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## **PIR Center's Recommendations for Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime**

**2010 – 2015**

In 2010-2015, PIR Center has prepared three nongovernmental White Papers exploring the possibilities to strengthen different aspects of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In 2010, on the sidelines of the NPT Review Conference in New York, PIR Center presented White Paper “**NPT 2010 – Strengthening the Regime**”. In 2013, at the Second Preparatory Committee to the NPT Review Conference in Geneva, White Paper “**Ten Steps toward a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East**” was presented. In 2014, at the Third Preparatory Committee to the NPT Review Conference in New York, White Paper “**Towards Nuclear Disarmament: NPT Article VI and Implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Decisions**” was presented.

This paper focuses in following up on PIR Center's recommendations on implementation of the article VI of the NPT and creation of the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East: two main challenging areas that can potentially damage the whole nuclear nonproliferation regime architecture – or strengthen it, if dealt with properly and in a timely manner.

PIR Center is an independent nongovernmental organization, which carries out research, as well as educational, public awareness and publishing activities. From the time of its founding in April 1994 to this day, the priority areas of the Center's research studies remain international security, arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. PIR Center is in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council.

“Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation” is one of the key programs of PIR Center. In the framework of the program a number of projects is implemented that cover Iranian nuclear issue, peaceful nuclear energy development and the perspectives of the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, place and role of Russia within the nuclear nonproliferation regime.



## Follow Up on PIR Center's Recommendations on Nuclear Disarmament: 2010-2015

<u>PIR Center Proposals</u>	<u>Status as of 2015:</u>
The nuclear weapon states commit not to station their nuclear weapons beyond their national territories	<p> - recommendation was implemented</p> <p> - some progress made</p> <p> - no progress made</p> <p> US nuclear weapons are still stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey</p>
<p>At the end of Cold War following the unilateral initiatives by Presidents Gorbachev (1991) and Yeltsin (1992), Soviet/Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe were withdrawn to the national territory by June of 1992.</p> <p>At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Republic of Belarus proposed creation of the Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Central and Eastern Europe.</p> <p>Such a zone could include Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria.</p>	
The Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty should become multilateral	<p> Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly (October 25, 2007) that proposed multilaterization of the INF Treaty did not have a follow up</p>
<p>Russia and the United States should begin talks on missile defense cooperation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ renewal of joint training exercises;</li> <li>➤ ensuring a maximum level of transparency of the two</li> </ul>	<p> Talks between Russia and the United States on missile defense have been stopped in 2014</p> <p> NATO have stated that it will not change it missile defense plans after</p>

<p>countries' missile defense programs;</p> <p>➤ creating a joint center (or centers) to exchange data, analyze and assess threats of missile attacks against NATO or Russia</p>	<p>comprehensive deal on Iranian nuclear program</p>
<p>Russia and the United States should announce that they have completely abandoned the development of strategic non-nuclear weapons.</p>	<p> The United States continue to develop its Prompt Global Strike program</p>
<p>All NPT members should reiterate their commitment to fulfill the obligations under Article VI</p>	<p> There is no inclusive discussion between the NWS and NNWS on further nuclear and conventional arms reductions</p>
<p>It is necessary to launch multilateral talks on banning the placement of weapons in space. The Russian-Chinese draft of a treaty banning the placement of weapons in space, or some other mutually acceptable draft, could be used as a starting point for such talks.</p>	<p> The main venue for the talks – Conference on Disarmament – remains blocked</p> <p> The USA and the EU oppose the proposed draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects and prefer to discuss the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities</p>
<p>All states that have yet to ratify the CTBT must do so without reservations. Until then, all countries without exception should declare a moratorium on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and on nuclear tests.</p>	<p> 8 Annex 2 states have yet to ratify the Treaty, (China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the USA)</p>

## PIR Center Proposals on Nuclear Disarmament for the Upcoming Review Cycles

- Russia and the United States should declare that they will not increase their stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, release data on stockpiles, officially state that nuclear warheads are being stored separately from the delivery systems
- Russia and the United States should begin new bilateral talks on further strategic offensive arms reductions to 1,000 or fewer warheads apiece. They should also discuss limitations on deployed strategic systems, launchers, and non-deployed strategic warheads
- Russia and the United States should announce that they have abandoned all programs to develop strategic offensive arms with non-nuclear warheads.
- In the Conference on Disarmament framework, all states that possess nuclear weapons should make simultaneous unilateral statements not to increase their nuclear arsenals; not to station nuclear weapons beyond their own borders; and not to develop new types of nuclear ammunition or delivery systems.
- All the countries which have yet to ratify the CTBT must do so without any reservations.
- An ad hoc body should be set up in the Conference of Disarmament framework to deal with the most pressing arms control issues.
- All states that possess nuclear weapons should begin multilateral negotiations on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles and on preventing the placement of weapons in space.
- In order to lay the ground for the launch of a multilateral process of reductions of all types of nuclear weapons, the states that possess nuclear weapons should begin consultations in the Conference on Disarmament framework to produce common nuclear weapons definitions and classification. They should also release their nuclear doctrines into the public domain, stating the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies, as well the numbers and types of their nuclear weapons.
- PIR Center recommends that UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters review the implementation and revisit the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education taking into account lessons learned, experience generated in this field, and new technological realities facilitating distance learning.

**Follow up on PIR Center’s recommendations  
on the creation of the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East  
2010-2015**

<p>All participants in the talks to establish a WMD-free zone should make joint statements in which they commit themselves to refrain from attacks (including cyberattacks), or threats of attacks, against each other’s declared nuclear facilities placed under IAEA Safeguards.</p>	<p> A number of states in the region continue to plan or endorse (officially or privately) strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities</p>
<p>As part of the negotiations, the participants should draw a Road Map for gradually placing all nuclear infrastructure facilities in the region under the IAEA safeguards.</p>	<p> Under the comprehensive agreement with the P5+1 Iran is expected to implement the modified code 3.1 to the Safeguards Agreement which will put its new facilities under safeguards once their construction starts</p> <p> No progress was made on placing relevant Israeli nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards</p>
<p>During the talks, all the states in the region should reach an understanding on the need to ratify without any further delay the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.</p>	<p> Under the comprehensive agreement with the P5+1 Iran is expected to ratify the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards agreement</p>
<p>The process could be facilitated by a decision to form a standing regional mechanism for confidence building measures with regard to nuclear programs, as well as chemical and biological weapons and some types of delivery systems.</p>	<p> No regional mechanism for confidence building measures was created</p> <p> The region continues being divided along the national and sectarian lines</p>

<p>Participation of all the Middle Eastern states in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be a precondition for signing a treaty establishing a WMD-free zone in the region.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Iraq has ratified the CTBT in 2013</li> <li> Three Annex 2 states in the region: Egypt, Iran and Israel have not ratified the treaty</li> </ul>
<p>Delivery systems should not be at the top of the agenda of the talks on establishing the WMD-free zone. Nevertheless, signing agreements to ban certain types of missiles would help build confidence and establish verification mechanisms in the region.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Countries in the region continue to develop and test new types of missiles</li> </ul>
<p>The negotiations should lead to a decision to set up an intergovernmental commission to draft the text of the treaty establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Regional powers failed to agree on the parameters of the conference to discuss possible aspects of future zone</li> </ul>
<p>Internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle would strengthen international cooperation in the region and reduce the likelihood of some countries choosing to pursue nuclear weapons programs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Despite some positive responses from the officials, the idea of the regional nuclear fuel cycle remains in the academic field</li> <li> In case a comprehensive agreement on Iranian nuclear program is reached, there will be a new possibility to revive the project</li> </ul>
<p>Institutional nuclear cooperation in the Middle East should be strengthened through the creation of a universal body, which would include every country in the region.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> Arab Atomic Energy Agency remains underdeveloped and not up to task of promoting nuclear energy cooperation</li> </ul>
<p>The states of the Middle East, which are on the verge of a rapid expansion of their nuclear infrastructure, should establish reliable mechanisms for early warning in the event of a nuclear accident.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> All the countries in the Middle East except for Syria are parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident</li> </ul>