Policy Memo

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1. On the Iranian problem for discussion by the RF and US presidents:

- progress (or results) of the fulfilment of Geneva agreements on the IRI nuclear programme (20.01.14 – 20.07.14);
- possibilities and conditions for conclusion, on the basis of the fulfilment by the parties of the Geneva agreement, of a comprehensive Treaty on the IRI Nuclear Programme removing the Iranian nuclear problem from the agenda of world policy;
- possibilities for RF and US cooperation with Iran in the field of stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of foreign troops from there;
- possibilities for RF and US cooperation with Iran in the field of stabilization of the situation in Iraq;
- possibilities for RF and US cooperation with Iran in the field of combat against drug trafficking;
- possibilities for RF and US cooperation with Iran in the field of combat against international terrorism;
- Iranian-Arab (Shia-Sunni) standoff and joint Russo-American measures to relax tension over these problems;
- possibilities, conditions and prospects for Iran’s involvement in the collective security system in the zone of the Persian Gulf.

2. Is there a missile threat on the part of the IRI?

The creation of nuclear weapons in the absence of means of their delivery makes no sense. Having a substantial capacity in the field of missile engineering, Iran, during President Ahmadinejad’s term in office (2005-13), was absorbing Soviet, North Korean and Chinese missile technologies at accelerated rates with a view to develop medium-range ballistic missiles, which in the Near and Middle East undoubtedly have a strategic significance. As a result, created and passed into service were the liquid-fuelled missiles Shehab-3 (Shehab-3M) and Gadr-1 (in various modifications with a range of operation from 1,300 to 2,000 km). In the nearest future it is possible to finish work for the creation of the solid-fuelled missile Sajil-2 (about 2,500-3,000 km). This makes it possible not only to offset the technical preponderance of the military air forces of Arab countries, which are actively purchasing aviation equipment in the West, but also to ensure in prospect a missile deterrence of Israel. However, it is too early as yet to speak of the possibility of fitting out the missiles indicated above with nuclear warheads, still less of the development of a ballistic
missile of intercontinental range of fire. According to the data of the London-based Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), it will take about ten years for Tehran to create solid-fuelled missiles with a range of operation of 4,000-5,000 km, and an equal time in addition to create an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Other missile carriers at IRI disposal are of little avail for reliable delivery of a nuclear charge over a considerable distance.

Even today Iranian missiles enable Tehran to keep in check the Near and Middle Eastern region, including Israel, and also the countries of Central Asia. Iranian missiles bear a certain threat to the armed forces of the United States and their allies deployed in the region. They are capable of covering not only military bases but also industrial centers, oil and gas production facilities and oil-and-gas infrastructure in general.

However, at present and not less than a decade from now Iranian missiles do not present a threat to Western Europe, much less to the USA. Besides, without a nuclear warhead the application of long-range ballistic missiles is absolutely ineffective and generally absurd.

3. The IRI nuclear programme. Should it be discussed today or postponed until later

Iran’s nuclear programme in its potential may pose a threat not only to the region. Therefore it is subject to discussion, constant monitoring and inspection by all means available.

However, Iranian missiles will constitute a threat only when equipped with nuclear weapons. Therefore a positive solution to the Iranian nuclear problem will also take the issue of the threat of Iranian missiles off the table, especially in the global strategic sense.

4. What is the attitude towards the full nuclear fuel cycle in Iran?

The question is: why at all do Iranians need industrial infrastructure for the enrichment of uranium and production of nuclear fuel if they have just one Bushehr nuclear power plant supplied with fuel by Russia. If the Iranian nuclear energy project - 7-8 power generating units (which is doubtful in the nearest future) is implemented, the countries that will have built the nuclear power plants in Iran will supply them with exclusively own-produced fuel. Iran will not be able to build a nuclear power plant of required industrial capacity on its own in the coming decades.

World experience testifies that facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) (enrichment of uranium and separation of plutonium) are owned only by states either possessing nuclear weapons (and it is for these purposes that the NFC was created in the first place) or by countries having a developed nuclear power generation industry. Twelve countries – Russia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, South Africa, India and Pakistan – have (or had in the past) major complexes for the
enrichment of uranium – and all of them created nuclear weapons on the basis of that technology. Enrichment plants also exist in Brazil, which initially created them also for military purposes but later relinquished them. In addition, non-nuclear states with developed nuclear engineering have enrichment plants: Japan (54 reactors), Germany (18 reactors) and the Netherlands (4 reactors). The FRG and the Netherlands have NFC facilities in the framework of the multilateral URENCO company (in which the United Kingdom and the United States also participate).

Another NFC component is the separation of plutonium from the reactors’ irradiated fuel. The construction of a heavy-water reactor AT Arak presupposes the possibility of separation of plutonium for peaceful or military aims. Eleven states now have such technology: Russia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, Israel, India, North Korea (all of them have created nuclear weapons on the basis of plutonium). Such technology is also possessed by the FRG, Japan and South Korea (20 reactors), which use plutonium for the production of mixed reactor fuel. In Iran there is neither the production of such fuel, nor the corresponding reactors.

Without developed nuclear engineering the enrichment of uranium or separation of plutonium are economically unjustified, all the more so given the abundant supply of low enriched uranium on the world market.

Specialists believe that standalone production of nuclear fuel is economically profitable if in the country there functions not less than ten nuclear units of atomic power plants. Otherwise the cost of fuel will be 3-7 times higher than on the world market. The Iranian situation with its nuclear programme is akin to that if, for example, a country where there are no automobiles in defiance of economic expediency is building plants for the production of petrol and a whole network of filling stations.