation culture is an indispensable condition for international nuclear cooperation. All responsible players in the world nuclear market must accept and understand it. Russia has the potential to promote a culture of non-proliferation safeguards in countries intent on building their own nuclear power plants. Russia’s efforts in the realm of non-proliferation education meet the interests of the nuclear industry and of public diplomacy, and with more active work abroad, will bring very real results.

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1 The text of the report is posted on the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs web page.

Russia and Europe: Can There Be a Breakthrough in Relations?

I. Ivanov

WHEN THE RUSSIA-EU SUMMIT in Moscow on May 10, 2005 endorsed the road maps for the Four Common Spaces (the Common Economic Space; Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; the Common Space of External Security; and the Common Space of Research, Education and Culture), this gave rise to many hopes and expectations – politicians, experts, and journalists spoke about a breakthrough in relations between Russia and a united Europe and tended to assert that the sides had finally overcome their fundamental differences, surmounted bureaucratic obstacles and now stood ready to ascend to a qualitatively new level of cooperation on a wide range of issues. Optimistic scenarios were built as to how the abolition of the visa regime would unfold, how the harmonization of legislation of the parties would proceed and what institutional forms the declared "strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia" could take.

Today, the number of optimists in Moscow and Brussels has greatly diminished. This brings home to us once again that the general political declarations do not automatically translate into concrete agreements and the opportunities once missed do not recur for a long time to come. And the current financial and institutional crisis in Europe in general has called into question the very relevance of the European project for Russia. In Moscow, those who believe that the center of global economic activity is shifting from Atlantic to Pacific and that Europe has turned out not to be ready for globalization and is therefore doomed increasingly to lag behind Asia, grow ever more vociferous. Hence follows the conclusion that our country’s future is firmly bound with the “Pacific civilization,” and Russia should distance itself, as much as possible, from the inevitable European decline that has become so manifest in the recent months.

Such views are difficult to accept. Of course, the Asian economic

Key words: nuclear non-proliferation culture, nuclear non-proliferation, education, public diplomacy, NPT Review Conference, nuclear energy, international cooperation.