WMD Nonproliferation Regimes: Current Threats and Challenges

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Moscow, 2015
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PIR Center at the 2015 NPT Review Conference


EVENTS SCHEDULE

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<thead>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30.08.2015</td>
<td>PIR Center International School on Global Security, August 30 – September 6, 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LATEST BLOG ENTRY

Strategic Friendship in Asymmetric Domain
09.05.2015
Oleg Demidov

Implementation of the signed agreement might present a challenge for its parties, and particularly Russia, in certain important aspects. On a number of issues, Moscow seems to be more interested than its Eastern partner is. This could also be true for the paragraph on internationalization and democratization of the Internet governance mechanism, in which the official Russian approach has been embedded. Russia’s goal is to achieve transition of control over critical technical business processes (including the IANA and VeriSign functions related to management of the DNS Root Zone) under the jurisdiction of international bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union.
Chapter ONE

Weapon of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems
What are Weapons of Mass Destruction?

• Nuclear Weapons (NW)

• Chemical Weapons (CW)

• Biological Weapons (BW)

• Delivery Systems
Use of WMD (1)

NUCLEAR – Hiroshima
(approximately 135,000 casualties)¹


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Use of WMD (2)

French soldier wearing respirator, World War I

Bodies of Kurds exhumed from a mass grave in Iraq

Chemical weapons

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Use of WMD (3)

Biological weapons

5 casualties
Photos of letters mailed to US senators containing anthrax, October 2001

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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)

Entered into force on April 29, 1997

191 member states (as for 08.08.2015)

- Signed and ratified
- Acceded
- Signed but not ratified
- Non-signatory

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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC)

Entered into force on March 26, 1975

171 member states (as for 07.07.2015)

- Signed and ratified
- Acceded
- Signed but not ratified
- Non-signatory

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Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

Established in April 1987

34 member states (as for 07.07.2015)

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Chapter TWO

The Basis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The **Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime** represents a set of international agreements and organizations with participation of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, and also of internal legislation of participating states who have the aim of preventing other states from acquiring a nuclear-weapon state status, if they have not possessed such status by 1967.

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Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The subject of the regime is all Nuclear Explosive Devices (NED), and also materials and the equipment and technologies required for their manufacturing.

Representative weapon casings for nuclear bombs used in World War II

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Three Pillars of Nonproliferation Regime

- Nonproliferation
- Disarmament
- Peaceful use of nuclear energy

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1)

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

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438 nuclear power reactors on operation as of 06.07.2015 (1)

Source: IAEA Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, 06.07.2015 // http://www.iaea.org/pris/
438 nuclear power reactors on operation as for 07.07.2015 (2)

Source: IAEA Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, 07.07.2015 // http://www.iaea.org/pris/

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Chapter THREE

Key Challenges for Nuclear Disarmament
ARTICLE VI

• Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Total amount of nuclear warheads in the world 1947 - 2013 (deployed and non-deployed)
### Nuclear-weapon states arsenals (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Deployed strategic nuclear warheads</th>
<th>Ready-to-use nonstrategic nuclear warheads</th>
<th>Non-deployed nuclear warheads</th>
<th>Total nuclear warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>4,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PIR Center Project «Nuclear Nine», 2014, [www.nuclearnine.pircenter.org](http://www.nuclearnine.pircenter.org)
SIPRI Yearbook, 2013

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“We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all concerned nations.”
Estimated US and Russian Strategic Nuclear Warheads by 2017

Source: Federation of American Scientists

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Nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe

- 180 bombs roughly
- 6 bases in 5 countries


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ARTICLE VII

• Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

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Conference on establishing WMD-free zone in the Middle East

• During the 2010 NPT Review Conference it was decided to hold a **Conference on establishing the zone free of WMD and delivery systems in the Middle East in 2012** with participation of all region states.

• In **November, 2012** Conference, planned for December, was cancelled due to US unwillingness to convene the Conference.

• The Conference **did not happen** prior to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
The Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ)

- Opened for signature: **September 8, 2006**
- Entered into force: **March 21, 2009**
- States parties – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

**Details:**

1. The only NWFZ in the Northern hemisphere;
2. First treaty, that contained a provision on recognition of the environmental damage linked to research, testing, and development of nuclear weapons;
3. Treaty members must provide conditions for universal overseeing for peaceful use of nuclear energy on the Treaty covered territory by the IAEA;
4. Border with four states having nuclear weapons – Russia, China, India and Pakistan.

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The 2015 NPT Review Conference
(27 April - 22 May, 2015)

Details:

1. Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France ratified the Protocol on the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone; the U.S. introduced the Protocol in the Senate.

2. The contradictions between the five nuclear-weapon States and the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states on disarmament are intensified.

3. The final document was blocked by the U.S., Canada and the U.K., who were disagreed with the Protocol on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

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Chapter FOUR

Regions of Concern
Nuclear proliferation in the world: 1945 - 2015

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Nuclear Nonproliferation on the Middle East

Countries which violated the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the past or are being suspected of such violation at present

Source: PIR Center, SIPRI

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Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation on the Middle East

Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Peaceful Nuclear Energy on the Middle East

Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Israel

Probably did not conduct any nuclear tests, though Israel’s complicity in the mysterious 1979 “flash” in the South Atlantic cannot be ruled out

NPT Member – No

CTBT Status – Signed but not ratified

Nuclear warheads – 100-200

Sources:
SIPRI YEARBOOK, 2012

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Chemical Weapons in Syria

1,300 tones of chemicals and precursors (Sarin, VX, Sulfur mustard)

>1,200 unarmed chemical projectiles

23 chemical facilities

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UN Security Council Resolution № 2118
September 27, 2013

23.06.2014 – All declared chemical weapons were shipped out of Syria.

10.07.2015 – 98.8% of Syria's chemical weapons, residues destroyed
“In late 2001 or early 2002, Libya received from the network documentation in relation to nuclear weapon design and manufacturing, but has stated that it had never carried out any work on the study or development of an actual nuclear weapon.

IAEA concluded that Libya does not have the necessary capabilities to design or manufacture nuclear weapons components. Nor did the Agency find any indications of work related to nuclear weapons development’

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

IAEA, 12 September 2008

In December 2003, Libya announced that it renounced its nuclear weapons program

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Iranian Nuclear Program

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
Source: http://news.made.ru

Iran's Arak facility
Source: www.payvand.com/news

Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
Source: www.nti.org

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India

First NW test - 18 May 1974

Last NW test - 13 May 1998

Largest yield test – 20-60 kT
Pokhran-II (May 11, 1998)

Total tests - 6 detonations

Deployed warhears – 80-100

Sources:
International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2013,
www.fissilematerials.org
Arms Control Association Country Resources, 2013,
www.armscontrol.org/countryresources
123 Agreement

- August 1, 2007 – India and US signed 123 Agreement
- September 9, 2008 – 45 Nuclear Suppliers Group members agreed to open nuclear market for India
- October 9, 2008 – US Congress ratified 123 Agreement with India
Pakistan

First NW test - 28 May 1998

Last NW test - 30 May 1998

Largest yield test – 25-36 kT in 1998

Total tests - 6 detonations

Deployed warheads – 80-100

Sources:
ABDUL QADEER KHAN is a Pakistani nuclear scientist and metallurgical engineer. The Head of the Network.

BUHARY SAYED ABU TAHIR (Sri Lanka)

GOTTHARD LERCH, a German citizen residing in Switzerland, worked for LEYBOLD HERAEUS, a German company that is alleged to have produced vacuum technology equipment.

FRIEDRICH TINNER and his sons, mechanical engineer, alleged to have had dealings with the nuclear arms expert since 1980s, was reported to have prepared certain centrifuge components, including safety valves.

PETER GRIFFIN, a citizen of UK who has business interests in DUBAI and currently residing in FRANCE. Alleged to have supplied the lay-out plan for the Machine Shop 1001 as a workshop to enable LIBYA to produce centrifuge.

German citizen GERHARD VISSEW was the managing director of Randburg company Krish Engineering.

Swiss citizen DANIEL GEIGES worked for Randburg company Krish Engineering as a project manager.

JOHAN ANDRIES MULLER MEYER, the citizen of South Africa Republic, the director of Tradefin Engineering. The main witness in the South African process.

Countries furnished know-how & materials

Countries received nuclear technologies
Abdul Qadeer Khan International Network Supplied Nuclear Technologies to the Following Countries:

- **Iran** (first transfer in about 1987)
- **Libya** (first transfer approximately in about 1997)
- **North Korea** (cooperation began in 1993)
- **Iraq** (nuclear technologies offers in 1990)
North Korea

- **March 12, 1993** – North Korea’s notification of withdrawal from the NPT
- **October 21, 1994** – Agreed Framework between the USA and DPRK
- **January 10, 2003** – North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- **August 27, 2003** – the beginning of the six-nation nuclear talks in Beijing, which include China, US, Japan, Russia, and South Korea
- **October 9, 2006** – North Korea conducted first nuclear test;
- **May 25, 2009** – North Korea conducted second nuclear test
- **February 12, 2013** – North Korea conducted third nuclear test

**Sources:**

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Chapter FIVE

Current Status of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime:
1995 – 2013... 2015
The Extension of the NPT: the Top Issue of the 1995 NPT Conference

ARTICLE X

Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

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The Goals of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

- **To extend** the Treaty and to define the period of extension in accordance with article X.2
- **To review** the operation and implementation of the Treaty by Member States during previous 5 years (1991-1995) as well as 25 year period (1970-1995) of its existence
- **To work out** recommendations to increase effectiveness of the Treaty
- **To assist** in achieving the universal status of the Treaty, that is joining all States in the Treaty

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Results of the Conference

- **Acceptance** of a legally binding decision about extension of the NPT according to article X, paragraph 2
- **Confirmation** of the perpetual indefinitely extension of the NPT
- **Acceptance** of a decision about extension of the NTP without voting, practically by consensus
- **Approval** of a mechanism of improving NPT review process in the future

“The surgery has been a success; the patient is alive but is still in the emergency room.”

Dr. Vladimir Orlov
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

- **24th April – 20th May, 2000 – New York, USA;**

- **Features of the conference:**
  - It is no need to speak about the future of the Treaty: it has already been extended for an indefinite period of time;
  - The nuclear-weapon states have significant contradictions among them;
  - The new active participant: New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden);
  - Iran and North Korea.

- **An unequivocal undertaking** by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI.

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2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Regrettably, there are times when multilateral forums tend merely to reflect, rather than mend, deep rifts over how to confront the threats we face. Today, the treaty faces a dual crisis of compliance and confidence. Delegates at the month-long conference could not furnish the world with any solutions to the grave nuclear threats we all face. And while arriving at an agreement can be more challenging in a climate of crisis, it is also at such times that it is all the more imperative to do so.


Dr. Vladimir Orlov
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**Key issues:**

1. Nuclear Disarmament;
2. States out of NPT, including Middle East problem
3. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, including international approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle
4. NPT non-compliance
5. Withdrawal from NPT

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2010 Review Conference Final Document (1)

• Final document included:
• Specific action plans on nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, consisting from 64 paragraphs;
• Proposed steps for implementing the 1995 Resolution calling for a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East.
• Support to the efforts, aimed on training of the qualified personnel for peaceful nuclear energy use.

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2010 Review Conference Final Document (2)

- **Nuclear Disarmament Section:**
  - Reduce and after eliminate all types of nuclear weapons
  - Reduce global nuclear weapon stockpiles of all types
  - Diminish the value of nuclear weapons in all military concepts and doctrines, force development and safety promotion strategies
  - Negotiate the conditions, which could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and lead to the elimination of this weapons in future
  - Reduce the risks of occasional and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons

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• **Peaceful Nuclear Energy Use Section:**
  • Developing the approaches for internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle
  • Supporting the efforts aimed on peaceful nuclear energy qualified personnel training
  • Strengthening the technical cooperation program, sponsored by the IAEA, aimed on providing support of the developing states on peaceful use of nuclear energy
2015 NPT Review Conference (1)

- US - Russia confrontation
- European security drastic deterioration
- Middle East states’ disappointment of the lack of progress in Israel’s accession to the NPT
- Lack of progress in Middle East WMD-free zone dialogue
- Multilateral disarmament profound crisis:
  - Stagnation at the Conference on Disarmament
  - Ratification process of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty not completed
- Escalating tensions in East Asia (DPRK)
2015 NPT Review Conference (2)

**Key issues:**

1. Nuclear Disarmament;
2. WMD-free zone in the Middle East;

**Key groups:**

1. P5;
2. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI);
3. Disarmament radicals
4. League of Arab States
2015 NPT Review Conference (3)

The Conference concluded **without** the adoption of a **Final Document**

**Key consequences:**

1. The lack of new action plan in the field of non-proliferation till 2020;
2. The issue on convening the Conference on WMD-free zone in the Middle East remained unsettled;
3. Disagreements on disarmament issues may lead to attempts to sign a document, prohibiting nuclear weapons.

V.A. Orlov
Chapter SIX

Key Nuclear Proliferation Challenges for this Decade
Key Problems for the Nuclear Nonproliferation

1. Nuclear disarmament process is insufficiently effective;
2. India, Pakistan and Israel refuse to join the NPT;
3. Several states violate NPT provisions;
4. Nuclear and missile technology proliferation networks became a part of reality;
5. Non-state actors seek access to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.

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6 Steps towards further Nuclear Disarmament:

1. Nuclear-weapon states accept the commitments not to increase their nuclear stockpiles.
2. Nuclear-weapon states renounce the onshore deployment of nuclear weapons beyond their national borders.
3. Nuclear-weapon states renounce the development of new types of nuclear weapons.
4. All nuclear-weapon states together must start to work on a Treaty for non-orbiting and non-deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space.
5. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty must be universalized.
6. Nuclear disarmament must become a part of global military budget cuts.

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and nuclear test
(opened for signature in 1996)
CTBT Annex 2 States
(States whose signature and ratification are required for the Treaty to enter into force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
«[To] achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned»

Barack Obama
Prague Speech (April 9, 2009)
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FCMT)

«A necessary condition for the success of FMCT negotiations is carrying them out within the Conference on Disarmament, and not anywhere else. That is the only way to ensure the participations of all key actors»
Sergey Lavrov
Russian Foreign Minister
March 1, 2011

«If efforts to start negotiations in the CD continue to stall, then those governments that wish to negotiate an FMCT will have to consider other options for moving this process forward»
Rose Gottemoeller
US Deputy State Secretary
October 5, 2010
## States of Concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>NPT member</th>
<th>CTBT status</th>
<th>Number of nuclear tests</th>
<th>IAEA membership</th>
<th>Transfer of nuclear technology to other countries</th>
<th>Physical security of military nuclear infrastructure facilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Signed, not ratified</td>
<td>n/a*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
<td>2***</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Since 1985**</td>
<td>Not signed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Probably did not conduct any nuclear tests, though Israel’s complicity in the mysterious 1979 “flash” in the South Atlantic cannot be ruled out

** North Korea initiated its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 and announced the resumption of NPT withdrawal procedure on January 10, 2003

*** Pakistan has conducted two underground nuclear tests, detonating a total of six nuclear devices

Source: "NPT-2010: strengthening the regime". Moscow, PIR Center, 2010.
States non-parties to the NPT (1)

**Israel**
Dimona nuclear facility that is the key element of Israel’s Nuclear Weapon Program

**South Sudan**

**India**
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the premier Indian research center carries out research in areas of nuclear research and development.

**Pakistan**
Uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta which has been developing actively since the beginning 1990.

**DPRK**
Yongbyon Nuclear Complex
States non-parties to the NPT (2)

- Ratification of the CTBT as soon as possible;
- Providing the access for IAEA inspectors to the Dimona nuclear facility;
- Early start of negotiations on WMD-free zone in the Middle East creation;
- Step by step NPT accession as a non-nuclear state.

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States non-parties to the NPT (3)

- Ratification of the CTBT as soon as possible;
- Renounce the blocking of FCMT negotiations start on the Conference on Disarmament;
- Providing IAEA with comprehensive information on nuclear materials proliferation taken place;
- Step by step NPT accession as a non-nuclear state.

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States non-parties to the NPT (4)

• Ratification of the CTBT as soon as possible;
• Implementation of the obligations under US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement from October 10, 2008 (123 agreement);
• Peaceful nuclear activity under Nuclear Suppliers Group 6 September 2008 decisions.
States non-parties to the NPT (5)

• Moratorium on nuclear test and further CTBT accession

• The implementation of the agreements in the six-nation talks framework with focus on regaining NPT membership of DPRK as a non-nuclear state

• Participation, along with South Korea, in a Korean Peninsula denuclearization process
States Non-Parties to the NPT (6)

North Korea talks are deadlocked
DPRK expands nuclear weapon and missile programmes

♦ Goal - denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, DPRK's return to the NPT, restoration of the IAEA safeguards
♦ P5 to initiate consultations on this issue
♦ South Korea and Japan to avoid pressures for further proliferation in the region
♦ Steps to encourage cooperation: humanitarian assistance and economic aid, easing of sanctions security assurances помошь
Responses: Use of Force

June 7, 1981
Israel's air strike against the Osirak reactor

An Israeli F-16 pilot's view as he lines up on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.

September 6, 2007
Israel's air attack against Syria

Syrian reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into it.

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Responses: Sticks (sanctions)

Iraq

South Africa

Libya

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Responses: Carrots

Ukraine

Iran

North Korea

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Nuclear Security and Nuclear Terrorism

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all states shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

• develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and transport;

• develop and maintain appropriate and effective border controls to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking in such items;

• establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate and effective national export and trans-shipment of such items.
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

- Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005
- Opened for signature in September 2005
- Signatories: 115, Parties: 99
- Provides for a definition of acts of nuclear terrorism and covers a broad range of possible targets, including those against nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors
- Encourages States to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings.

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Nuclear Security Summits

1996 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit
April 19-20
Moscow, Russia

2010 Nuclear Security Summit
April 12-13
Washington, USA

2012 Nuclear Security Summit
March 26-27
Seoul, South Korea

2014 Nuclear Security Summit
March 24-25
The Hague, Netherlands

2016 Nuclear Security Summit
Chicago, the U.S.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

NPT 2020

Nonproliferation
Disarmament
Peaceful use of nuclear energy

Dr. Vladimir Orlov
PIR Center at the 2015 NPT Review Conference


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<td>PIR Center International School on Global Security, August 30 - September 6, 2015</td>
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LATEST BLOG ENTRY

09.05.2015
Oleg Demidov

Implementation of the signed agreement might present a challenge for its parties, and particularly Russia, in certain important aspects. On a number of issues, Moscow seems to be more interested than its Eastern partner is. This could also be true for the paragraph on internationalization and democratization of the Internet governance mechanism, in which the official Russian approach has been embedded. Russia’s goal is to achieve transition of control over critical technical business processes (including the IANA and VeriSign functions related to management of the DNS Root Zone) under the jurisdiction of international bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union.