



“U.S.-Russian Dialogue on the NPT Review Process: Ideas from Next Generation”

What Should the US and Russia Do on Article VI?

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Policy Recommendations

Main objectives

- Preserving the existing disarmament and arms control architecture
- Further strengthening and developing Russian-U.S dialogue on disarmament

issues as well as creating a healthy environment for doing so

- Bridging the gap between NWS and NNWS by demonstrating to the NNWS that the US and Russia remain committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament and are willing to adhere to the Article VI of the NPT.

Broad Strokes

- Engage with the NNWS
- Work on common goals within the NPT framework
- Employ a set of measures to sustain and advance strategic stabilization dialogue between Russia and the US

Engaging the NNWS

Short-term goals: Bridge the divide between NWS and NNWS, bring **together** the opponents and proponents of the treaty, make the 2020 Review Conference process productive and constructive.

Long-term goals: ensuring that the TPNW would not be undermining the NPT and helping to incorporate the TPNW into the existing NPT regime strengthening and complementing it instead of making it a competing structure.

Hinge countries

NAC	NPDI	Humanitarian CG*	NAM?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Brazil</u> • <u>Egypt</u> • <u>Ireland</u> • <u>Mexico</u> • <u>New Zealand</u> • <u>South Africa</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Australia • Canada • <u>Chile</u> • Germany • <u>Mexico</u> • Netherlands • Japan • <u>Nigeria</u> • <u>Philippines</u> • Poland • Turkey • <u>UAE</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Austria • <u>Brazil</u> • <u>Chile</u> • <u>Costa Rica</u> • <u>Egypt</u> • <u>Ireland</u> • <u>Mexico</u> • <u>New Zealand</u> • <u>Nigeria</u> • <u>Philippines</u> • Switzerland? <p style="font-size: small; margin-top: 10px;">*Based on the list of cosponsors of the WP on the Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons submitted for the Second NPT PrepCom (Geneva, 23 April – 4 May 2018).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Azerbaijan • <u>Chile</u> • Cuba • Indonesia • Malaysia • <u>Nigeria</u> • Peru • <u>Philippines</u> • <u>South Africa</u> • <u>UAE</u> <p style="font-size: small; margin-top: 10px;">Observers: Argentina, <u>Brazil</u>, <u>Costa Rica</u>, Kazakhstan, <u>Mexico</u>.</p>

*Source: Pursuing Consensus on Disarmament Agenda at the 2020 Review Conference: Recommendations for Russia and the United States.
By **Alain Ponce Blancas***

Engaging the NNWS

- Draft out working papers on future possible disarmament initiatives and propositions
- Establish “consultation mechanisms” involving P5 and NNWS key groupings
- Issue a joint P5 statement acknowledging the reality of TPNW and disarmament agenda.

Address Strategic Balance issues

Short-term goals: Address NNWS concerns about heightened risk of nuclear war. Demonstrate that both countries are responsible nuclear powers.

Long-term goals: develop an arms control architecture that can answer challenges stemming from new military technologies and lead to framework for mutual assured stability that in turn enables further disarmament process.

Addressing strategic balance issues

- Extend New START
- Resolve the INF Treaty compliance issues through establishing technical inspections
- Russia and the US must reaffirm and update a joint comprehensive Agreement on the Prevention of the Nuclear War
- Conduct strategic stability talks

Work on common goals within the NPT framework

Short-term goal: demonstrate how established and recognized NWS approved institutes can help strengthen the regime, acquire substantial progress on the disarmament agenda issue

Long-term goal: advance international verification methodologies, create a reliable environment for future disarmament

Work on common goals within the NPT framework

- Improving and maintaining verification standards through active involvement of Russia and China in the work of IPNDV.
- Focus on immediate issues of prevention of nuclear war and cessation of arms race, transparency in armaments and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.
- Actively pursue adoption of FMCT through pressure on Pakistan or overturning the consensus rule.