NATIONAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

New York, 3-28 May 2010
INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared for the VIII Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and contains information on the implementation of its articles by the Russian Federation over the period since the VII Review Conference held in 2005.

The indefinitely extended NPT is a time-tested instrument, which for the last 40 years has effectively prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons, allowed further progress in the process of nuclear disarmament and guaranteed the development of wide international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The recent years have clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the balanced structure of NPT State Parties’ obligations. All the States – large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear need this Treaty.

Today the particular relevance of effective actions on the NPT-based approach in the field of non-proliferation is also dictated by the danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. It means that we need to strengthen the international "safety net" that allows managing such risks in advance.

Current concerns of the international community related to the existing global challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were highlighted during the UN Security Council Summit on September 24, 2009, which could be regarded as a prelude or a foreword to the Review Conference. The Resolution 1887 adopted by this Summit confirmed the most important thing - all current challenges to the non-proliferation regime that have recently appeared, including the emergence of black markets of nuclear materials could and must be addressed on the basis of the NPT. The Russian Federation is ready to engage in close international cooperation in this area.

The tasks of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and combating terrorism should be dealt with in strict compliance with the norms of international law and with due account for the legitimate interests of
development and security of all States. We are thus convinced that the NPT should be fully and effectively implemented in years to come. In this regard we believe that the VIII Conference of State Parties should above all focus on comprehensive and objective review of every aspect of the NPT implementation, reaffirm its viability as the most important tool for averting the threat of nuclear proliferation and reiterate the commitment of all State Parties to fulfill their obligations under this Treaty, as well as agree on the "package" of effective and feasible steps towards further strengthening the non-proliferation regime in order to achieve the universalization of the NPT.

As an NPT State Party and a Depository the Russian Federation is consistent in fulfilling its obligations under the NPT and confirms its strong and unfailing support for the Treaty.

The role of the Russian Federation in ensuring implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions and articles of the Treaty is described below.
ARTICLES I AND II

The Russian Federation, as a nuclear-weapon State, has strictly complied with its obligations under Article I of the Treaty undertaking not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. The Russian Federation has never in any way assisted, encouraged, or induced in non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

The Russian Federation has proceeded from the fact that strict compliance with Article II of the Treaty provides one of the main guarantees against the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE III

Application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under this Treaty Article is an important prerequisite for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an assurance of the implementation by the NPT non-nuclear-weapon States of their obligations.

The Russian Federation supports efforts by the IAEA in this field and considers it essential to further improve the Agency's verification activities, including legal, organizational and technical aspects. In this context, Russia attaches great importance to the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and urges the States that have not yet signed or ratified it to do so as soon as possible.


The Additional Protocol is aimed at raising the effectiveness of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States through detecting possible undeclared nuclear activities. Application of “integrated safeguards” is essential for improving technical and economic effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system.
The Additional Protocol is a factor that should be taken into account when considering potential nuclear export deals. At present Russia is ready to accept it as pre-condition for transferring sensitive nuclear technologies and equipment.

In order to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system the Russian Federation provides financial assistance to the Agency in implementing its verification activities through the national programme of scientific and technical support of the safeguards. Over the 26 years of its existence significant work has been carried out to strengthen the technical capabilities of the Safeguards Department of the IAEA Secretariat, to equip it with verification methods, samples and sources, and to train staff.

As of today the programme includes a number of objectives such as conducting by the Russian laboratories studies of environmental samples collected by IAEA inspectors, training courses on modern non-destructive verification methods, as well as nuclear material accounting inspections at gas centrifuge enrichment plants, development of new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities, etc.

In the context of large-scale development of civil nuclear industry in the world and emergence of new countries that have not possessed such capabilities previously, there is an increased risk of proliferation of technologies that could be used to obtain weapons-grade nuclear materials. Russia along with other G8 States has elaborated and established at the national legislative level strict but objective criteria that regulate transfer to non-nuclear-weapon States of the most sensitive nuclear equipment and technologies, related to uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The most important criterion is compulsory participation of the importing State in the NPT. As for uranium enrichment technologies, they are intended to be shared only as appropriate without revealing the technology that could be diverted to production of weapons-grade material. We are working on universalization of these criteria in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Russia recognizes the strengthening of multilateral export control regimes as one of the most important instruments to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and technologies. Improving their efficiency and transparency along with getting involved countries - technology holders in their functioning would, in our view, prevent unauthorized transfers of controlled nuclear items and technologies.

The Russian national export control system is based on control lists and export regulations of listed items which are established in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. We have been supporting their activities since their creation and strongly believe that the NSG and the Zangger Committee defined the agreed procedure for the transfer of controlled goods without infringing upon the legitimate rights of States to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Russia supports outreach and constructive interaction with all countries, including those outside the NPT, in order to assist them in establishing and improving national nuclear export controls.

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to coordination of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation risks. It supports consistent and universal implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1540, aimed at countering WMD black markets and preventing the risk of such weapons and related materials, technologies and means of their delivery falling into the hands of non-State actors, first of all terrorist organizations. Russia takes an active part in the work of the UN Security Council 1540 Committee.

Russia participate in the IAEA programme on combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. With the support of the Agency our country organizes international training courses for experts in physical protection.

A lot has already been done in the field of creating effective international “safety net” aimed at preventing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. In this context, it is necessary to note the importance of systematic IAEA efforts to strengthen the regime of nuclear
security in the world. In this connection, we take note of the successful implementation of the IAEA Plan for physical nuclear security for 2007-2009.

The most important areas of work include the development by the IAEA of a series of publications on physical nuclear security, including “Goals and Fundamental Principles of Physical Nuclear Security”, as well as the IAEA recommendations such as a revised paper "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Plants" (INFCIRC/225). The preparation of these documents is always carried out with active participation of Russian experts.

Training of experts in physical protection is of great importance for us. Russia organizes IAEA physical protection training courses in the Obninsk Interdepartmental Special Training Centre on a regular basis. Since 2001, eighteen IAEA training courses, attended by 300 foreign specialists, have been held. A regional training course on the physical protection of research reactors was held in the Tomsk Polytechnic University.

Particular attention should be given to the programme on the maintenance of the IAEA database on illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. Russia actively participates in the data exchange process and submits to the IAEA relevant official information on incidents that occurred in its territory.

Currently the IAEA works in accordance with its Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013, with special emphases on strengthening nuclear security to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. While stressing the priority of the physical protection of nuclear materials, it is necessary to ensure the security and safety of radioactive substances and sources. In order to prevent the radiological threat, activities on the protection of this category of materials should be organized at a new, increased level. In view of the international character of the terrorist threat we consider it essential to strengthen the mechanisms of multilateral and bilateral interaction on this track.

On July 6, 2009 the Presidents of Russian and the US made a Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation, in which they particularly stressed their
commitment to strengthening cooperation in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Building upon previous joint efforts, experience and achievements, they declared an intent to broaden and deepen long-term cooperation to further increase the level of security of nuclear facilities all around the world. In particular, it is planned to continue work on the repatriation of spent highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel of research reactors back to the country of origin, the development of new types of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for them, the possible conversion of research reactor cores in third countries. We invite all the IAEA Member States to join us in this work.

Russia made a crucial decision to make, starting with 2010, a significant voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. We expect this contribution to facilitate further strengthening of physical security regime.

The Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, put forward by Presidents of the Russian Federation and the US in 2006, is an essential contribution to the realization of this goal. Today, the Initiative is acquiring global dimension. 79 states and four observer organizations (IAEA, EU, Interpol, UN Office on Drugs and Crime) became its participants. This is a positive example of interacting in today’s world in order to counter emerging challenges and threats.

Such key international documents as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Amendment to the Convention, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism serve as a basis for the interaction. The Russian Federation has ratified the above-mentioned conventions, including the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We believe that its entry into force will make it possible to considerably strengthen the international nuclear security regime. However, its progress is hampered by the fact that most of the State-Parties have not yet adopted the Amendment.

Russia believes that security and safety of radioactive sources (RS) are important means to prevent the uncontrolled transits of hazardous materials
suitable for the production of a "dirty bomb". We commend multilateral efforts in this area. We support the IAEA activities aimed at ensuring secure handling of radioactive sources. We regard the adoption of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the elaboration of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources as a considerable achievement. Russia is assisting the IAEA in drafting the International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources and Devices, which contributes to enhancing control over them.

Russia as a major producer, consumer and exporter of radioactive sources, is actively working to establish an RS export/import control regime. We are taking steps to harmonize national norms and regulations with the established international principles.

Russia has elaborated and put into effect a sophisticated national legislative and regulatory framework for handling radioactive materials, which makes it possible to effectively ensure their transportation security and meets all the IAEA requirements. We are in favour of strengthening the regime governing the transportation of such materials which has been adopted by the international community. However, we believe that it should not result in the erection of unjustified administrative burdens which are often incompatible with the universally recognized norms of international law.

ARTICLE IV

The Russian Federation is of the view that in the immediate future the world has no alternative to further development and wider application of civil nuclear energy.

Energy consumption across the world is growing rapidly. In the second half of the twenty-first century the stocks of oil and natural gas will be generally exhausted. There is a goal to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. This problem could actually be resolved only through the development of nuclear energy.
The Russian Federation consistently advocates broader access of the NPT States Parties to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and promotes international cooperation in this sphere. We believe that it is critical to make further efforts towards enhancing the role and authority of the IAEA, a competent and responsible organization that provides for such cooperation on a global scale. This will make it possible to strike the necessary balance between harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The further development of nuclear energy and its large-scale application in economic development require a systemic approach to tackling new fundamental and complex tasks. It was with these issues in mind that, at the United Nations Millennium Summit, President of the Russian Federation proposed an initiative on the sustainable development of humankind and comprehensive ways to address the nuclear weapons non-proliferation and the environmental protection of the Earth. In line with this initiative the IAEA is implementing the International Project on Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). Its primary objective is to create nuclear energy systems that are economically competitive, environmentally safe and capable of reducing the risk of proliferation and ensuring the sustainable development of civilization.

We appreciate the results and positive trend of the work within the INPRO. We support the new approach adopted by the IAEA's Nuclear Energy Department in organizing working meetings with national teams of the States participating in the INPRO. The first meeting took place in Moscow, in January 2009, with participation of the representatives of the IAEA Secretariat which discussed the whole range of issues regarding the implementation of the project.

We appreciate the efforts by the IAEA Secretariat on budgetary financing of the project. The Russian Federation decided for the first time to provide long-term funding of the project during 2008 – 2012. The annual contribution will amount to 23 million rubles. We believe that such financing will make it possible to plan the implementation of the project and set tasks for the future.
The INPRO provides an opportunity to get together all interested participating States – both those possessing and using technologies – for collective consideration of ways to meet the energy needs of the participating States.

In the future the INPRO platform could become a basis for new forms of partnership that would ensure joint work of the INPRO participating States aimed at establishing conditions for introducing innovative nuclear energy systems.

The number of countries participating in the project reached 28, including the European Commission. The fact that some countries participating in this project are at the same time involved in a United States-led programme – the Generation IV International Forum – calls for a closer interaction of these two projects. On July 30, 2009 the Russian Federation joined the Framework Agreement for the Generation IV.

The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project is one more example of the Russian Federation's successful participation in multilateral cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The ITER is a unique engineering project. The site for it has been already chosen, and its practical implementation has begun.

Russia's participation in the ITER project serves its long-term interests of nuclear energy development; it is scientifically, technically, economically and politically substantiated and is a consistent step for Russia along the way of mastering thermonuclear technologies. In accordance with its obligations, Russia will make and deliver to the construction site unique equipment for main systems of the reactor. The Russian side meets all the obligations it has assumed including establishment of manufacturing of superconductors in complete compliance with the high standards of the ITER project.

The analysis of technological aspects of promising innovations can be used for studying problems and stages of establishing an international structure of nuclear energy in the world.
In accordance with Article IV of the NPT Treaty, all Parties have the inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which include the capability to develop a national nuclear fuel cycle with some of its elements being highly sensitive from the point of view of non-proliferation. Thus, it is necessary to guarantee secure conditions for implementation of national nuclear programmes and to alleviate non-proliferation concerns in this context.

Russia believes it is essential to create such an environment that would prevent the spread of sensitive NFC technologies and at the same time ensure the development of large-scale nuclear energy industry.

We believe that achieving these goals can be based on the elaboration and implementation of multilateral approaches to the NFC aimed at providing an economically substantiated and feasible alternative to the development of all its elements at the national level.

The NFC internationalization would be advantageous from the point of view of the economy, environment and security, as well as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We commend the results of the work done by the IAEA Expert Group to elaborate approaches to multilateralize sensitive NFC technologies.

A number of initiatives were recently proposed both at the national and multilateral levels. In January 2006, the President of the Russian Federation proposed to work jointly to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and establish international NFC service centers. The establishment, together with the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) in Angarsk in 2007 was the first practical contribution of Russia to the implementation of this approach. Armenia and Ukraine have also acceded to the Center.

In January 2008, we officially informed the IAEA about listing IUEC as one of the Russian NFC enterprises, eligible for the IAEA safeguards. In 2008,
the IUEC obtained all necessary permissions and licenses to carry out its practical activities as a supplier of products and services.

We are grateful that the IAEA welcomed the Russian initiative. We share the opinion of the IAEA that the Center is capable to resolve not only the issue of guaranteed access to NFC services, but also to ensure nuclear fuel supply to the IAEA Member States from the guaranteed LEU reserve at the IAEA requests.

The creation of the guaranteed reserve is an alternative to the highly costly way of establishment of all NFC elements at the national level.

On November 27, 2009 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Resolution (GOV/2009/81) concerning the Russian initiative to establish a reserve of LEU for the supply to the IAEA for its Member States. Fourteen States co-sponsored the Resolution.

The adoption of the Resolution facilitated the signing of the relevant Agreement between Russia and the IAEA, which envisages establishing in Russia of a 120 ton physical reserve of 5 per cent enriched LEU.

On March 29, 2010 the Agreement was signed by the Director General of the “Rosatom” State Atomic Energy Corporation Sergey V. Kirienko and the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano.

The Russian proposal is based on Article IX of the IAEA Statute. The rights of the IAEA Member States, including to developing their own production capacity in the sphere of the NFC, have been neither violated, nor infringed. In other words, in order to have the right to receive the LEU from the guaranteed reserve it is not necessary to renounce the right to establish and develop own fuel cycle. We have not established such a condition. The guaranteed reserve is a response to the concerns of those, who are afraid to be in full dependence on the nuclear fuel market situation or the political will of some states.

In developing our proposal to establish a guaranteed LEU reserve we have taken into account the following considerations. A reliable nuclear fuel supply can be ensured only through a properly functioning market where both suppliers and consumers fulfill their obligations under commercial contracts. The purpose
of the guaranteed reserve is to provide nuclear fuel to consumers in circumstances where they have encountered insurmountable political difficulties in obtaining the LEU, which are not related to non-proliferation issues.

There will be no need for the IAEA budget expenditures or additional contributions from IAEA Member States. The Russian Federation shall bear all costs associated with the production of LEU, its storage and keeping, application of the IAEA safeguards, etc. A country receiving the material will pay for the material supplied at its market prices. The guaranteed reserve will not undermine the existing LEU market.

The creation and use of the guaranteed reserve is regulated via two agreements: one between Russia and the Agency on the provision of an LEU reserve in accordance with Article IX of the IAEA Statute; and the second, a model agreement between the IAEA and a potential recipient country of the LEU.

The LEU supply mechanism from the guaranteed reserve is triggered by a decision of the IAEA Director General and LEU will be supplied at his request without delay. There will be no discussion of each individual shipment in the IAEA Board of Governors. Neither Russia, nor any other State will influence the decision of the Director General regarding the supply.

While concluding the agreement with the IAEA on the supply of LEU to the IAEA Member States, Russia, from the point of view of its domestic legislation and international commitments, considers as necessary the following conditions: nuclear material must be used for the purposes not related to the nuclear weapons creation; nuclear security and physical protection must be assured; nuclear material must be under the IAEA safeguards during the entire period of its utilization in the recipient country; material should be used only for the declared purposes that is for the electric power production at a specified nuclear power plant.

The material can be supplied to any non-nuclear IAEA Member State that meets its commitments under the Safeguards Agreement and has placed its nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards.
The Russian proposal does not conflict with other known initiatives and by no means competes with them.

In March 2005 the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation passed a law ratifying the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. The Russian Federation thus acknowledged the primacy of international law in regulating civil liability for nuclear damage. This step will promote our cooperation with other countries with regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to ensuring the safety of its nuclear facilities, viewing it as a condition sine qua non for developing the nuclear energy industry. It actively participates in the Convention on Nuclear Safety. As mandated by the Convention, the Russian Federation prepared its national reports, reflecting its compliance with the obligations to ensure nuclear safety in the country, and submitted them at the meetings to review national reports held in 2005 and 2008.

We attach great importance to the IAEA programme of technical assistance and cooperation. The Russian Federation has been fully pledging and will continue to pledge its voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. We call for keeping its existing funding mechanism through contributions by Member States in their national currencies, the amount of which is determined in accordance with the existing practice on the basis of the UN scale. Many years the Russian Federation has been actively cooperating with the IAEA in implementing projects seeking effective use of applied nuclear technology in areas that are important for developing the economies of the Agency’s Member States.

The Russian Federation has expanded its participation in safety- and security-related projects, including projects dealing with the safety of nuclear facilities, radiation security and the safety of transportation and radioactive waste management.
The Russian Federation has also been actively contributing to training skilled national personnel for other countries and conducting scientific research, which are important elements of technical assistance activities.

The Russian programme includes large-scale efforts aimed at training personnel. Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (MEPhI), which is known for its good traditions and highly-skilled graduates, and a number of regional educational institutions formed the “National Research Nuclear University – MEPhI”. This decision was taken in 2008.

The Russian Federation will be glad to host courses for foreign students and professionals from the IAEA Member States and provide them with advanced train for national nuclear energy programmes.

The Russian Federation is assisting developing NPT Member States in building accelerators and neutron generators; it also supplies neutron radiography units, gamma-ray treatment equipment, liquid nitrogen production units, ionizing irradiation sources, and other equipment and materials. We are willing to look into the possibility of cooperating in building low- and medium-power reactors, including mobile nuclear power plants with long-life no-reload operation. Such plants could be run and fully controlled by a supplying State. The Russian Federation is ready to proceed with the construction of a 70 mW offshore nuclear power plant capable of both producing energy and desalinating water.

The Russian Federation is taking part in the IAEA programme to develop a network of regional international training and demonstration centers for reprocessing and storage of radioactive wastes produced as a result of applying nuclear methods in health care, scientific research and industry.

The Russian Federation attaches utmost importance to developing cooperation with the CIS Member States — namely Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus — in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This will establish the legal framework required to implement some particular bilateral projects.
In May 2009 the third Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management recognized the repatriation of spent fuel of research reactors as positive and efficient practice. The repatriation from third countries of HEU fuel for research reactors of Russian and American design is carried out through cooperation between Russia and the US with the participation of the IAEA. The Russian Federation supports the IAEA programme on decreasing the level of enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors to less than 20 per cent. Its implementation will considerably reduce the risk of HEU proliferation.

It is the international cooperation that in many respects defines the successful implementation of the costly projects often requiring some non-conventional technological solutions, but having high priority in terms of environment and nuclear and physical safety. In this respect, the Russian side confirms its intention to be involved as a donor in the project of removal of the spent nuclear fuel from Vinca research reactor (the Republic of Serbia). The Russian Federation decided to assist Ukraine in strengthening security of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and accelerating its decommissioning. To this end, in 2009 we allocated 10 million USD to the Nuclear Safety Account and 7 million USD to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund.

As a practical contribution to strengthening security, the Russian Federation assisted the Republic of Armenia in enhancing safety at the Armenia nuclear power plant within the IAEA technical cooperation programme. In 2008 we allocated 240 million rubles for these purposes, and we take active part in the implementation of the "Armenian" projects.

Taking into account the high level of nuclear technology in Russia, we have substituted the technical assistance from the IAEA by relevant national projects.

ARTICLE V
In 1990 the USSR declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. Since then there have not been any nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions conducted by our country. We intend to pursue this policy in future as well. We expect that other nuclear-weapon States will take a similar approach.

In 2000 Russia ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We remain committed to this Treaty, which makes an essential contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that a comprehensive and no-threshold ban on any nuclear explosion is an effective mean of restraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

The progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world depends to a great extent on ensuring the universality of the CTBT and on the accession to it of all the States possessing nuclear capabilities, that is, on the early entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with all its provisions.

We contribute to attaining this objective. We consistently facilitate the earliest entry into force of the CTBT. We believe that the moratorium on nuclear testing being an important measure cannot replace international legal obligations under the CTBT.

In addition to bilateral work, we consistently participate in the relevant multilateral activities. Our country has always been a co-sponsor of the resolutions in support of the Treaty, which have been approved over several years by the United Nations General Assembly. We participate in the meetings of foreign ministers (the so-called Friends of the CTBT) held biennially on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly session. An important area of work to ensure the CTBT entry into force includes the Conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty, convened biennially by the United Nations Secretary-General as envisaged by Article XIV of the Treaty. We take an active part in such conferences the latest of which was held in 2009 in New York.
Russia fully supports the progressive and balanced creation of a verification mechanism within the framework of the CTBT. We are building the Russian segment of International Monitoring System (IMS), as envisaged by the CTBT. In accordance with the Treaty, the Russian segment of the IMS comprises 6 primary and 13 auxiliary seismic stations, as well as 4 infrasound stations, 8 radionuclide stations, and 1 radionuclide laboratory (a total of 32 facilities).

In 2006 the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on the Conduct of Activities Relating to Facilities of the International Monitoring System, provided for by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, entered into force. The Agreement has provided a solid legal basis for expanding cooperation between Russia and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. It is intended to speed up work to create a Russian IMS segment – a core element of the CTBT verification – and ensure its operation before the Treaty enters into force.

We also actively assist the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in creating another part of the Treaty verification mechanism that is on-site inspection regime. Our inspectors and observers have taken an active part in the on-site inspection integrated field exercise, conducted in 2008 in Kazakhstan. The exercise became an important milestone in creating a unique global CTBT verification mechanism.

ARTICLE VI

Being aware of the special responsibility as both a nuclear-weapon State and Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council for fulfilling the obligations under the NPT Article VI, the Russian Federation continues in the spirit of good will to carry out profound, irreversible and verifiable reductions of strategic offensive arms.
The signature in Prague on April 8, 2010 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has become an important step in this direction.

This new Treaty is intended to replace one of the most significant disarmament agreements in history, i.e. the US-Soviet Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (START) which expired on December 4, 2009.

START performed its historic role in ensuring international peace, strategic stability and security. It laid the foundation for creating a qualitatively new climate of trust, openness and predictability in the process of reduction of strategic offensive arms which is reflected in the new Treaty. Deep reductions of strategic offensive arms both countries have carried out since the end of the Cold War, made the world more stable and safe, dissipated the feeling of persistent threat that was hanging over the peoples of our and other countries, and made it possible to shift from "coexistence" period to the stage of partnership and mutually beneficial co-operation thus creating completely different political and military environment in the world.

Under that Treaty the Parties undertook to reduce, seven years after its entry into force, the total of their deployed strategic delivery vehicles and their attributed warheads down to each 1600 and 6000. Russia has fully implemented its START obligations, and by the deadline of December 5, 2001 it has actually cut down the aggregate number of its deployed strategic delivery vehicles, i.e. inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and the number of their attributed warheads to 1136 and 5518 respectively.

Even though the obligations under the START Treaty are completely implemented, the Russian Federation continues the elimination of its strategic offensive arms. By January 1, 2010 the Russian side has eliminated some 1600 launchers of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 3100 ICBMs and SLBMs, 47 nuclear submarines and 67 heavy bombers. As of the beginning of the current year the Russian side has possessed some 800 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 3900 warheads accountable for them under START. Compared with the data we cited in the report on the implementation of the NPT Article VI at the 2005 Review Conference these figures show an actually growing contribution of the Russian Federation to the fulfillment of the Treaty obligations.

The provisions of the new START stipulate that each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after its entry into force and thereafter the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- 700, for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and HBs;
- 1550, for warheads on them;
- 800, for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and HBs. This aggregate limit brings both deployed and non-deployed launchers as well as HBs into the legal scope of the Treaty. It provides means to restrain the upload potential of the Parties (i.e. capacity to swiftly build-up the number of deployed warheads in times of crisis) and creates additional momentum for conversion or elimination of the strategic offensive arms to be reduced.

Thereby, Russia and the U.S. have once again clearly demonstrated their striving for sweeping reductions of strategic offensive arms. The Parties agreed to cut down by one third the aggregate number of warheads (Moscow Treaty limit is 2200) and more than halve the aggregate limit for strategic delivery vehicles (START figure was 1600 with no limits for delivery vehicles under the Moscow Treaty).

While negotiating the new START we were mindful that nuclear disarmament is impossible without taking into account current trends in the field of strategic defensive arms, and that no constraints on the deployment of strategic missile defense systems exist today.
After the new Treaty enters into force, the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of May 24, 2002 (Moscow Treaty) will be no longer effective as well. In fact the Parties have already met their obligations under the Moscow Treaty.

As a result of the implementation of the 1987 U.S-Soviet Treaty on Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) 1846 ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500-5500 kilometers and their associated 825 launchers were scrapped. Altogether, more than 3 thousand nuclear re-entry vehicles with a total yield of over 500 thousand kilotons have been deactivated. We have also put forward a proposal to render the obligations under the INF Treaty universal.

In terms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, withdrawal by the Russian Federation of tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union republics to its territory is of great importance.

It is only now, years later, that we can objectively evaluate the scope and extraordinary complexity of the operation. All tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn to the territory of the Russian Federation in a relatively short term. Besides, we duly ensure their technical safety and secure storage.

Russian nuclear weapons are placed under fail-safe control. Its effectiveness is strengthened by both institutional and technical measures. In particular, since 1991 the total number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has decreased fourfold. Over the same period the total number of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced more than fivefold.

Russia has developed and implemented a range of measures to counter terrorist acts, and all nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities are regularly inspected for safety on a complex basis.

2009 marked a 15-year anniversary of the practical implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of Russia and the USA concerning the Disposition of the Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Megatons to Megawatts Program. By now in
the course of the realization of this project over 350 tons of weapons-grade uranium have been irreversibly converted into low enriched uranium, which is equivalent to 14 thousand nuclear warheads and accounts for approximately 76 percent of the total amount of highly enriched uranium intended for conversion under this Agreement.

This year as part of the implementation of the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation signed in April, the last reactor that has been producing weapons-grade plutonium, has been stopped. Russia will dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium by means of irradiation in BN-800 reactor.

The above-mentioned facts and practical steps taken by the Russian Federation to fulfill its obligations confirm our willingness to steadily follow the course of the genuine nuclear disarmament in compliance with the requirements of Article VI of the NTP.

ARTICLE VII

The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) represents one of the most important instruments for consolidating the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole and the NPT in particular. By creating NWFZs and thus implementing Article VII of the NPT, States are promoting strengthened regional and international stability and security and enhanced mutual trust and understanding. Russia consistently supports this process and contributes to the efforts of States aimed at establishing and formalizing the status of such NWFZs.

Taking into account the concerns and aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT to receive legally binding security assurances excluding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, the Russian Federation by signing relevant Protocols provide such legally binding security
assurances to all States which have acceded to the agreements on NWFZs. These security assurances were reiterated by the Russian Federation in 1995 through the UN Security Council Resolution 984. We reaffirm these commitments and our intention to follow the same course as new Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are established.

The international community has gained considerable experience in establishing NWFZs. We consider it vitally important to bring agreements institutionalising such zones in line with well-established principles and parameters of creating NWFZs, as well as with the rules of international law. Violation of these requirements might complicate the process of legal recognition of NWFZs by nuclear-weapon States and providing them with relevant security assurances. In this context, we note the fundamental role of the 1999 Guiding Principles of the UN Commission on Disarmament as regards establishment and legalization of new NWFZs.

The Russian Federation highly appreciates 40-year experience of the effective functioning of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the first international legal document establishing nuclear-free status of the vast and highly populated region, and its contribution to the process of further establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the world.

Russia strictly abides by its commitments under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which sets forth obligations of nuclear-weapon States in regard of the States Parties to this Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

The historical significance of this document is that it provided a precedent for establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, having defined to a considerable extent the parameters of this process in other regions of the world.

We welcome the entry into force on March 21, 2009 of the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty (Semipalatinsk Treaty). We are confident that the Treaty will contribute to strengthening peace and stability in the region. The Treaty not only establishes the first Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the northern hemisphere,
which itself is very important, but also obliges its Parties to bring into force the Additional Protocol to their Nuclear Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. For the first time the Additional Protocol is set forth as a legally binding instrument. We consider it an important step towards strengthening the IAEA safeguards system and further consolidation of nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We note that the Semipalatinsk Treaty and its Protocol providing security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to States Parties to the Treaty are fully consistent with the norms of international law and take into account the Recommendations of the UN Disarmament Commission of 1999.

Signing and ratification of the Protocol by all five nuclear-weapon States can ensure full and efficient functioning of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. We believe that continuation of consultations between the States of Central Asia with the States which have concerns could facilitate eliminating such concerns. Russia is prepared to render further support in this work.

The situation in the sphere of the non-proliferation of WMD in the Middle East is the most complicated, while stability in the Middle East is important not only for regional but also for international security. There are still states in the region that have not yet placed their nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards and have not yet acceded to the NPT. Some countries remain outside the Conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biologic weapons (CWC and BWC).

We believe that the best way to comprehensively address non-proliferation issues in the Middle East and to ensure peace and security in the region would be to establish a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as stated in the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and confirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Russia is committed to the provisions of the 1995 Resolution. We are convinced that implementation of this Resolution in its entirety would contribute
to strengthening security of all Middle East states and certainly international security as well. In this connection, in 2009 at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference Russia proposed to undertake concrete steps to implement the 1995 Resolution and presented a set of measures which could help to advance in the implementation of the document, primarily through establishing a dialogue between all interested States. Our proposal was to hold an international conference or a meeting with participation of all interested states, first of all Middle East States, to consider the prospects of the implementation of this resolution in its entirety.

We also believe it appropriate to appoint a special coordinator who would be authorized to hold consultations with the Middle East states on this issue and during the further review process would present a report on the results of this work.

Moreover all States in the region need to sign and ratify the CTBT, to create a favorable climate for the establishment of a WMD-free zone. The States on which the Treaty’s entry into force depends could even now consider the possibility of ratifying the CTBT as a first step in this process and a confidence-building measure.

Another confidence-building measure we proposed is that all the Middle East countries to consider the possibility of their voluntary forgoing of indigenous development of capabilities for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, having emphasized that we do not question the right of states to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe that exercising this right would be best guaranteed through multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

Undoubtedly, the key constituent of establishing a zone free of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is placing all nuclear facilities of the region that are not yet subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards under such safeguards.

Russia is ready to continue the process of settling the remaining concerns relating to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South-East Asia (Bangkok Treaty) through dialogue between the nuclear-weapon States and the ASEAN countries.

ARTICLES VIII, IX, X

The Russian Federation is pleased to note that 190 States are now parties to the NPT, which makes it one of the most widely represented international agreements. To achieve the NPT universality, the Russian Federation is actively working both in bilateral and multilateral formats to have India, Pakistan and Israel join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. While strictly observing the provisions of article IX, the Russian Federation has not changed its stand as regards the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. We continue, in accordance with the Treaty, to consider them non-nuclear-weapon States and expect them to comply with Security Council resolution 1172.

As regards the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the Treaty, the Russian Federation is taking a very active part in the process of settling the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula.

Being aware of its responsibility as a Party to the NPT as well as its Depositary, the Russian Federation underlines the exceptional sensitivity of the issue relating to withdrawal of States from the NPT. We consider it necessary to minimize the possibility of situations where States refuse to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. We believe that enhancing the responsibility of States for making a decision to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with
article X could be one of the ways to strengthen the NPT. This objective could be achieved through the adoption of a number of political measures and procedures which would be applied in such cases. However, such actions should not lead to a revision of the provisions of the NPT or to the reopening it.